CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK


FOURTH FORMAL NEGOTIATION MEETING OF CONTRIBUTORS

TO THE SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (UNIFIED)

TO BE HELD IN BARBADOS

OCTOBER 24 AND 25, 2012


DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE ROLE OF THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN
ENHANCING CITIZEN SECURITY IN THE REGION

The attached Paper has been revised based on comments/questions from the Contributors at the Third Formal Negotiation Meeting of Contributors to the Special Development Fund (Unified) which was held in Barbados on July 19 - 20, 2012.  Contributors are asked to note that:

(a)     revisions to the document are highlighted for ease of reference and reflect the comments/queries raised by SDF Contributors in the following areas:

   (i)      Partnerships and Coordination;

   (ii)     Internal Capacity; and

   (iii)    Gap Analysis.

**CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK**



**SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (UNIFIED)**

**DISCUSSION PAPER ON
THE ROLE OF THE CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
IN ENHANCING CITIZEN SECURITY IN THE REGION**

<u>**SEPTEMBER 2012**</u>

# **ABBREVIATIONS**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| BMC | - | Borrowing Member Country |
| BNTF | - | Basic Needs Trust Fund |
| CARICOM | - | Caribbean Community |
| CBO | - | Community-based Organisations |
| CDB | - | Caribbean Development Bank |
| CHDR | - | Caribbean Human Development Report |
| CIDA | - | Canadian International Development Agency |
| DFID | - | Department for International Development of the United Kingdom |
| EU | - | European Union |
| GBV | - | Gender-based Violence |
| IDB | - | Inter-American Development Bank |
| NGOs | - | Non-governmental Organisations |
| OAS | - | Organisation of American States |
| SDF | - | Special Development Fund |
| UNDP | - | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNICEF | - | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNODC | - | United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime |
| USAID | - | United States Agency for International Development |
| WB | - | World Bank |

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

2. PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF CITIZEN SECURITY BY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

3. FRAMEWORK FOR CDB'S INVOLVEMENT IN CITIZEN SECURITY


# APPENDICES

1. EXCERPT FROM THE CARICOM COMMUNITY ACTION PLAN FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION 2009 – 2013

2. AREAS FOR CDB INTERVENTION

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.      The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Caribbean Human Development Report (CHDR) on Citizen Security 2012 indicates that there has been an increasing level of violent crime in some countries despite the efforts of the crime agencies in the state.  Increasing levels of violent crime have the potential to put at risk the performance of key productive sectors, particularly the hospitality industry, and render already fragile economies unattractive to investors. It can also frustrate entrepreneurial pursuit and impact productivity negatively.  The increase in violent crime has induced the population and policy-makers to divert resources from other more productive purposes, such as education, to activities related to security and protection.  The sharp increase in violent crimes has been attributed mainly to the drug trade.  However, although drug traffickers perpetrate the worst acts of violence, there is a whole spectrum of criminal activity from assault, robbery, petty theft and extortion to gender and intra-family violence.  Another worrying trend in the Caribbean is the increase in youth violence, (gang-related) including school-based violence.  The rising levels of crime are rooted in growing inequality, high levels of unemployment, and an increase in the levels of social exclusion of the poor population, especially among young men, and the lack of trust in the formal judicial system.

2.      The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) recognises the urgency with which this issue must be addressed if the Region is not to lose the developmental momentum of the past two decades or worse, experience an erosion of the socio-economic gains attained.  Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) have also acknowledged their limitations in dealing with the severest cases of crime and violence which often times have a regional underpinning, particularly crime related to drug trafficking and the trade of illegal weapons.  Solutions to these crimes transcend national and regional boundaries. There is no one ideal approach to the prevention of crime and violence.  However, interventions that seek to address issues in poor communities, that target youth both as victims and perpetrators of crime; and reform of the criminal justice system, are approaches that can be pursued in preventing crime.

## CDB'S ROLE

3.      Citizen security is a central public policy issue that is worthy of serious attention by governments and development agencies.  Citizen security/insecurity can have a deleterious effect on economic and human capital growth in the Region and can impede the Bank in achieving its purpose as set out in the Charter "to contribute to the harmonious economic growth and development of the member countries in the Caribbean".  It is an issue which CDB cannot ignore.  However, CDB's approach must be informed by the Region's needs and challenges; its capacity; and the work of other Development Partners. The primary approach that is being recommended is a developmental one in accordance with CDB's mandate. The focus therefore should be on the prevention of crime and violence.

