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CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK



EVALUATION REPORT

**COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION
JAMAICA
WITH MANAGEMENT RESPONSE (APPENDIX 1)
FINAL REPORT**

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OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

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COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION - JAMAICA

FINAL REPORT

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**Office of Independent Evaluation
Caribbean Development Bank**

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Serena Rossignoli
Head (Ag.), Office of Independent Evaluation

Executive Summary

Background

This independent evaluation report covers two Jamaica Country Strategy and Programme (CSP) periods (2014-2 - 2016 and 2017-2021), including projects which fall under these CSPs and are completed or still being implemented.

This evaluation examines the extent to which the Bank's programme in Jamaica has achieved its intended outcomes and targets. It is intended to inform the Bank's new Country Engagement Strategy (CES) which is expected to be finalised in 2023. The evaluation also aims to offer lessons and recommendations that may be used to course-correct CSP interventions that are still under implementation; improve development effectiveness going forward; and to provide options for the Bank's consideration in its future engagement with Jamaica. It also serves to complement and add depth to the 2017-21 Strategy Completion Report, which was completed shortly before the evaluation started.

For most of the past four decades, Jamaica has suffered from very low growth, high public debt, and serious social challenges. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita remained static over the period 2001-2019 and has not kept pace with the increased GDP per capita of upper middle-income countries. In 2008, Jamaica moved from being classified as upper middle income to middle income. As a result of the economic crisis due to COVID-19, International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures show a decline in GDP per capita from USD5,369 in 2019 to USD4,664 in 2020, which has affected living standards and exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities.

Jamaica was a founding member of CARICOM in 1973 and a founding member of the CDB. Over the period 1971-2021, CDB approved a total of USD920 million (mn) in loans to Jamaica, covering all sectors except for Mining and Quarrying, and Tourism.¹ In 2021, Jamaica had the second largest share of CDB's outstanding loan portfolio at 10.0 per cent (%), behind Barbados (12.8%)².

Country Strategy and Programme Management

There is a very strong perception by a wide group of stakeholders that CDB has not been visible and engaged enough in Jamaica and that it has not capitalised on its position as the region's own development bank. This has impacted overall programme management and performance of the two CSPs across all the evaluation criteria:

- **Relevance** was reduced due to limited uptake of interventions and insufficient consideration of executing agency capacity. While the fiscal context was acknowledged as a key factor in the uptake of loans, it was noted that the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) did take on loans from other international financial institutions (IFIs), and that one reason behind this was the more active engagement by these IFIs.
- **Coherence** was affected as CDB did not engage effectively or sufficiently with partners or succeed in leveraging complementarities. Other IFIs and international development partners (IDPs) in

¹ Jamaica page on CDB website, accessed 5th October 2022 from <https://www.caribank.org/countries-and-members/borrowing-members/jamaica>

² CDB (2022), Annual Report 2021

Jamaica had very little awareness of CDB's work in the country, with more than one partner unaware of the type of support CDB was providing to the country.

- **Effectiveness and efficiency** were affected as anticipated results were not achieved, partly due to insufficient ongoing engagement/adaptation in some interventions, but also due to key contextual factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
- **Sustainability** was constrained by inappropriate planning and design of interventions (which resulted in, for example, significant rescoping of interventions after the appraisal stage) and insufficient mitigation of capacity constraints, although there were positive examples of capacity building and sustainability in some projects.

Relevance

The development challenges identified in the period covered by the two CSPs were and remain aligned with Vision 2030 Jamaica and thus are highly relevant. The individual interventions planned were also generally well aligned with the relevant Sector Plans. Almost all stakeholders felt that CDB's interventions were highly relevant, although noted that several interventions did not proceed, which some linked to the scope of the 2017-2021 CSP being too broad and ambitious and thus reduced the overall relevance.

While technical capacity in Jamaica was considered strong, project management was seen as a key capacity limitation within executing agencies. This was mitigated by either building capacity among existing staff within the agency (seen as better for sustainability) or via putting in place a Project Implementation Unit within the executing agency and recruiting temporary staff (seen as a quick fix and more likely to provide the necessary support during the lifetime of the project).

Alignment with CDB's cross-cutting priorities was strong overall, especially with gender and the environment, which were integrated to some degree in the design of almost all interventions. Other cross-cutting priorities of Regional Cooperation and Integration (RCI), Energy Efficiency (EE) and Energy Security and Governance were not as consistently integrated, but in most cases, this was due to them being less relevant to the specific intervention. While alignment at design stage was generally strong, it was not possible to rigorously assess to what extent this followed through to implementation due to the lack of ongoing monitoring reports available. Some stakeholders felt that, in some cases, integration of areas such as gender was not strong as implementation began.

Coherence

While CDB routinely highlighted the importance of coordination and collaboration with other IDPs, engagement with existing development partners was limited in breadth, although there were some important positive examples of good cooperation, for example with other IFIs as part of the Policy-Based Loan (PBL). There is, however, clear will among IDPs to work more with CDB, through various coordination mechanisms which already exist.³ Internal CDB coordination was relatively strong during the CSP preparation and project appraisal stage, and there is some evidence it supports mainstreaming of CDB's cross-cutting priorities. However, it was weaker during CSP and project-level implementation and is being restricted by the lack of a country/strategy level mechanism to support ongoing coherence.

³ Including IDP collaboration in areas such as climate change and gender equality, and a cross-sectoral working group coordinated by UNDP

Effectiveness

The evaluation found that overall effectiveness of the CSP programme over the period reviewed has been mixed. The Bank is perceived as a valued player as it often understands the context better than other IFIs, but one which has not leveraged its position as the region's own development bank.

Results Monitoring Frameworks (RMF) were included in the design of the two CSPs, which allowed for measuring development results using defined Key Performance Indicators (KPI). However, there is little evidence that the data generated by specific interventions have been used for measuring progress. Most of the nine CSP outcomes as defined for both CSPs were assessed by this evaluation as "Partially Achieved." The outcome related to renewable energy and energy efficiency was assessed as "Achieved"; while the outcome related to citizen security was "Not Achieved." CDB's contribution to progress against the CSP outcomes ranged from none to some. While this may seem poor, it should be seen within the context of high-level national outcomes where CDB is one of several actors providing support.

The design of indicators and targets within the framework of the CSPs was generally found not to be fully "SMART"⁴, although it should be noted that RMFs were still a relatively new concept for CDB at the time the 2014-16 CSP was drafted. Moreover, adaptive management was not facilitated by the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system or the RMFs, as CSP level monitoring was not conducted on an ongoing/regular basis and needed changes, therefore, were not detected. It should also be noted that the sector outcomes and related KPIs were not appropriate to monitor the progress of specific interventions; intervention-level monitoring was done by the executing agencies but there is little evidence of progress reporting on the interventions that could be used for measuring progress of sector and CSP outcomes. Additionally, the RMF indicators were linked to results of Vision 2030 Jamaica rather than to the interventions. Specific interventions were not outlined in the CSP, and thus specific outputs were not defined in the RMFs. As the RMFs were not modified during implementation, intervention level outputs were not integrated into the RMFs. Therefore, the RMFs could not serve as an integrated tool for M&E of the CSPs. Several intervention level indicators were designed to collect gender-specific information but it is unclear if the RMFs adequately captured gender disaggregated data.

Efficiency

The CDB's implementation experience in Jamaica was relatively poor in both CSP periods. Specifically, performance in terms of duration between key project milestones which appears to have worsened during the 2017-21 CSP, partly due to COVID-19 related disruptions, which also negatively impacted disbursement levels.

A broad range of factors affected implementation. At project level, the main constraining factors were a perception of burdensome and slow CDB processes; insufficient and/or slow CDB engagement and communication; insufficient or inappropriate design and planning of interventions (with both implementing agencies and CDB seen as playing a key role in this area); and limited GOJ/executing agency capacity and cumbersome approval processes and structures. Supporting factors were positive engagement and strong CDB and GOJ/executing agency capacity in key projects such as the Basic Needs Trust Fund (BNTF) and several Technical Cooperation interventions.

⁴ Did not meet all SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) criteria, although it should be noted that many indicators did meet some of these criteria.

Sustainability

Realisation of sustainability was mixed overall, with positive evidence of sustainability in several of the projects sampled, but also several interventions where prospects for sustainability were low or sustainability had apparently not been achieved.

While the importance of building the capacity of national systems to support sustainability was widely acknowledged, in practice CDB's follow-through was mixed. Training was often provided, and several projects were implemented from within Jamaican institutions. However, use of temporary Project Implementation Units for several interventions limited the ability of CDB to strengthen institutional capacity in the medium to long term.

A failure to identify and/or sufficiently mitigate against all CSP level risks, several of which materialised, also negatively affected sustainability. Despite these challenges, there were examples where there were reasonably positive prospects for sustainability across several CDB sectors, with particularly positive examples in some BNTF sub-projects and the Bush Fire Warning Index intervention.