4.      The resources available from Special Development Fund (SDF) for citizen security projects will be dependent on the level of the SDF 8 replenishment, but are likely to be inadequate in relation to the scale of the Region's needs.  This will limit the size, number and type of the Bank's interventions, and suggests that to make the most of these resources, efforts should be made to seek and exploit synergies, in particular joint projects, with other development partners.  To the extent feasible, CDB would seek to leverage some of its resources with those of other partners to create additional, larger, and more efficient interventions in this field.  It will also encourage external development partners to use the Bank as a channel for some of their bilateral resources intended for citizen security operations, where appropriate. In working closely with development partners, CDB may provide support to BMCs for implementation of strategies developed by other agencies e.g. UNICEF's Safe Schools Programmes.  In other instances, there may be co-financing of activities, (e.g. UNDP CHDR dissemination) or financing of the expansion of existing programmes aimed at addressing youth-at-risk.

5.      CDB would also seek to mainstream citizen security, into the Bank's country investment projects (identification, preparation, design, appraisal, and supervision), Country Strategy Papers and technical assistance interventions.

6.       A Portfolio Manager within the Projects Department would be designated the focal point for citizen security within the Bank.  The six Operations Officers (Social Analysts and Gender Specialists) within the Projects Department will be further trained to provide the analytical inputs for citizen security concerns in the Bank's work.

7.      The Bank's programme of support for citizen security would rely not only on expertise available within the Bank, but also on outsourcing to quality institutions, research centers and consultants.

8.      Citizen security/insecurity can be manifested at both national and regional levels.   Given BMCs' limited resources, both financial and human, and the need to address the specific circumstances of each country, CDB will determine, at what level – national or regional – it is more effective to intervene/ provide support.

### Objective of CDB's Interventions

9.      The objective is to enhance the capacity of BMCs to improve citizen security.  The approach will be a developmental one that focuses on the preventative factors for crime and violence.  CDB will support interventions that:

(a)      strengthen the role of the school as a socialisation and transformation agent;

(b)      enhance community cohesiveness and resilience;

(c)      increase resilience of at-risk youth (unemployed, those who have come in contact with the law as victims and perpetrators);

(d)      reduce domestic and gender-based violence;

(e)      improve living conditions  through environmental design (upgrade settlements, provide safe green spaces for community activities); and

(f)      enhance the policy and legislative frameworks for citizen security.

# 1. CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION

1.01    The levels of violent crime in the Caribbean Region have been steadily increasing for more than a decade.  In 2002, the mean homicide rate for the Caribbean was estimated to approximately 30/100,000.[1] Since then the rate for some countries has declined but the general trend in the Region has continued upward.  Some countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis have been experiencing extraordinarily high rates in the range of 30 to 62 incidents per 100,000 citizens[2].  These rates significantly exceed the average for the Latin America and Caribbean Region (18/100,000 in 2007) and are multiples of the global mean (of approximately 8/100,000 in 2007).  There is considerable variation across the Region with countries such as Barbados, registering a homicide rate that has remained relatively low and stable.  High homicide rates are usually accompanied by high rates of other violent crimes.  As a Region, the Caribbean, and particularly the English-Speaking Caribbean, is faced with a profound problem of violence in its different forms[3].  Figure 1 provides homicide rates for selected Caribbean countries.

**Figure 1:  Homicide Rates in Selected Caribbean Countries – 1990-2010**



Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Caribbean Human Development Report (CHDR) on Citizen Security 2012 (**Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; and Trinidad and Tobago Police Service**)

1.02    The problem in the Caribbean is, however, not limited to high rates of violent crimes.  Perhaps more troubling are the changing patterns of crime and the threats that the new forms of criminality pose for the security of citizens.  In most of the countries with high rates of violent crimes, gang activity and especially the activities of organised crime networks, have been a major factor in the elevation of these

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[1]  UNDP/World Bank (WB) 2007, page iv.
[2]  From data provided by the respective police forces. These data have been made public.
[3]  Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Task Force Report: Report on Crime and Security: (2002)
   http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/regional_issues/crime_and_security_task_force_report_2002.pdf

crimes and the emergence of new types of crimes. It is well established that gangs tend to increase criminal productivity. In Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, gangs reportedly account for more than 60% of the homicides in these countries[4]. In other countries, such as Guyana, domestic and Gender Based Violence (GBV) are more problematic than gang violence. There are significant variations in patterns within the Region – and these variations should inform response planning.

### Sub-population Most Affected

1.03    Where violent crime has become a major social problem it exhibits very clear patterns of geographic concentration. It tends to be urban and is particularly concentrated in the capital cities of the Region. Within these cities, it is inclined to be even further concentrated in the communities of the poor. It is thus this subpopulation which tends to be most affected by violent crimes and within these sub-populations, the young males are most at risk as victims of violent conflict rather than predatory crimes. This group is also the greatest supplier of violent offenders. The victimisation and criminal participation experiences of the sexes are very different. Women, for example, are the main victims of rape, domestic violence and other forms of GBV.