Conclusions and Recommendations

CDB's strategy moving forward will need to be framed within Jamaica's overall economic outlook and sustainability as it recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. Four recommendations are offered against four conclusions outlined below.

Country Relationship, Relevance, and Coherence:

CDB has a long-standing relationship with Jamaica, and is perceived by the Government and other in-country stakeholders as having valuable regional expertise and experience. However, CDB's sub-optimal engagement with Jamaica over the period 2014-2021 has led to a failure to capitalise on this comparative advantage. This, along with a failure to strategically collaborate and coordinate with other IDPs, has allowed other IFIs to dominate by offering funds in larger amounts and/or at preferential rates in a context of constrained GOJ fiscal space.

Jamaica is a key BMC in terms of its population, history with CDB and potential lending envelope. CDB will need to build on what was reportedly a well-received mission in July 2022. Given the number of in-country stakeholders who referenced the lack of permanent in-country presence as a limitation, it is vital that CDB find ways to make up for this. There is strong commitment from CDB, GOJ and other in-country counterparts to rebuild the relationship and learn from past missteps. Keeping this momentum going will require significant effort at the overall Country Engagement Strategy (CES) and individual intervention level.

There is room for CDB to focus the support provided through the new CES on those areas where GOJ (and other IDPs) perceives it has specific track record and expertise, such as climate change, irrigation and water supply, and rural education and access projects. This may improve uptake of grants and loans and maximise opportunities for collaboration and sharing of expertise with others. Such cross-fertilisation of expertise may also allow CDB to prove its worth in sectors where it has struggled to gain traction to date, but it feels it has value to add, such as citizen security.

- **Recommendation 1a: Explore and identify the most appropriate ways for CDB to become more visible and mitigate the lack of permanent in-country presence in Jamaica in the immediate future, linked to the launch of the new CES.**
 - This could include a review of the frequency and type of mission visits to ensure they support delivery of the overall CES and individual interventions. Similarly, the frequency and format

of remote engagement efforts with Jamaica could be reviewed and better tailored to the CES requirements and preferences of in-country stakeholders.

- For example, infrastructure/capital investments are required to go through additional GOJ approval processes, which may benefit from in-country visits at key times. Similarly, if investments in specific sectors are seen to be struggling to get approval, this may indicate a need for more and/or better targeted in-country missions by relevant Operations Officers.
- **Recommendation 1b: Explore options that would be feasible and cost-effective for provision of a more permanent in-country presence in the medium- to long-term. Options could include recruitment of a full or part-time Jamaica-based member of CDB staff; or contracting of a local fund agent or delivery partner.**
 - The role of this individual/entity would include improved ongoing monitoring of CES implementation, and participation in formal and informal engagement mechanisms with GOJ, other counterparts and IDPs.
 - Given this would involve a change to CDB's standard model of working at country level, it is understood this recommendation would require high-level discussion across CDB. But given Jamaica's importance within the CDB portfolio, the available options should be considered, along with the operational and financial implications of each.
- **Recommendation 1c: Ensure that renewed engagement with Jamaica includes all key GOJ, IDP and other in-country partners (e.g. private sector and NGO community), and that CDB clearly demonstrates where it can provide added value in supporting Jamaica's development needs.**
 - Specifically, ensure that CDB is actively involved in all existing in-country IDP coordination mechanisms, and look for opportunities to lead IDP engagement in areas where CDB is already perceived as having a comparative advantage, such as climate change.

Implementation:

As noted in other CSPEs, a broad range of factors affected implementation in Jamaica, but a common theme was one of mutual frustration, with both parties finding each other's structures and/or processes often confusing and/or convoluted.

There are indications that infrastructure-type projects being implemented under less experienced executing agencies are the most challenging, as GOJ approval structures and ongoing implementation requirements are the most demanding in these cases. But there are potential opportunities to learn from the mutually positive experience of CDB and Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) in implementing multiple BNTF infrastructure projects.

- **Recommendation 2a: As part of renewed engagement efforts with in-country stakeholders, conduct a targeted, Jamaica-specific review of CDB processes and guidance, to identify areas for improvement.**
 - Prior CSP evaluations have identified some level of BMC frustration with CDB processes, and findings in this evaluation also identify this as an issue in Jamaica. It is interesting to note that it was the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic that pushed CDB towards accepting soft-copy exchange/receipt of key documents from BMCs, which demonstrates that processes can be adapted where there is a push for this to happen.
- **Recommendation 2b: Ensure that all CDB staff engaged in the Jamaica CES are well briefed on GOJ's development frameworks and approval structures, and that future CES receive support from all necessary areas of government.**

- GOJ's development framework and approval structures are rigorous, comprehensive, and multi-layered, especially for capital investment projects. Informal mechanisms and relationships can also affect the likelihood of a particular intervention having the necessary fiscal space created. Given this complex context, it is vital that CDB staff working with the Jamaica CES are fully apprised of the formal and informal structures that exist.
- A detailed Jamaica orientation brief, which is reviewed on an annual basis as structures and key individuals within the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and Ministry of Finance (for example) change would be useful, and would support efforts to increase and improve engagement with Jamaica.
- If CDB does consider the development of some form of permanent presence in Jamaica, the role of the individual or entity engaged could also include orienting CDB officers on the Jamaican context and helping them to negotiate the structures that exist.

Risk Management and Sustainability:

There was some tension between CDB's desire to minimize the risk of project implementation, being affected by insufficient executing agency capacity to manage projects, with the desire to strengthen national systems. The success of interventions, such as BNTF, through JSIF; and the Street Light Retrofitting Project, through the Jamaica Public Service (JPS), offer potential lessons on how other in-country agencies can be supported to improve their project management capacity to support CDB and other IDP projects, and thus set them on the pathway to more sustainable capacity and results.

- **Recommendation 3a: Work with the government to build country-level capacity (particularly in Project Management) which can support successful project implementation, while also building long-term institutional capacity, and thus sustainability of results. Specifically, ensure that CDB is abreast of ongoing GOJ discussions around how to improve project management capacity of key government ministries.**
 - There is a need to engage with GOJ and other partners to review how limited in-country capacity affected project implementation, and develop better ways to address and mitigate this risk. There are reportedly discussions taking place within GOJ around how to improve the project management capacity of key government ministries. CDB should ensure they are kept abreast of these discussions, so that future intervention design can consider changes in the context and where appropriate move away from the preferred "quick fix" of putting in place short-term Project Implementation Units.
- **Recommendation 3b: Review lessons learned from interventions which have been successfully implemented without the creation of short-term, external consultant led Project Implementation Units. This may include a review of whether agencies which already have proven implementation capacity, such as JSIF and National Water Commission, can be used to (co-)implement interventions which may be outside of their normal area of operations.**
 - Where building capacity from the ground up may be challenging, there may scope for Executing Agencies with less capacity to work alongside and co-implement alongside agencies with more experience of managing CDB/donor funds. If this avenue is explored, then it is vital to ensure that there are clear terms of reference for the agencies involved, to avoid confusion or conflict around respective roles.

CSP Monitoring and Evaluation:

The CSP RMFs were well aligned with Vision 2030 Jamaica, which is appropriate and offers opportunities for CDB to align with and contribute to GOJ's ongoing monitoring of Vision 2030 objectives. This alignment

was however not leveraged: instead of identifying CSP indicators with readily available and collated GOJ data, non-SMART indicators were chosen which neither captured CDB contribution nor overall progress. The lack of appropriate RMFs resulted in frustration among CDB staff as even where progress was made, it was not always captured. CDB staff were keen to improve monitoring but had limited capacity to do so: there is no dedicated officer assigned to conduct ongoing CSP monitoring, and existing staff have multiple responsibilities and varying degrees of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expertise and interest. Even if there were sufficient existing capacity to conduct ongoing CSP level monitoring, the lack of supportive systems (including Information Technology systems) and processes acts as a further barrier. All of this has resulted in an M&E system that acts more as a barrier than as a nimble, intuitive system which could allow CDB and in-country counterparts to identify where progress is off-track, and adaptations are necessary.

- **Recommendation 4a: Develop CES RMFs in a more participatory way that increases awareness and buy-in. Ensure targets are SMART, and clearly identify/mitigate assumptions and risks. Ensure project RMFs feed into the overall CES RMF, and that key processes which support this, such as production of Project Supervision/Completion Reports, are completed for all projects.**
 - Both CDB and GOJ stakeholders should be involved in the development/review of CES RMFs, to ensure they align with broader in-country results frameworks and also consider wider CDB targets/priorities (such as gender mainstreaming, for example).
- **Recommendation 4b: Ensure more effective ongoing monitoring and adaptation. This should include clear assignment of responsibilities for overall CES, sector, and intervention level monitoring. It may also include designation of Mid-Term Reviews as a Board requirement; inclusion of CES monitoring as part of the role of any future permanent in-country presence (see Recommendation 1b).**
 - In addition to clear assignment of monitoring responsibilities, there should be agreed check-in points to monitor progress. This will support timelier course-correction of interventions if/when it becomes clear that an intervention is not on track to achieve the anticipated results and allow for targets and associated indicators to be adjusted in line with the context. This will help to ensure that stakeholders remain focused on the aim of interventions, improve likely effectiveness and sustainability, and reduce frustration associated with indicators that do not capture the work completed.

Acronyms

BMC	Borrowing Member Country
BNTF	Basic Needs Trust Fund
BOD	Board of Directors (CDB)
BOP	Balance of Payments
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CES	Country Engagement Strategy
CGA	Country Gender Assessment
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease
CSEC	Caribbean Secondary Certification
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CSPE	Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation
DFC	Development Finance Corporation
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECG	Evaluation Cooperation Group
ED	Economics Department (CDB)
EE	Energy Efficiency
EID	Economic Infrastructure Division (CDB)
ESU	Environmental Sustainability Unit (CDB)
EU	European Union
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Gender Equity
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GIS	Geographic Information System
GNI	Gross National Income

GOJ	Government of Jamaica
HDI	Human Development Index
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	International Development Partner
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JADEP	Jamaican Drugs for the Elderly Programme
JMD	Jamaica Dollar
JPS	Jamaica Public Service Company
JSIF	Jamaica Social Investment Fund
JSLC	Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MEGJC	Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation
MTF	Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework
MTR	Mid Term Review
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHF	National Health Fund
NIR	Net International Reserves
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OIE	Office of Independent Evaluation (CDB)
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organisation
PATH	Programme of Advancement through Health and Education
PBL	Policy-Based Loan / Lending
PCR	Project Completion Report
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PFM	Public Financial Management

PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PSD	Private Sector Development Unit (CDB)
PSR	Project Supervision Report
PwD	People with Disabilities
RCI	Regional Cooperation and Integration
RMF	Results Management Framework
RWSL	Rural Water Supply Ltd
SDF	Special Development Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small Island Developing State
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic, Time-bound
SSD	Social Sector Division (CDB)
TA	Technical Assistance
TCD	Technical Corporation Division (CDB)
ToC	Theory of Change
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK CIF	United Kingdom Caribbean Infrastructure Partnership Fund
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWI	University of the West Indies
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE) for Jamaica is intended to:

- Provide a status report on the performance of Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) programming in Jamaica, particularly as the current Country Strategy Paper (CSP) (2017-21) is due for renewal.
- Examine the extent to which the Country Programme made progress in achieving its outcome targets, the factors that affected the programme's implementation and sustainability of the results achieved.
- Provide critical thinking on the Bank's experience of operating in Jamaica since 2014 and draw lessons and recommendations that may be used to improve the development effectiveness of the Bank's future strategy and programming.
- Enable CDB to consider its strategic choices in Jamaica, facing a substantially changed operating environment, a different risk profile and likely demand for a different type of engagement from the Bank.

A list of those interviewed and documents consulted are listed in Annexes B and C.

The primary audience for the evaluation's findings is those charged with designing CDB's next CSP, now Country Engagement Strategy (CES) for Jamaica, and project teams in the various sectors. General lessons will also be of interest to senior management and the Board of Directors.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation is utilisation-focused, based on the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) Good Practice Standards for Country Evaluations. The evaluation team used a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative analysis from document review and key informant interviews (KII) and quantitative analysis of administrative/financial data. The drawing of conclusions used triangulation to corroborate or contest assertions about the Bank's performance, as well as thematic analysis to synthesise the multiple sources of evidence. Overall, the qualitative approach was appropriate given the scope of the exercise and limitations in performance data available.

The evaluation was initiated in March 2022 with a ten-week inception phase to finalise the design, data sources, main areas of focus and proposed workplan. A two-week mission visit to Jamaica was conducted in the first weeks of July 2022, with preliminary findings shared with stakeholders in early August to inform the drafting of the new Jamaica Country Engagement Strategy (CES) originally planned for submission to the Board in December 2022. The main evaluation tool was the evaluation matrix, (see Annex D) structured around the key evaluation questions provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR) and finalised during the inception phase and five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. It was supported by the development of a reconstructed Theory of Change (see Annex F).

EVALUATION SCOPE

The evaluation was designed to serve both accountability and learning purposes, in determining how Bank interventions performed and the lessons that can be drawn to inform Bank operations in the future. It does

not provide summative ratings for CSP criteria or Bank performance. Instead, the evaluation focused on identifying strengths, weaknesses, lessons, opportunities, and risks.

The evaluation was focused on CDB's implementation of the Country Strategy Papers for Jamaica (2014-2016 and 2017-2021), but activities undertaken after expiry of the CSP (from January – June 2022) were also considered. 24 of the 50 projects covered by the CSPs were sampled for this evaluation, with the sampling criteria driven by sectoral coverage and size of project, plus associated TA. The PBL was also included. The project sample is set out in more detail in Annex A.

LIMITATIONS

Some significant limitations were experienced during the evaluation process described below. Despite these challenges, we consider the overall strength of evidence for the findings presented to be strong in most cases (based on multiple pieces of evidence from a variety of sources/stakeholders), and at least moderate in all cases (based on multiple pieces of evidence but from a narrower range of sources/stakeholders). We have noted within the report where it was not possible to present specific analysis or findings due to some of the challenges mentioned below:

- **Constrained availability of CDB staff and in-country stakeholders during the main data collection phase:** The original evaluation timeline as received from OIE indicated a country mission between July and September, with delivery of a draft evaluation report by the end of September 2022. On further discussion via email and calls between OIE, the evaluation team and the Country Economist in late May 2022, it was highlighted that for the evaluation to be able to inform the ongoing CES development process and thus be as useful as possible, preliminary findings would be needed by the end of July. It was thus agreed that the planned evaluation mission visit to Jamaica would be brought forward to early July⁵. Unfortunately, this coincided with Operations staff's first mission to Jamaica since the onset of COVID-19. This partial clash in timeline was known at the time the agreed evaluation mission date was brought forward, and the various risks of this highlighted by the evaluation team. It was agreed however that the benefits of having preliminary findings by the end of July outweighed these risks and thus the mission should proceed.

Despite all efforts by the various parties to mitigate these risks, very few CDB staff were available for interview during the identified primary data collection window, as they were occupied with planning and conducting their own mission. Several in-country stakeholders also had limited availability during the agreed mission visit dates, due to being occupied in consultations with CDB officers about the new CES. As a result, preliminary findings presented in early August were based on an incomplete set of interviews with limited strength of evidence. To strengthen the evidence base for the main evaluation report, data collection was ultimately extended by almost two months, with interviews still being conducted by late August and early September 2022 and secondary documents from CDB also still being retrieved up to mid-August. Despite these challenges, the extension of our data collection window thanks to the flexibility of CDB staff and the evaluation team meant we did speak to CDB officers from all targeted teams, many at both inception and main data collection phases. We also managed to speak to most of the targeted in-country key informants, although there were some organisations which despite multiple efforts we were unable to reach out to, which limited triangulation and thus strength of evidence for some projects⁶.

⁵ It could not take place earlier than this as the evaluation's inception phase was still ongoing in May and June, and the evaluation lead was engaged on a mission to another country from 15th June – 31st July 2022.

⁶ Including Jamaica Public Service Company (JPS) (relevant for the Streetlights Retrofitting intervention); Social Development Commission (relevant to several interventions); Jamaica Association of Composers Authors and

- **Limited availability of key CDB background documents:** Despite considerable effort to support the evaluation team with access to key documents, several key documents either did not exist, or proved hard for CDB to locate. Some examples of key documents that remain missing from the data set include Project Supervision Reports (PSR) and/or Project Completion Reports (PCR) for many sampled interventions over both CSP periods⁷. As a result, our assessment of project-level Effectiveness and Efficiency was constrained for some interventions, as we were unable to verify if/when several projects had been completed; whether defined project level outputs and outcomes had been achieved; and were unable to compare projected and actual project timeliness. Furthermore, as no mid-term review of the CSP had taken place, the evaluation had to rely more heavily on perceptions of key informants. The extension of our data collection window mitigated the above challenge to some extent, as some key documents were retrieved later in this window via CDB or via in-country key informants themselves. During interviews with key informants from interventions where no PCRs or PSRs were available, the evaluation asked specific questions about the perceived achievement of intended outputs and outcomes and for any consultant reports they had available. This helped to fill some of our gaps, and ultimately there was only one intervention (Canada – Caricom Climate Adaptation Fund) where we were unable to source any specific background documents summarising progress or get specific stakeholder insights. As a result, we were able to gather qualitative views of progress based on the documents and key informant insights for almost all projects, but quantitative analysis of progress against some indicators and timelines was not possible for all projects.