1.04    Victimisation surveys which have been conducted in the various countries of the Region reveal a consistent pattern. They confirm the characteristics of most victims of violent crimes. Four groups were significantly more likely to report having been victimised. These are males, young people 18 to 34 years of age, people who are unemployed or under-employed; and those of low educational levels[5]. As noted earlier, there is symmetry between the victims and perpetrators of violence – which is suggestive of a dynamic of proximity and of a vicious cycle.

1.05    In countries with high crime rates, all groups are affected, but in different ways. This gives crime prevention programmes potentially broad appeal. It is, however, the most vulnerable sub-populations where serious crimes are concentrated, which should be better protected and which would be the greatest beneficiaries of prevention programmes.

### Risk Factors

1.06    The identification of the risk factors which are associated with the most problematic forms of crime and criminality is indispensible for formulating effective crime prevention policies and programmes. The approach to understanding the risk factors for crime and criminality in the Region should include: specifying the risk factors for specific crimes and forms of criminality; and identifying risk factors and determinants at different levels, that is, at the level of countries, communities and individuals. Policies and programmes may therefore be informed by the different levels of analysis.

### The National Level

1.07    Low growth rates, high rates of youth unemployment, and high rates of inequality are all conditions which are associated with high rates of homicide[6]. As a cluster of factors, they point to the limitations of the legitimate opportunity structures and the differential abilities of people to access these limited opportunities. Moreover, in the case of Jamaica, low arrest and conviction rates have become a significant contributor to the homicide rate[7]. This finding may also apply to other countries such as St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago with very low arrest and conviction rates for homicide and other

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[4]  These are publicly stated police estimates.
[5]  See UNDP CHDR 2012
[6]  United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/WB 2007.
[7]  Francis et al. 2009. *Crime and Development – The Jamaican Experience.* Kingston: SALISES.

serious crimes. In these cases, it is not only the lack of opportunities, but also the status of the national institutions – particularly the institutions of social control.

<u>The Community and Household Levels</u>

1.08    In most Caribbean countries, the available resources for crime reduction and prevention are quite limited.  High impact policy results are thus only possible if the responses to this problem are highly targeted. Community level understanding of the problem and the corresponding programming are therefore of considerable importance.   In some countries, much has been done at the community level and considerable experience has been accumulated.  Very little research has however been undertaken. Much of what is known is from the UNODC/WB study and, more recently, the UNDP CHDR on Citizen Security 2012.

1.09    Violent victimisation declines as household income increases. However, property-related victimisation increases with income. This latter category includes robberies which entail the use of violence to relieve the victims of their property.  A similar relationship between wealth and victimisation rates exists at the community level.  This relationship is perhaps strongest in Jamaica[8].

1.10    Within the Caribbean, there is no consistent relationship between female-headed households and levels of criminal victimisation, that is, between family structure and victimisation patterns[9].  However, family stability may be related to delinquent behaviour.  Poor families in high crime communities may have greater difficulty providing parental supervision and protecting the more vulnerable members of the household.  The available evidence suggests that more cohesive communities where residents have a strong sense of belonging and inclusion, being respected by other members of the community, and being able to participate in community life and decision-making – are more likely to have a lower gang presence and lower crime victimisation rates than less cohesive communities[10]. More cohesive communities are better able to exert greater informal control over their members.

<u>The Individual Level</u>

1.11    At the individual level, much is known about the risk factors associated with child aggression and delinquency.  But for late adolescents and young adults, the empirical work on criminality has been primarily limited to isolating the risk factors for joining gangs.  This is very useful because as noted earlier, in several countries, gang violence is the main source of the escalation of violent crimes.  The risk factors for joining gangs include, *inter alia,* having parents who approve of antisocial behaviour, having antisocial peers and perceived access to guns.[11]

**Responses by CDB's BMCs**

1.12    The available survey data indicate that Caribbean publics regard the crime problem as either the most important or second most important social problem facing their countries.[12] Citizen security is thus a central public policy issue that is worthy of serious attention by governments and development agencies. The traditional response by Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) has been largely focused on law enforcement.  Such a self-limiting approach has, however, been largely ineffective.  In many jurisdictions,

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[8]  UNODC/WB, 2007.
[9]  UNODC/WB, 2007.
[10] UNDP CHDR, 2012.
[11] These findings are based on the work of Charles Katz and Andrew Fox and were conducted in Trinidad and Tobago.  See Katz, C and Fox, A. 2010.  Risk and Protective factors associated with gang involvement in Trinidad and Tobago. *Rev Panam Salud Publica* 27(3).
[12] UNDP CHDR, 2012.

arrest and conviction rates for some categories of serious crime are low.  For example, the conviction rates for murder in Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are estimated to be approximately 8% and 6% respectively.[13] This traditional policing response rests on the theory of deterrence, but given the realities of the performance of law enforcement, there is little deterrence.