1.3 Report Overview

The following section outlines the Jamaica CSPs between 2014-21. Section 3 sets out the context for CSP implementation and for the current deliberations regarding Jamaica’s economic recovery. Section 4 presents the findings with respect to CDB country programme management, while Section 5 considers performance against the evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The main conclusions are summarised in section 6 under four areas for attention: adapting to changing economic conditions; implementation challenges; limitations of a project-based approach; and the continued relevance of the CSP. Section 7 presents the evaluation’s recommendations.

Publishers Limited and the Ministry of Culture, Gender, Entertainment and Sport (both relevant to the Business of Music intervention); and the Ministry of Finance and Public Service representative with knowledge of the Policy Based Loan.

⁷ The evaluation team was unable to retrieve PSRs or PCRs at all for 16 out of the 24 sampled projects (11 of which were TA projects). In addition, several of the PSRs and PCRs that were retrieved were incomplete (did not contain updates on progress against project indicators and/or updated timelines or associated narrative detailing progress and challenges with implementation).

2 CDB Support to Jamaica

Jamaica was a founding member of CARICOM in 1973, and a founding member of the CDB. Over the period 1971-2021 CDB approved a total of USD920mn in loans to Jamaica, covering all sectors except for Mining and Quarrying and Tourism.⁸ By 2021, Jamaica was CDB's second largest borrower in cumulative terms at 10.0% of CDB's total lending, behind Barbados (12.8%)⁹

The CSPs were also designed with Gender Equity (GE), environmental sustainability, Energy Efficiency (EE)/energy security and governance considerations in mind. The 2017-2021 CSP rested on four pillars aimed at achieving nine outcomes¹⁰:

- Pillar 1: Enhanced Educational Quality and Social Protection
 - Expected Outcome 1: Enhanced educational quality
 - Expected Outcome 2: Improved effectiveness of social protection*
- Pillar 2: Enhanced Governance and Citizen Security
 - Expected Outcome 3: Improved public sector governance
 - Expected Outcome 4: Reduced crime, increased citizen security and support for at-risk youth
- Pillar 3: Economic Growth and Competitiveness
 - Expected Outcome 5: Inclusive growth & competitiveness reforms
 - Expected Outcome 6: Resilient economic infrastructure*
 - Expected Outcome 7: Agricultural sector transformed*
- Pillar 4: Strengthened Environmental Sustainability and Energy Security
 - Expected Outcome 8: Reduced vulnerability to natural disasters*
 - Expected Outcome 9: Improved energy security and efficiency

Expected Outcomes 2, 6, 7 and 8 were also reflected to some extent in the 2014-2016 CSP, which had only two pillars (Accelerated Sustained Inclusive growth and Environmental resilience and climate change response) and three outcomes (World class education and training; Hazard risk reduction and adaptation to climate change and Sustainable urban and rural development).¹¹ A visual summary of the CSP pillars, outcomes, and sector outcomes in relation to Vision 2030 Jamaica National Outcomes can be found in the Theory of Change (ToC) diagram in Annex F.

Planned, approved, and disbursed CDB projects during this evaluation period are shown in Table 1 (see more detailed breakdown in Annex G). These include substantial investments in agriculture (mostly irrigation-focused), rural water supply, energy infrastructure and economic cooperation (via a USD30mn PBL). The CSPs appear to have remained generally relevant during the period in terms of the interventions that proceeded, although as discussed under Section 5.2, relevance was impacted by some significant planned investments that did not proceed. As in other Borrowing Member Countries (BMCs) recently evaluated¹², disbursement of approved loans and grants in Jamaica has been slow as can be seen in Table 1 and Annex H.

* Indicates that this outcome was also reflected to some extent in the 2014-16 CSP

⁸ Jamaica page on CDB website, accessed 5th October 2022 from <https://www.caribank.org/countries-and-members/borrowing-members/jamaica>

⁹ CDB (2022), Annual Report 2021

¹⁰ Caribbean Development Bank (2017): Jamaica Country Strategy Paper 2017-21

¹¹ Caribbean Development Bank (2014): Jamaica Country Strategy Paper 2014-16

¹² Barbados CSPE (2020), Suriname CSPE (2021), Belize CSPE (2021)

Table 1: Planned and Actual CSP Activities by Sector, 2014-2022 (in USD)

CDB Sector	Planned	Approved	Disbursed	Percentage disbursed
Economic Cooperation	\$30.00m	\$35.70m	\$35.42m	99%
Private Sector Development	\$0.00m	\$15.43m	\$8.33m	54%
Economic Infrastructure	\$64.70m	\$56.35m	\$25.59m	45%
Environment Sustainability	\$1.30m	\$6.64m	\$5.11m	77%
Social Sector	\$95.70m	\$84.29m	\$22.61m	27%
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency	\$0.00m	\$0.13m	\$0.12m	95%
Technical Cooperation	\$2.00m	\$1.15m	\$0.88m	76%
TOTAL	\$193.70m	\$199.69m	\$98.06m	49%

2.1 CDB Support by Sector

Both CSPs for Jamaica were underpinned by the Vision 2030 Long Term Strategic Development Plan for Jamaica, and the relevant and available medium term development plans for each period, along with other relevant sector specific plans and strategies.¹³ Jamaica’s development priorities over this period were framed by Vision 2030’s long-term vision - “Jamaica, the place of choice to live, work, raise families and do business”¹⁴, which is outlined as being achieved through the realisation of four “National Goals” and associated “National Outcomes”¹⁵:

- Jamaicans are empowered to achieve their fullest potential
 - A healthy and stable population
 - World-Class Education and Training
 - Effective Social Protection
 - Authentic and Transformational Culture
- Jamaican society is secure, cohesive, and just
 - Security and Safety
 - Effective Governance
- Jamaica’s economy is prosperous
 - A Stable Macroeconomy
 - An Enabling Business Environment
 - Strong Economic Infrastructure
 - Energy Security and Efficiency
 - A Technology-Enabled Society
 - *Internationally Competitive Industry Structures*
- Jamaica has a healthy natural environment

¹³ CDB (2014), Country Strategy Paper 2014-16, Jamaica; CDB (2017), Country Strategy Paper 2017-21; GOJ (2012), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2012-15; GOJ (2015), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2015-18; GOJ (2018), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2018-21

¹⁴ GOJ (2009), Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan

¹⁵ GOJ (2009), Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan; GOJ (2012), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2012-15; GOJ (2015), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2015-18; GOJ (2018), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2018-21

- Sustainable Management and Use of Environmental and Natural Resources
- Sustainable Urban and Rural Development
- Hazard Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change

The above was reflected in the Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Frameworks (MTF) over the period which included the 2014-16 and 2017-21 CSPs, with those in blue listed as priorities in all three MTF periods (2012-15, 2015-18, 2018-21), and those in italics listed as a priority in the 2018-21 MTF only. Strong Economic Infrastructure fell off the priority list in 2018-21, reflecting changing development priorities.

The 2014-16 CSP was limited in scope due to the economic context in Jamaica at that time, and the CSP did not provide an indicative breakdown of how the planned support would be allocated to different CSP intended outcomes. Ultimately USD15.7mn (41%) more than what was planned was approved, with most of the support going towards a USD30mn a “Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability” Policy Based Loan (PBL). Other significant investments included a USD15mn Line of Credit and USD1.8mn for BNTF 8, which was mostly focussed on school infrastructure interventions.

Table 2: Indicative Areas of CSP Support

	Activities	Indicative Allocation (USD mn)	%	Approved Allocation (USD mn)	%
CSP 2014-16	Accelerated Sustained Inclusive Growth	38.5¹⁶	100%	52.9	98%
	World class education and training			1.8 ¹⁷	
	Other			51.1 ¹⁸	
	Environmental Resilience and Climate Change Response	38.5	100%	0.7	2%
	Hazard risk reduction and adaptation to climate change			0.1	
	Sustainable urban and rural development			0.6	
TOTAL	38.5	100%	54.2	140%	
SP 2017-21	Enhanced Educational Quality and Social Protection	29.2	15%	9.2	6%
	Enhanced educational quality	16		7.3	
	Improved effectiveness of social protection	13.2		1.9	
	Enhanced Governance and Citizen Security	24.3	12.5%	6.9	5%
	Reduced crime, increased citizen security & support for youth	23.5		6.6*	
	Improved public sector governance	0.8		0.3	
	Economic Growth and Competitiveness	113.9	59%	98	67%
	Inclusive growth & competitiveness reforms	30.0		1	
	Resilient economic infrastructure	39.7		30.8	
	Agricultural sector transformed	44.2		66.2	
Strengthened Environmental Sustainability & Energy Security	26.3	13.5%	31.7	22%	
Improved energy security and efficiency	25		25.1		
Reduced vulnerability to natural disasters	1.3		6.6		
TOTAL	193.7	100%	145.6	75%	