1.13    More comprehensive approaches that include social crime prevention are required and some countries have already moved in this direction. A few governments have adopted citizen security and justice programmes which pay greater attention to crime prevention, to reform of the criminal justice system including the police, courts, juvenile justice and corrections, the integration of the communities of the poor and better protection of the rights of citizens. Despite these positive changes, most BMCs allocate insignificant proportions of the national budgets to crime and violence prevention.[14]

**Lessons Learnt**

1.14    Caribbean countries have learnt much from their more recent experiences with the control, reduction and prevention of serious crimes.  Some of these lessons are:

(i)     **Good policy-making and planning is a condition for success**.  The capacity of the Ministries of National Security in the development of public policy along with the capacity to evaluate the effectiveness of the related programmes and projects must be enhanced.   Upgrading such expertise in the ministries will facilitate the elaboration of more comprehensive policies and programmes.   Moreover, this would improve the accountability of the institutions of the criminal justice systems to the civic authorities.

(ii)    **There is need for a broader coalition of partners**.  More comprehensive approaches to crime control and prevention, better coordination and effective implementation of programmes require governments to work in new ways and in partnerships with organisations that are not part of the state structure (e.g. Crime Stoppers).  Effective crime prevention and control requires better and more inclusive governance systems and processes.

(iii)   **Greater investments in crime prevention are required for sustained reduction in serious crimes and greater social stability.**  Law enforcement and suppression has its limits.  Even advances which may be made by crime suppression are unlikely to be consolidated unless there is greater attention to social crime prevention.  Some promising practices in social crime prevention may be found within the Region.  These projects have not been well documented and have not been evaluated.  If waste is to be avoided, then increased expenditure must be accompanied by increased effectiveness.

(iv)    **The systems of accountability should be strengthened.**  Reform and transformation of the justice system also means developing the right relationships between the institutions and the citizens that they are supposed to serve.  This is an important aspect of change that is necessary for greater public confidence and legitimacy of these institutions. Reform is therefore not just the preserve of law enforcement and justice sector experts. Stronger systems of accountability that involve representation from the ordinary citizenry is necessary if institutional reform is to succeed.

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[13] 2010 estimates by the Jamaican Constabulary Force, 2007 data from the Trinidad Police. The Trinidad rate is now expected to approximate that of Jamaica.
[14] UNDP CHDR, 2012.

    (v)     **Early intervention programmes with children at school.**  Children are products of their circumstances, and school is very much a large part of these circumstances.  Where home and family backgrounds may be failing children, the school can act as a socialisation and transformation agent.

    (vi)    **T he need for accurate information on crime and violence.** Given the multi-dimensional nature of citizen security and the diverse ways in which it can be manifested, solid research must underpin the development of all interventions.  Evidence-based policy and programming that draws on the distilled experiences of the Region and elsewhere are more likely to be effective than simply muddling through or scaling up old and ineffective patterns of responding to the challenges.

## 2.  PROGRAMMES IN SUPPORT OF CITIZEN SECURITY BY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

2.01    Interventions to address issues of citizen security fall under a variety of programmes and projects such as national security and justice, child development, youth at risk, safe community or community safety, community development and renewal, peace promotion and conflict management, employment and human resource development, education and training, and disaster risk management.  However, development partners' programmes in the field of citizen security are not always available in detail, and are expressed frequently in terms of Governance.  It is therefore difficult to identify precisely the areas/activities that are not being addressed by development Partners at the regional level.  The Donors' Governance Group, of which CDB is a member, is in the process of developing a matrix identifying activities funded by the Group.  As citizen security becomes more entrenched in the development agenda in the Region, more specific reporting will be critical.

2.02    Table 2.1 below provides a snapshot of the areas funded by the key Development Partners.  The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been the major financier of interventions aimed at enhancing citizen security in the Region.  To date, IDB has approved over USD60 million for citizen security operations in Jamaica, Guyana, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago.  These operations have targeted, *inter alia,* both in-school and out-of-school youth and have supported capacity building of Ministries of National Security.  The IDB is in the process of establishing a special programme and multi-donor fund for citizen security in the Latin American and Caribbean Region.  The main objective of that initiative is to "improve the effectiveness of public policies on citizen security".  The UNDP has prepared the CHDR on Citizen Security 2012 and has programmed a number of initiatives, involving the youth, for disseminating the findings of the Report. Reform of the justice system has been the main focus of Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) intervention in the Region.  CDB's most direct foray into the area of citizen security has been an intervention aimed at rehabilitating youth who have come in conflict with the law and increasing connectedness of at-risk youth to the school system.

2.03    In 2010, the CARICOM Secretariat, in collaboration with the UNODC produced the draft Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention 2009-2013.  The Action Plan seeks to prevent and reduce levels of violence and crime in member states.  It has five specific goals: reduce violence, foster social inclusion, promote integration, empower victims and protect the environment and economic resources.  Appendix 1 provides a synopsis of the Action Plan.  The CARICOM Secretariat has worked closely with USAID, EU and UNODC on regional programmes aimed primarily at drug interdiction and law enforcement.

**TABLE 2.1: DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' OPERATIONS IN CITIZEN SECURITY**

| Item | DFID | OAS/ USAID | CIDA | IDB | UNDP UNODC UNICEF | WB | CDB | EU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Reform[15] | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ | | √ | √ |
| Social Crime Prevention | √ | √ | √ | √ | | √ | √ | √ |
| Conflict Resolution and Peace Building | | | | √ | √ | | | |
| Gang Reduction and Prevention | | | | √ | | | | |
| Violence Reduction/ Research | | | | √ | √ | √ | | |

Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID)
Organisation of American States/United States Agency for International Development (OAS/USAID)
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
European Union (EU)

2.04    Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBO) are very active and have implemented several small-scale projects that are primarily aimed at addressing youth at risk.  These projects span a range of activities including: drug addiction counselling, skills training, parenting classes, and the provision of sports training.  Sustainability of these interventions is a challenge as the funding source is usually very short-term and unpredictable.  These projects are generally not well documented and evaluated.  If these programmes are to be scaled-up, they must be rigorously evaluated and informed by the distilled experiences of the Region and elsewhere.

2.05    Given the magnitude of the problem, and the potential to worsen as the economic climate becomes more challenging, there needs to be increased and sustained investment to arrest the situation. BMCs have recognised the urgency of the situation, however, they are constrained by a lack of capacity, both financial and human, and incoherent policies and legislative frameworks.

## 3.    FRAMEWORK FOR CDB'S INVOLVEMENT IN CITIZEN SECURITY

3.01    There is no one approach or "magic bullet" that can address all the risk and protective factors for crime and violence.  Because it is multi-dimensional in origin and can manifest itself in different ways there is no one solution. Social crime prevention and enhancing of law enforcement can be complementary and not antithetical. Therefore, there are also multiple possible entry points to reduce crime and violence.   In one instance, the most promising approach may be in the context of a settlement upgrading project; in another, in the context of a reform of the education sector or increased connectivity through urban rehabilitation of road infrastructure; in a third, in the context of a reform of the criminal justice system.  The underpinning guideline is that successful interventions are evidence-based, starting with a comprehensive analysis of the types of violence and risk factors, and ending with a careful evaluation of the intervention's impact which will inform future actions.  As mentioned at Section 2 above, it is difficult to identify all the citizen security activities being undertaken at the regional level by the development partners.  Before any activity can be supported, CDB will undertake a thorough review of activities at the national/local level to ascertain accurately the areas that have not been targeted.  Each solution, therefore, will be carefully calibrated to suit the environment.

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[15] Institutional reform/transformation – Police Reform, Justice Sector Reform, Correction.

3.02     Citizen security can have a deleterious effect on economic and human capital growth in the Region and can impede the Bank in achieving its purpose as set out in the Charter "to contribute to the harmonious economic growth and development of the member countries in the Caribbean".   It is an issue which CDB cannot ignore.   However, CDB's approach must be informed by the Region's needs and challenges; its capacity and the work of other Development Partners.   Given the risk factors identified at Section 1, the primary approach that is being recommended is a developmental one in accordance with CDB's mandate.  The focus therefore should be on the prevention of crime and violence.  This approach is in congruence with the findings of 'The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010' which indicated that, "support for crime prevention policies such as, increased investment in education, youth development, job creation and poverty reduction, is fairly universal across the Caribbean".   The recommended approach is also in accord with the CARICOM Action Plan for Social Development and Crime Prevention. (See Appendix 1)

3.03     The resources available from SDF for citizen security projects will be dependent on the level of the SDF 8 replenishment, but are likely to be inadequate in relation to the scale of the needs of BMCs. This will limit the size, number and type of Bank interventions, and suggests that to optimise the use of these resources, efforts should be made to seek and exploit synergies, in particular, joint projects, with other development partners.   To the extent feasible, CDB should seek to leverage some of its resources with those of other partners to create additional, larger, and more efficient interventions in this field.  It could also encourage external development partners to use the Bank as a channel for some of their bilateral resources intended for citizen security operations, where appropriate.  In working closely with development partners, CDB may provide support to BMCs for implementation of strategies developed by other agencies e.g. UNICEF's Safe Schools Programmes.  In other instances there may be co-financing of activities, (e.g. UNDP CHDR dissemination) or financing of the expansion of existing programmes aimed at addressing youth-at-risk.