¹⁶ Consisting of USD33.8mn (SDF 8 funds) and USD4.7mn (BNTF 7). The CSP paper did not assign indicative figures against the individual pillars or outcomes

¹⁷ BNTF 8 funds, which were mostly directed towards school infrastructure projects

¹⁸ Consisting of Economic Cooperation projects (PBL and MoFPS Institutional Strengthening), PSD (6th Industrial Line of Credit and “Enhanced Institutional And Regulatory Framework For Jamaica’s Information Communication Technology Business Process Outsourcing Industry”), Social protection interventions (namely “Conducting Baseline Studies For Seventeen Vulnerable And Volatile Communities To Support The Government Of Jamaica's Community Renewal Programme”) and various Technical Cooperation Projects

In the 2017-21 CSP, overall, only 75% of the planned USD193.7mn was followed through with approved projects, and there were some significant deviations from the original indicative allocations against CSP outcomes in the following areas:

- Under [Enhanced Educational Quality and Social Protection](#), approved allocations were USD20mn lower than planned. Ultimately the only education projects that proceeded were under BNTF.
- Under [Enhanced Governance and Citizen Security](#), approved allocations were USD17.4mn lower than planned. Planned citizen security interventions did not proceed, so again the only relevant projects that proceeded were community infrastructure (roads, water, and irrigation) projects that were seen as supporting overall community development and thus citizen security.
- Under [Strengthened Environmental Sustainability and Energy Security](#), approved allocations were USD5.4mn higher than planned, despite only two significant interventions going ahead.

Table 2 outlines the indicative areas of CSP support and approved allocations along with deviations.

3 Country Context

3.1 Overview

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONTEXT

Jamaica is a middle-income country with a population of 2,827,695 the fourth largest population in the island Caribbean^{19,20} and second largest among CARICOM member countries^{21,22}. Jamaica's Human Development Index (HDI) score of 0.73 placed it 85th out of 187 countries in 2022. The economy is characterised by small size, openness, and extreme vulnerability to natural hazards. Its potential for economic and social development has been acknowledged and is discussed below, yet it is highly vulnerable to external shocks, shown all too clearly by recent economic crises, exacerbated by the effect of COVID-19, while also facing ongoing development challenges.

Jamaica is an archipelagic state and has stewardship over a marine space 24 times its land space, with an exclusive economic zone of approximately 235,000 km². Despite its relatively large population compared to most other Caribbean countries, Jamaica is categorised as a Small Island Developing State (SIDS)²³, and experiences many of the unique social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities related to such contexts²⁴, including vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks, fragile land and marine ecosystems which cause vulnerability to biodiversity loss and climate change.

Jamaica was a founding member of the CDB, in an Agreement signed on October 18, 1969, in Kingston, Jamaica^{25,26}. It was the single largest shareholder from 1983 until Trinidad and Tobago increased its share capital to the same level. Currently Jamaica and Trinidad remain the Bank's largest shareholders with 17.31% each²⁷.

For most of the past four decades, Jamaica has suffered from very low growth, high public debt, and serious social and environmental challenges. GDP per capita remained static over the period 2001-2019 and has not kept pace with the increased GDP per capita of upper middle-income countries. As a result of COVID-19, IMF figures show a decline in GDP per capita from USD5,369 in 2019 to USD4,664 in 2020, which has affected living standards and exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities (see Figure 1)²⁸.

¹⁹ Behind Haiti, Cuba, and Dominican Republic,

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Behind Haiti

²² Ibid

²³ United Nations (2022), "List of SIDS", Accessed 28 May 2022 from <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids>

²⁴ United Nations (2022), "About Small Island Developing States". Accessed 28 May 2022 from <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states>


²⁵ Entered into force on January 26, 1970

²⁶ CARICOM (2022). "Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)". Accessed 28 May 2022 from [https://caricom.org/institutions/caribbean-development-bank-cdb/#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20Development%20Bank%20\(CDB,force%20on%20January%2026%2C%201970](https://caricom.org/institutions/caribbean-development-bank-cdb/#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20Development%20Bank%20(CDB,force%20on%20January%2026%2C%201970)

²⁷ CDB (2022), "Borrowing Members". Accessed 28 May 2022 from <https://www.caribank.org/countries-and-members/borrowing-members/trinidad-and-tobago> and <https://www.caribank.org/countries-and-members/borrowing-members/jamaica>


²⁸ World Bank (2022): GDP per capita data set. Accessed 27 May 2022 from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=BZ-XT-JM-GY-GT-SV>

Figure 1: GDP per Capita (USD): Jamaica vs. Upper Middle-Income and selected LAC Countries



Over the period 2008-10, the country was gripped by recession, with GDP falling by 0.8-3.4% each year, followed by one year of growth in 2011 only to be followed by another fall in GDP of 0.4% in 2012 (see Figure 2)²⁹. In October 2012, unemployment stood at 13.7%, public debt was estimated at 134.1% of GDP (see Figure 3), and the country registered a fiscal deficit of 4.0% of GDP and a primary surplus of 5.3% of GDP, the current account of the Balance of Payment (BOP) was 12.8% of GDP and Net International Reserves (NIR) stood at USD884.3mn (Gross Reserves equivalent to 11.7 weeks of imports of goods and services)³⁰.

Figure 2: Jamaica GDP Growth (Annual % Change) between 1980 and 2021



Key factors behind these problems were Jamaica’s unsustainable debt burden, low competitiveness, a weak business climate, and lack of policy credibility. During 2012/13, GOJ prepared a comprehensive economic

²⁹ Ibid


³⁰ Ministry of Finance and the Public Service (2014), “Fiscal Policy Paper 2013-2014”

reform programme to address these challenges,³¹ with support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)^{32,33}. Its main objective was to put public debt on a firmly downward trajectory and thereby create a virtuous cycle of debt sustainability and higher economic growth. This multi-layered reform programme comprised ambitious fiscal consolidation, improvement in competitiveness, debt reduction, and improved social protection programmes. Achieving higher and sustained growth was considered key to increase the welfare of Jamaicans and ensure the country’s long-term macroeconomic stability³⁴.

As a result of the implementation of the economic reform programme, by the end of 2019, Jamaica had realised a much-improved macroeconomic position with positive results up to then. There was small but consistent GDP growth from 2014-19, and debt levels were significantly reduced and maintained at below 100% of GDP prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (discussed further below).

The Jamaican economy is heavily reliant on the service industry. Between 2010 and 2020 the contribution to GDP from the service industry³⁵ fluctuated between 78-80%, while goods production represented a maximum of 27%, with manufacturing, construction and agriculture being the main drivers in this area.³⁶ This heavy reliance on the service industry contributed to the extreme shock experienced because of the COVID-19 pandemic over the period 2020-21.

Figure 3: Internal and External Balance between 2001 and 2021



The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the most severe economic contraction to be recorded in several decades. Given its inherent vulnerabilities including high indebtedness, limited diversification of its production base and a high degree of susceptibility to natural, economic, and health-related shocks, Jamaica was constrained

³¹ International Monetary Fund (2013), "IMF Executive Board Approves USD932.3n Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Jamaica", Accessed 24 May 2022 from <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2013/126/article-A003-en.xml>

³² Government of Jamaica (2013), "Fiscal Policy Paper 2013 – 14".

³³ The Jamaica economic reform rested on three main pillars: 1) Profound fiscal consolidation to halt and reverse the debt accumulation process; 2) Debt service reduction through liability management initiatives (this includes the National Debt Exchange that was completed in March 2013); and 3) Measures to enhance the competitiveness of Jamaica products, thus facilitating faster economic growth.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Categories for services as recorded in the ESSJ include – Basic Services, Electricity and Water, Transport, Storage and Communication, Financial Intermediation Services and Other Services.

³⁶ PIOJ (2020), (2018), (2013), "Economic and Social Survey Jamaica".

in its ability to employ effective measures to mitigate the severity of the pandemic. As a result, real GDP for 2020 contracted by 9.9% (see Figure 2).

The COVID-19 pandemic also resulted in a disruption in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to Jamaica as major investment projects and decisions were halted. However, several multilateral institutions responded to the liquidity demands of Jamaica, with a series of initiatives aimed at mitigating the immediate impacts of the pandemic and providing finance for economic recovery. GOJ requested and received emergency financing from the IMF in the amount of USD520.0mn (100% of quota) through the Rapid Financing Instrument, which was used to support the Balance of Payments needs stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁷ GOJ has however been successfully exploring ways of mitigating the impact of disasters, as outlined in Box 1. Another stabilising factor was that remittances were strong during the period, helping with the balance of payments and household income.