3.04     Citizen security/ insecurity can be manifested at both national and regional levels.   Given BMCs' limited resources, both financial and human, and the need to address the specific circumstances of each country, CDB will determine, at what level – national or regional – it is more effective to intervene/ provide support.  However, there are activities that can be supported more effectively and efficiently at the regional level.  Some of these are:

> (a)      Establishment of a regional crime observatory;
>
> (b)      Development of a platform for sharing best practices and policies and relevant research associated with the observatory; and
>
> (c)      Assessments/evaluations of selected promising good practices in the Region with the potential for replication.

**Objective**

3.05     The overall objective is to enhance the capacity of BMCs to improve citizen security by focusing on the prevention and control factors underlying crime and violence and targeting at-risk and vulnerable groups.  CDB recognises the multi-dimensional nature of violence and the need for different strategies to respond to the diverse risk and protective factors.  In assisting BMCs to address these factors, CDB will support the following:

(1)  **<u>Social Crime Prevention Activities</u>**

      (a)  strengthen the role of the school as a socialisation and transformation agent;

      (b)  enhance community cohesiveness and resilience;

      (c)  build resilience of at-risk youth (unemployed, those who have come in contact with the law as victims and perpetrators); and

      (d)  decrease domestic and GBV.

(2)  **<u>Prevention through Environmental Design – Improve Living Conditions</u>**

      (a)  upgrade settlements and regularise tenure regularisation including the provision of green and open spaces for secure citizen activity; and

      (b)  improve shelter conditions.

(3)  **<u>Enhancing the Policy Framework for Citizen Security</u>**

Appendix 2 provides more details of interventions that will be supported by CDB.

**Ineligible Activities**

3.06  Given its capacity and the role of other Development Partners, CDB will not support the following activities:

      (a)  reform of the criminal justice system;

      (b)  reform of penitentiary systems, except juvenile facilities; and

      (c)  training law enforcement agencies.

This list is not exhaustive and is meant to be only illustrative of the types of ineligible interventions. Given the fluidity of the situation and the multi-dimensional nature of the problem, the list could be expanded or contracted depending on the likely impact of the intervention.

**Implementation**

3.07  To date, CDB has financed one major intervention which had citizen security as its main objective.  However, the concept of citizen security is already embedded in several of the Bank's interventions. The recently approved Road Safety Project in Belize, although conceived within the framework of safe infrastructure will have a major impact on security of citizens in that country – (for example through improved lighting, safe spaces for pedestrians, traffic stops, visible law enforcement and improved relationships between the police and the community).  The same applies to projects funded under the Basic Needs Trust Fund (BNTF) Programme which, through environmental design, seek to improve infrastructure such as small feeder roads, foot paths, and walkways in poor communities. Likewise the Bank's education projects all have an impact on education achievement and school connectedness, major preventative factors for crime and violence.  However, the heightened risk to life and property of Caribbean citizens mandates that CDB addresses the issue in a more direct and focused manner.

3.08    CDB will also seek to mainstream citizen security considerations, into the Bank's country investment project cycle (identification, preparation, design, appraisal, and supervision), Country Strategy Papers and technical assistance interventions. CDB-financed projects are already screened/ mainstreamed for issues such as poverty reduction, the environment, and disaster risk management.  The Bank will devise a similar approach to integrate citizen security outcomes by including a component within an intervention, where relevant, to support polices or institutional arrangements promoting citizen security. While this may be applicable only to some of CDB's investment projects, there would also be an advantage in being able to assess more comprehensively, the impact of the Bank's portfolio of country projects in contributing to the objective of enhanced citizen security.

3.09    In pursuing the citizen security outcome more frontally, the Bank will need to enhance its capacity in the area.  To date, staff has been sensitised to the trends and issues in crime and violence in the Region.  There will be need for more knowledge-building through structured training as well as participation in regional and international fora.  The Bank's programme of support for citizen security, however, will rely not only on expertise available within the Bank, but also on outsourcing to quality institutions, research centres (discussions with the University of The West Indies have already commenced) and consultants.  The Bank would also need to identify a "resource" that could function as the focal point for citizen security.  It is being proposed that a Portfolio Manager within the Projects Department be designated the focal point for citizens' security.  Given the approach being proposed at this time, the current staff complement can deliver the expected citizen security outcomes.  The six Operations Officers (Social Analysts and Gender Specialists) within the Projects Department will be trained further to enhance their capacity to provide the analytical input for integrating citizen security concerns in the Bank's work.

3.10    The process is important and can reverse exclusion by allowing affected communities to play a role in the decision-making that would affect their lives.  In pursuing the citizen security mandate, CDB must seek to forge alliances with NGOs and CBOs who are involved in implementing interventions to address the same.  CDB should therefore seek to promote dialogue with all key stakeholders – public, private and civil society.   There is also need to maintain a long-term commitment to the development of communities.  CDB's work through the Social Investment Fund Projects and BNTF Programme provides opportunities to intervene at the community level.

### Expected Results

3.11    CDB's involvement in citizen security is expected to enhance the capacity of BMCs to address the issue of crime and violence.  In the long term it is expected that there will be (a) a reduction in juvenile crime; (b) improved employability of young persons who have been rehabilitated after committing a crime; and (c) decreased incidence of GBV.  Positive economic impacts will be experienced though improved returns on education investments, reduced health costs associated with the care of victims and perpetrators, and overall increased productivity.  Additional details are provided at Table 3.1 below.

**TABLE 3.1:  RESULTS MATRIX**

**(SDF 8 Implementation Period)**

| Impact | | | Enhanced capacity of BMCs for improving Citizen Security | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome** | **Output Indicators** | **Target** | **Outcome Indicators** | **Source/Means of Verification** |
| Strengthened school system as a transformation agent and social safety net. | (a) Number of school-based interventions funded. | 15 | (a) Reduction in school-based violence.<br><br>(b) Percentage improvement in retention of boys in the school system.<br><br>(c) Parent/school participation quotient. | Project reports, School Reports, Ministry of Education Reports. |
| Enhanced community cohesiveness. | (a) Number of social protection interventions.<br><br>(b) Number of programmes for enhancing capacity of CBOs and NGOs. | 3<br><br>5 | (a) Decrease in violent crime within the community.<br><br>(b) Increase in number of projects designed and implemented by CBOs and NGOs. | Beneficiary documents.<br><br>Police records. |
| Enhanced resilience of at-risk youth. | (a) Number of juvenile rehabilitation projects.<br><br>(b) Number of second-chance interventions.<br><br>(c) Number of apprenticeship/ internship projects. | 2<br><br>3<br><br>3 | (a) Decrease in crime committed by youth.<br><br>(b) Decrease in the rate of recidivism of young offenders.<br><br>(c) Increase in employability of out-of-school youth and those who have committed crimes. | Ministries of National Security, Labour, Social Welfare, Youth. Project Documents. |
| Decreased incidence of domestic and gender-based violence. | (a) Number of training/ counselling programmes targeted at perpetrators and victims. | 3 | (a) Decrease in the number of GBV cases reported to the Police.<br><br>(b) Decrease in the demand for social services by victims of GBV. | Police Records.<br><br><br>Ministry/Bureau of Gender Affairs. |
| Improved living conditions through Environmental Design. | (a) Number of settlement upgrading projects.<br><br>(b) Number of BNTF sub-projects aimed at improving living conditions of households in poor communities. | 1<br><br>15 | (a) Decrease in incidence of violence in targeted communities.<br><br>(b) Heightened perception of personal safety by community. | Impact Evaluation Reports.<br><br>Project Reports. |
| Enhanced policy framework for citizen security. | (a) Number of national security policies and strategies. | 2 | (a) Increased number of projects emanating from a comprehensive national strategy that are adequately resourced. | Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Planning. |

## EXCERPT FROM THE CARICOM COMMUNITY ACTION PLAN FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION 2009 - 2013

### 1. Fundamental Objective

1.1     The fundamental objective of the Action Plan is to prevent and **reduce levels of violence**[5] **and crime** in Member States through a cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach focused on:

(a)     **groups at risk** of engaging in violent behaviour and criminal activities, already exposed to high levels of violence and victimisation, and groups in conflict with the law, **in particular children and youth;** and

(b)     **institutional responses** to crime and violence from a prevention perspective.

1.2     The Action Plan aims at promoting the sustainability of Actions through **government leadership and commitment,** and **participatory approaches** involving key stakeholders (e.g. schools, government and local authorities, police, NGOs, private sector) from programme/project design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

### 2. Strategy

2.1     The Actions foreseen in the Plan will be implemented **at regional, national and local levels**, as pertinent and in light of international evidence about the effectiveness of implementing crime prevention at the local level drawing on wide support of different partners and the role of local authorities advocated by the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime.

2.2     Actions will rely on **empirical data obtained to inform the specific Action in question**, establish benchmarks, monitor progress and enable the measurement of impact, obtained through, *inter alia*, safety audits and crime victimisation surveys.  The implementation of safety audits and crime victim surveys, as appropriate, is cross-cutting the five pillars (see section V) and should be included as a component in individual country projects.