*Box 1: Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance*³⁸

Jamaica made important strides in disaster risk financing during the period 2014-21. A World Bank team worked with the Ministry of Finance and Public Service (MOFPS) and benefited from data and information provided by the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC), the Insurance Association of Jamaica (IAJ), the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), and the Financial Service Commission (FSC). Its 2018 report was prepared using the operational framework that was developed and promoted by the World Bank Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program (DRFIP).

The report made recommendations to the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) for the formulation of a country-specific comprehensive disaster risk finance (DRF) strategy, based on the assessment of the legislative, financial management, fiscal, and insurance market environment in Jamaica. This would equip MOFPS with information and instruments to manage contingent liabilities posed by natural disasters. It concluded that Jamaica could adjust its approach to disaster financing to be timelier and more cost-effective and to minimize opportunity costs; existing instruments for DRF are not optimised to address Jamaica's disaster risk profile, prone to high-and low-frequency natural hazards.

On average, in the long term, the GOJ would need to cover losses of approximately USD121mn (JMD16 billion (bn)) annually, or 0.84 percent (%) of Jamaica's 2015 gross domestic product to address its contingent liabilities related to hurricanes and floods, an amount also equivalent to 3.09% of total government expenditures in 2016. Hurricane damage to public and private building infrastructure alone will amount to USD67 mn (JMD9 bn) on average each year in the long run. In addition to long-term impacts on economic and social development in Jamaica, disasters also increase Jamaica's sovereign debt, as more loans are borrowed to finance unplanned post-disaster expenditures.

The pandemic also highlighted Jamaica's socio-economic vulnerabilities and threatened the achievement of development targets within the timelines outlined in Vision 2030 Jamaica - National Development Plan. A summary of the current development context and challenges is provided below.

SOCIAL CONTEXT

Gender: Gender issues have a considerable impact on development in Jamaica, spanning education, crime and violence, political representation, and the labour force among others. While Jamaica was the first English speaking country in the Caribbean to achieve universal adult suffrage and grant women the right to be elected to Parliament, and despite GOJ's commitment to various gender-related initiatives, gender inequality and

³⁷ Planning Institute of Jamaica (2020), "Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica"

³⁸ World Bank Group (2018), "Advancing Disaster Risk Finance in Jamaica", Accessed 4 Nov 22 from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33089>

inequity are still a major development concern. In 2019 Jamaica had a Gender Development Index (GDI) of 0.994, ranking it in high in terms of equality compared to other Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, but only 88 out of 162 countries overall³⁹. Wide disparities are found in the details of the GDI and GNI reports, with a low 19% of parliamentary seats held by women in 2019; and female participation in the labour market at 59.8% compared to 72.5% of men. In contrast, male participation in education is declining compared to that of women, with 70.0% of women with at least some secondary education, compared to 62.4% of men. Data from the 2016 Women’s Health Survey of Jamaica showed that one in every four Jamaican women reported being sexually harassed during their lifetime. In response, GOJ introduced the sexual harassment (Protection and Prevention) Act 2021, which aims to protect all its citizens in the workplace, while renting property, conducting business or in other daily interactions⁴⁰.

Poverty and Social Inequities: Jamaica’s Human Development Index (HDI) has been steadily rising since 1990, and in 2019 was 0.734, ranking it 101 out of 189 countries. Inequality-adjusted HDI results in a loss of 16.6%, which is a smaller loss than for LAC countries (22.2%) and high HDI countries (17.9%). This is somewhat reflected in the 2018 Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC), which indicated that there has been a reduction in inequality, with a decrease in GINI Coefficient from 0.37822 in 2017 to 0.36147 in 2018. Poverty rates also appeared to decrease in recent years to 12.6% of the population in 2018, as did extreme poverty rates to 3.5% of the population. Despite this, 4.8% of the population were found to be extremely vulnerable to falling below the poverty line. Poverty and social inequities have been found to especially impact women (see previous section on Gender), youth and persons with disabilities (PWD). Youths aged 15-24 are more likely to be unemployed and not in education, and more likely to be involved in crime. Jamaica ranks 75th out of 183 countries in the 2020 Youth Development Index – a substantial drop from its ranking of 46th in 2017, and Jamaica is one of only three countries in the Caribbean which has shown an overall drop in youth development since 2010. PWD are also found to be far more likely to be without access to education and have significantly lower employment rates.


Governance: According to the World Bank’s (WB) Worldwide Governance Indicators⁴¹, Jamaica’s performance on the quality of governance has been mixed over the period 2014 to 2020. Rule of Law has remained consistently below the 50th percentile compared to other countries globally. Control of Corruption has shown marginal but steady improvement but remains below the 60th percentile. All other indicators have remained flat or shown slight falls from 2019 to 2020 after modest increases previously, reflecting the need for continued focus on improving overall governance.

³⁹ UNDP (2022), “Multi Country Office in Jamaica/Gender”, accessed 8 Nov 2022 from [Gender | UNDP Multi Country Office in Jamaica](#)

⁴⁰ Jamaica Information Service (2022), “The Sexual Harassment (Protection and Prevention) Act “, Accessed 28 May 2022 from <https://jis.gov.jm/information/get-the-facts/the-sexual-harassment-protection-and-prevention-act/> .

⁴¹ World Bank (2021). Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2021 Update. Accessed 28 May 2022 from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=wgidataset.xlsx> .

Figure 4: Jamaica Governance Indicators between 2014 and 2020



Challenges in the Education Sector: Overall enrolment in education in Jamaica indicates a positive picture, with stable and relatively high enrolment figures up to secondary education level over the period 2015-2020, and equal enrolment rates between males and females at both primary and secondary level. This changes at the tertiary level, where women consistently make up more than 60% of the total enrolment.⁴² Compared to enrolment figures, attendance figures have shown significantly worse performance, with only 8 out of 10 students attending school daily, and much lower figures in rural areas and amongst poorer families. The 2014 Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC)⁴³ indicated that over 27% of households cited financial reasons for poor school attendance. In the JSLC 2018⁴⁴, full attendance had dropped to 76.7% at primary and 72.6% at secondary level, but with a decrease of 8% (19.9%) of families reporting financial problems for lack of attendance.

Even though the Ministry of Education has consistently received one of the largest portions of the National Budget (approximately 20%), quality issues have continued to be a concern. In 2018 only 65.6% of fourth grade students mastered foundational skills in numeracy and 83% in literacy.⁴⁵ In 11th grade only 47% of applicants passed the mathematics assessment, while 68% passed the English Language test, in the 2018 Caribbean Secondary Certification (CSEC) examination⁴⁶, and pass rates showing a further marked decline during 2020-21, when COVID-19 lockdowns affected the education system.⁴⁷ The pandemic highlighted the digital divide that not only exists between schools, but also between students and teachers. A key impediment in many schools is the lack of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) resources and internet connectivity. At the same time, 35% of students were estimated by the MOEY to be without internet access during the COVID-19 pandemic, with limited access to the remote learning strategies established by schools.⁴⁸ While the internet is being used as the primary tool to access education, many children lacked

⁴² For example, At the university of the West Indies (UWI) Mona of a total 17, 331 students enrolled in 2019/20 12,025 or 69.3% were females. The total number of students graduating in 2019/20 was 3689 and 74% of the number were females.

⁴³ PIOJ (2014), “Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2014”.

⁴⁴ PIOJ (2018), “Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2018”.

⁴⁵ MOEY (2019), “2018 Grade 4 Literacy Test by Schools”.

⁴⁶ The World Bank data suggest that learning levels in the general population could be lower as only 40% of students sit the CSEC and these are the students identified with a high probability of passing.

⁴⁷ World Bank data estimates the COVID-19 resulted in a loss of 1.3 years of Learning Adjusted Years of Schooling (LAYS) due to reduction in quality of learning.

⁴⁸ The MOEYI estimates that approximately 120,000 students have not been consistently engaged since the onset of COVID giving rise to learning gaps. Using 2018/2019 statistics this represents 15-20% of the enrolled primary and

access to broadband internet. Further, for teachers to successfully navigate the digital space, they must be adequately equipped with the necessary resources as well. However, several schools received upgraded internet services since the start of the pandemic, with some also benefitting from sponsorships for internet services by private donors.⁴⁹ Limited access to Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) sectors has also been raised and improving access to these is a key part of GOJ's Vision 2030.

Gaps in Social Protection: There are several social protection programmes in Jamaica. The most prominent programmes facilitating social protection are Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH); the National Health Fund (NHF); the National Insurance Scheme (NIS); and the Jamaican Drugs for the Elderly Programme (JADEP).

PATH provides cash transfers to eligible persons in families selected for inclusion in the programme through a proxy means test. The 2018 JSLC revealed that 36.4% of households across the country had at some time applied for the benefits under PATH and 61.7% of those that applied had received a benefit at some point. The NHF is a drug subsidy programme providing universal social assistance to people, of any age, with any of 17 specified medical conditions. Approximately 15.6% of the over-18 population is registered to the NHF, however registration rates are notably lower in the poorest poverty quintile of the population.⁵⁰

The NIS is a contributory social insurance programme that provides a minimum guaranteed pension and other benefits to eligible persons who are registered. Approximately 55% of persons 18 years and older reported that they had registered with the NIS at some time and, in 2018, 57.9% of women and 52.8% of men were registered. It was found however that 27.5% of those registered had never contributed to the Scheme, potentially affecting the ability of the programme to provide the intended coverage. Some of the reasons cited for the low levels of contribution include the registrant not being in employment; opting to save independently of the scheme and being unsure of how to contribute.⁵¹ The JADEP is targeted at persons sixty years and older and is a universal drug subsidy programme for this age group. However, by 2018 only 17.4% of those eligible were registered⁵², with substantially lower number in men (13.2%), compared to women (21.3%).

Crime and Violence: Crime rates in Jamaica have remained among the highest in the world over decades, with homicide rates between 2015 and 2018 rising to 56 per 100,000 after a decline from 2009 to 2014.⁵³ Studies indicate a range of interconnected factors behind the crime rates, including poverty, gang violence, the drug trade, culture (and associated firearms culture), and money laundering and "scamming".^{54,55} The economic impact of crime and violence in Jamaica has been conservatively estimated at between 3.7- 4% of

secondary school cohort that year (Jamaica Education Transformation Commission (2021), *The Reform of Education in Jamaica, 2021 Report*).

⁴⁹ Jamaica Education Transformation Commission (2021), *The Reform of Education in Jamaica, 2021 Report*

⁵⁰ Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and Statistical Institute of Jamaica (2021), "Jamaica Survey of living conditions 2018".

⁵¹ Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) & Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) March 2021, "Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2018".

⁵² Anecdotal reasons given for this include the fact that many of the elderly use the public sector facilities where the drugs are 100% free to the user; some of the elderlies do not have the capacity to interact with the formal systems because of lack of know how or lack of identification such as National ID or Birth Certificate.

⁵³ World Bank (2022), "Homicides (per 100,000 people) – Jamaica". Accessed 29 May 2022 from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=JM>.

⁵⁴ Sherill V. Morris-Francis et al (2019). *Crime and Violence in the Caribbean: Lessons from Jamaica*

⁵⁵ CDB (2017), "Country Strategy Paper 2017-21 – Jamaica".

GDP.⁵⁶ Youth are particularly at risk of becoming involved in or victims of crime and violence, with youths responsible for 48% of murders and major crimes. Men account overall for 97% of major crimes.^{57,58}

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

Climate and Environmental Risks: Jamaica is at high risk of natural disasters, with high percentages of GDP and the population at risk to two or more hazards. The primary risks are linked to natural hazards including hurricanes, floods, droughts, earthquakes, storm surges, and landslides. Over the last two decades, the frequency and intensity of hurricanes and high-intensity rainfall events have increased, with the country averaging at least one storm event per annum.⁵⁹ Climate change has affected key sectors such as water, where resources have been adversely impacted by climate-related extreme events such as droughts, flooding, and tropical weather systems, as well as sea level rise. Both groundwater and streams are vulnerable to pollution, saline intrusion, eroded riverbeds, and, in some areas, reduced rainfall. The distribution of water resources is also susceptible to damage from extreme climate events such as landslides and flooding.

Jamaica's forests (which cover over 40% of land area) are the main repositories of terrestrial biodiversity, especially of flora and fauna. The main threats to biodiversity in Jamaica have been identified as habitat loss, climate change, resource over-exploitation, invasive alien species and pollution. Conservation constraints include: a lack of political will; limited public awareness; conflicting policy/limited inter-Agency collaboration; unwillingness to share data/information; limited information on biological resources and natural heritage; low revenue/funding; limited expertise in areas such as taxonomy; poor socio-economic planning; and weak law enforcement. Other factors noted were population growth, coupled with agricultural, industrial and commercial expansion, which resulted in intense competition for land leading to encroachment and fragmentation of natural habitat; processes and events such as erosion and hurricanes, the effects of which were often exacerbated by human activities and practices.⁶⁰

Agricultural Sector: Agriculture plays a critical role in driving economic growth, moderating Jamaica's debt burden, and reducing rural poverty and inequality. The agriculture sector's contribution to GDP has almost doubled since 2007 to 8.7% to GDP in 2020.⁶¹ Given the sector's importance for food security and the overall economy, addressing the various challenges is essential, including those resulting from climate change. Decline in agricultural output due to the impact of irregular rainfalls and drought has been a hallmark of the sector over the past thirteen years.⁶² Farmers have sustained significant crop loss due to the winds, floods, landslides, and prolonged periods of rain during hurricane season. Small farmers also suffer significant losses related to lower yield from drought. Crop cultivation on steep slopes and unsustainable farming practices such as slash and burn have led to soil erosion, flooding, and degradation of watersheds. Furthermore, approximately 60% of all farmlands is located on the southwestern half (leeward side) of the island, with a semi-arid climate. Small farmers, with five hectares or less, account for 85% of total agricultural holdings. These farmers have limited resources and, as a result, limited capacity to recover from extreme weather events, as crop production is highly dependent on rainfall.⁶³

Energy: Energy security is key to economic growth and environmental sustainability. Over the period 2017-21, Jamaica imported between 21.6 and 25.9mn barrels of petroleum products each year representing over

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ward, McGaw, and Marsh (2017). Youth, Peace and Security Case Study, Jamaica.

⁵⁸ IADB (2016), . D. Harriott and M. Jones (2016), "Crime and Violence in Jamaica"

⁵⁹ CDB (2017), "Country Strategy Paper 2017-21 – Jamaica".

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ World Bank (2021), "Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, value added (% of GDP) – Jamaica". Accessed 28 May 2022 from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=JM>

⁶² IICA (2018), "Assessment of the vulnerability of Jamaica's agricultural sector to the adverse consequences of severe weather events".

⁶³ Ibid.

90% of the country's energy needs. Electricity generation and road transportation account for the largest proportion of fuel imports, consistently accounting for over 55% of total consumption overall, and 64% in 2021 (34% road transportation; 30% electricity generation).⁶⁴ By reducing the country's expenditure on electricity consumption, valuable resources could be freed for other priority investments. GOJ committed in the 2009 National Energy Policy to create a modern, efficient, diversified, and environmentally sustainable energy sector for the island. This included: replacing oil with Liquefied Natural Gas as the main energy source; diversifying the energy mix toward a renewable energy (RE) target of 30% by 2030; and reducing the energy intensity and consumption of petroleum imports in the medium term through energy efficiency (EE) initiatives in the electricity and transportation sectors.⁶⁵ Despite this, growth in the RE sector (hydropower, wind and solar) has been slow, with wind contributions remaining static over the period 2017-2021 and solar showing modest increases.⁶⁶

3.2 IFI/Donor Context

The principal multilateral partners in Jamaica aside from CDB are the WB, European Union (EU), InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations (UN) agencies. OECD figures do not accurately capture the development flows to Jamaica, but they are still provided for consistency with other CSP evaluations (see Figures 5 and 6). Specifically, they do not capture China Ex-Im Bank or WB flows at all. Separate data indicates that IDB is in fact the largest partner, having provided USD898mn of financing over the period 2016-22, with a similar amount provided over their previous strategy period from 2013-15⁶⁷. World Bank is the second largest multilateral partner, having provided over USD700mn of loans over the period 2014-2021⁶⁸. World Bank commitments showed a dramatic drop from 2014-15, when over USD400mn in loans was provided, to just USD115mn over the period 2016-2018 (and zero in 2019), which reflects GOJ's fiscal situation at that time. However, since 2020 the World Bank has again become a major lender, providing over USD100mn in both 2020 and 2021⁶⁹.

There are several UN agencies providing support and with a permanent physical presence in Jamaica. The largest bilateral partner is China, which provided the second largest amount of funding overall after the WB, with USD653mn of loans from 2016–2021 through the China Ex-Im (Export-Import) Bank, entirely for road infrastructure⁷⁰. Other significant bilateral donors include the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, France, and Canada. In the sectors supported by the CDB, CDB appears to represent a very small financial contribution compared to other actors except for in water supply and sanitation, where it is the largest single donor. A summary of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by major sector is provided in Figure 5, and CDB specific support by sector in Figure 6⁷¹.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology (2022), "Jamaica Energy Statistics 2021".

⁶⁵ CDB (2017), "Jamaica Country Strategy Paper 2017-2021".

⁶⁶ Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology (2022), "Jamaica Energy Statistics 2021".