2.3     All Actions will have specific and **well-defined target groups**. **Evaluation** of Actions undertaken **at national and regional levels will feed back into the process with a view to enabling the sharing of experiences and good practices among member states**, informing future Actions as well as informing the design and/or refining of national crime prevention strategies.  The Action Plan will include a Public Information and Communication Strategy.  The publication of crime victim survey results and citizen participation in the evaluation of crime prevention or relevant policy will be a key aspect of the 'communication – evidence based – impact' approach of the Action Plan.  This process will be facilitated by the CARICOM Secretariat and in collaboration with IMPACS.

2.4     [5] The World Health Organization defines violence as: The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation. (WHO Global Consultation on Violence and Health. Violence: a public health priority. Geneva, World Health Organization, 1996 (document WHO/EHA/ SPI.POA.2). http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/9241545615_chap1_eng.pdf.

2.5     The Action Plan is underpinned in five Pillars and corresponding priority Areas and related Actions.  Actions at **national level within and across the five pillars and priority areas will be implemented in selected Member States in accordance with national needs and priorities**.  Member states will ensure the relevance of a particular Action for the national and local/community contexts in which they are to be implemented.  No single strategy or intervention on its own is likely to be sufficient to address youth violence and crime; multiple, concurrent and evidence-based interventions based on empirical data are required. Due to the cross-sectoral nature of the Action Plan the **oversight and coordination at the national level will be under the responsibility of National Crime Prevention Councils or similar body attached to the Office of the Prime Minister**.

### 3.     Pillars and Priority Areas

3.1     The Action Plan is cross-sectoral and underpinned in five pillars with the following objectives:

(a)     Pillar I Prevent and Reduce Violence
(b)     Pillar II Foster Social Inclusion
(c)     Pillar III Promote Reintegration
(d)     Pillar IV Empower Victims
(e)     Pillar V Protect the Environment and Economic Resources

3.2     Each pillar of the Action Plan is outlined below with the corresponding **Areas**, **Actions** and preliminary **Impact Indicators**.  The collection of empirical data to inform and guide the development of Actions, provide baseline for the measurement of progress, **establish well-defined target groups**, and enable monitoring and evaluation cross cuts the Actions in the five pillars.

**Figure 1:  CARICOM Social and Development Crime Prevention Action Plan**



CARICOM SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CRIME PREVENTION ACTION PLAN
Cross-sectoral oversight
Communication – Evidence based – Measuring impact
Best practice
Prevent and reduce violence
Foster social inclusion
Promote reintegration
Empower victims
Protect environment & economic resources
Regional/national pilot programmes/projects

**AREAS FOR CDB INTERVENTION**

1.   **Social Crime Prevention Activities**

   (a)   strengthen the role of the school as a socialisation and transformation agent:

      (i)     promoting safe democratic schools;

      (ii)    reducing violence; bullying and cyber-violence;

      (iii)   retaining boys in the school system;

      (iv)    providing supervised after school care, extra-curricular activities and homework groups;

      (v)     training for students and teachers in non-violent conflict resolution;

      (vi)    providing Early Childhood Development programmes;

      (vii)   enhancing the involvement of parents/community in the school system;

      (viii)  promoting peer guidance and leadership programmes; and

      (ix)    developing alternative in-school programmes for troubled youth.

   (b)   enhance community cohesiveness:

      (i)     providing after-school care; homework centres, sport facilities;

      (ii)    building capacity in conflict resolution and negotiations;

      (iii)   providing parenting classes; and

      (iv)    training of community leaders, parents, teachers and youth in social and situational crime prevention.

   (c)   build resilience of at-risk youth (unemployed, those who have come in contact with the law as victims and perpetrators):

      (i)     assist in reintegrating and rehabilitating youth who have committed crimes;

      (ii)    provide options for separating incarcerated youth from adults;

      (iii)   support entrepreneurial training, job placement/internships; and

      (iv)    provide second chance education and training opportunities.

   (d)   decrease domestic and gender-based violence:

      (i)     training in gender equality;

        (ii)        counselling and rehabilitation of offenders; and

        (iii)       formulating national plans of action on GBV.

2.      **Prevention through Environmental Design – Improve Living Conditions**

     (a)       upgrade settlements and regularise tenure regularisation including the provision of green and open spaces for secure citizen activity; and

     (b)       improve shelter conditions.

3.      **Enhancing the Policy Framework for Citizen Security**

     (a)       build the institutional capacity of regional governments on all levels (national and regional) for designing, implementing, and monitoring related policies;

     (b)       undertake research on crime and violence;

     (c)       exchange information and share knowledge and good practice; and

     (d)       develop comprehensive results monitoring frameworks for all interventions and provision of resources for baseline surveys and impact evaluations.