⁶⁷ IDB (2022), Independent Country Program Review, Jamaica, 2016-2022

⁶⁸ World Bank (2022), IBRD/IDA Summary, Jamaica, Lending Amounts by FY. Accessed 3rd Oct 2022 from WBG Finances - IBRD/IDA Summary ([worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org))

⁶⁹ \$150m during this period was for COVID-19 recovery – see Development Projects : Jamaica COVID-19 Response and Recovery Development Policy Financing - P174531 ([worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org))

⁷⁰ Inter-American Dialogue (2022), "China-Latin America Finance Databases". Accessed 8 Nov 2022 from https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/

⁷¹ Retrieved from stats2.oecd.org 02 Sep 22. "Commitments" are defined as formal/written commitments to provide funds. It is notable that based on the CDB figures, this does not capture all commitments during this period, and so is provided to provide a snapshot of the major donors overall and in each sector rather than as a rigorous representation of funds committed. OECD disbursement figures are similar.

Figure 5: ODA Commitments to Jamaica by Major Sector, 2014-20 (USDmn)





Figure 6: Official Development Assistance Commitments to Jamaica 2014-2020, (USDm)



4 Performance

4.1 Introduction

This section of the report examines the performance of CDB’s activities in Jamaica since 2014 against overall strategy and programme management, and then against the five specific evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

4.2 Country Strategy and Programme Management

Finding 1: There was a very strong perception across stakeholder groups that CDB has not been visible and engaged enough in Jamaica and that it has not capitalised on its position as the regional bank. This has impacted on overall programme management and performance of the two CSPs across all the evaluation criteria.

The Bank has no permanent presence in Jamaica, and most stakeholders saw this as having severely limited CDB’s ability to effectively engage at both a strategic and operational level. Several stakeholders directly compared the lack of CDB presence with the WB and IDB, who did have a physical presence in-country and were seen as being very proactive in how they engaged with GOJ and other in-country stakeholders. COVID-19 further affected CDB’s ability to engage, as staff were unable to conduct in-country missions for over two years. There was however a majority consensus that there were issues with limited engagement prior to the onset of COVID-19, and that CDB had failed to capitalise on its position as the regional Bank, with valuable local expertise and experience to offer. CDB’s July 2022 mission visit was seen as the first step towards improved engagement with Jamaica, but it was felt that a lot of work was needed to get the relationship back on track. As one stakeholder stated –

“As the regional bank – “our bank” - CDB needs to do more to build its reputation among BMCs including Jamaica by advocating for them, pushing forward the issues the region has, and helping GOJ to speak the language of the IFIs and ensuring they don’t get exploited” (Development Partner).

The impact of CDB’s sub-optimal engagement and visibility cuts across all evaluation criteria:

- **Relevance** was reduced due to limited uptake of interventions and insufficient consideration of executing agency capacity: While the fiscal context was acknowledged as a key factor which affected uptake of loans, it was noted that GOJ did take on loans from other IFIs, and that one factor behind this was the more active engagement by other IFIs.
- **Coherence** was affected as CDB did not engage effectively or sufficiently with other partners or succeed in leveraging complementarities: Other IFIs and IDPs in Jamaica had very little awareness of CDB’s work in the country, with more than one partner unaware of the type of support CDB was providing to the country.
- **Effectiveness and efficiency** were affected as anticipated results were not achieved at least partly due to insufficient ongoing engagement/adaptation in some interventions, but also due to key contextual factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
- **Sustainability** was constrained by inappropriate planning and design of interventions (which resulted in, for example, significant rescoping of interventions after the appraisal stage) and insufficient mitigation of capacity constraints, although there were positive examples of capacity building and sustainability in some projects.

4.3 Relevance

4.3.1 Overview

The development challenges identified in the CSP, and the proposed support programme were generally highly relevant to Jamaica's development priorities. The proposed programme was also relevant to CDB's corporate and sectoral mandates. However, despite the generally high degree of design relevance of CDB's programme, many of the proposed engagements were not realised, which reduces the substantive relevance of the programme.

4.3.2 Relevance to Jamaica's development challenges

ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS AND STRATEGIES

Finding 2: The development challenges identified in the period covered by the two CSPs were and remain aligned with Vision 2030 Jamaica and thus highly relevant. The individual interventions planned were also generally well aligned with the relevant Sector Plans. Almost all stakeholders felt that CDB's interventions were highly relevant. Nevertheless, several interventions did not proceed, sometimes due to the scope of the 2017-21 CSP being too broad and ambitious.

Background documents showed that the sectors covered by the two CSPs mapped well against GOJ national outcomes as set out in the Vision 2030 development plan and the relevant Medium Term Socio-Economic Development Frameworks (MTF). The 2014-16 CSP planned to work in three out of the 15 National Outcomes in Vision 2030, compared to the 2017-21 CSP which covered 11 out of 15 outcomes (see Table 3)⁷².

There were some outcomes that the 2017-21 CSP covered which were not considered a priority in one or more of the MTFs. For example, Energy Security and Efficiency was not listed as a priority in any of three MTFs covering the period 2014-21, but it was included in the 2017-21 CSP⁷³. There was also some shifting of priorities from the 2015-18 MTF to the 2018-21 MTF, which benefited CDB's programme alignment: Internationally Competitive Industry Structures (including agriculture) and Sustainable Management and Use of Environmental and Natural Resources were not listed as priorities in either the 2012-15 or 2015-18 MTFs, but both became priorities in the 2018-21 MTFs, and aligned well with CDB's 2017-21 outcomes related to transformation of the agriculture sector and reduced vulnerability to natural hazards⁷⁴.

Three outcomes within Vision 2030 and the MTFs were not supported by either CSP: those related to health, culture, and technology. The 2017-21 CSP paper noted that multiple other actors were working in health, for example Global Fund, USAID, WHO/PAHO, EU, WB, but none were listed as working in culture, and only the IDB was listed as working in technology. However, no GOJ stakeholders referenced these outcomes as being areas that CDB should have supported. At intervention level, CDB's planned interventions were generally in very good alignment with the focus areas and interventions outlined in relevant Vision 2030

⁷² CDB (2014), Country Strategy Paper 2014-16, Jamaica; CDB (2017), Country Strategy Paper 2017-21; GOJ (2012), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2012-15; GOJ (2015), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2015-18; GOJ (2018), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2018-21; GOJ (2009), Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan

⁷³ Of interest is that WB and UNDP also provided support in this area despite it not being a priority in the MTF. This indicates that GOJ may have indicated this area as a priority in discussions with CDB and other IDPs

⁷⁴ Although the 2017-21 CSP had already been agreed by the time the 2018-21 MTF was drafted

Sector Plans, with all interventions at least partly aligned, and the majority in strong alignment (see Annex E)⁷⁵.

The limited scope in terms of outcomes covered by the 2014-16 CSP was related to the fiscal context in Jamaica at the time. Within these constraints, the CSP planned to focus on areas of strong CDB track-record in Jamaica such as irrigation, rural education and water infrastructure (via BNTF), but also in citizen security, where it had no previous experience in Jamaica. The 2017-21 CSP plans were in contrast extremely broad. In both cases, interventions that proceeded reflected the changing context in Jamaica at the time, with the 2014-16 CSP ultimately providing most of the support to a USD30m PPBL which cut across Safety and Security, Governance, and Inclusive Growth related CSP outcomes.

Stakeholders confirmed that the plans outlined in the two CSPs were highly relevant, as were the interventions which proceeded. They were seen as based on a good understanding of the context and needs of the country, with a clear consultative process which allowed CDB and other stakeholders to reflect on the priorities of the government (e.g., irrigation, rural education, and water infrastructure) along with broader needs.

While no specific examples were shared of grants being offered but not taken up, uptake of concessional loans was below expectations due to constrained fiscal space and the match funding required. However, there was a perception across stakeholder groups that even within this context, CDB could have done more to engage with GOJ to raise uptake – noting that loans and grants were taken up from other IFIs – and actively work through issues with CDB processes, lack of visibility, requirements for counterpart funding, others providing better offers etc. In addition, some stakeholders felt that the 2017-21 CSP was too broad, and that the CSP may have been more successful if it had focussed on fewer sectors/outcomes and/or fewer interventions⁷⁶.

ALIGNMENT WITH COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

While it was noted by some stakeholders that the technical capacity within Jamaica is strong compared to the other BMCs, implementation capacity, specifically project management capacity, is more limited, particularly within government ministries/departments.

Project Management was seen as a main capacity limitation within executing agencies. This was mitigated by either building capacity among existing staff within the agency (seen as better for sustainability) or via putting in place a Project Implementation Unit within the executing agency and recruiting temporary staff (seen as a quick fix and more likely to provide consistent results). Stakeholders felt that neither of these solutions was ideal, and highlighted that many agencies, including government departments, are not currently set-up to cover project management/implementation type activities.

⁷⁵ GOJ (2012), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2012-15; GOJ (2015), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2015-18; GOJ (2018), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2018-21; GOJ (2009), Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan

⁷⁶ CDB (2020), 2017-21 Country Strategy Completion Report; KIIs (CDB and GOJ)

Table 3: Alignment between GOJ and CDB Strategies⁷⁷

GOJ Vision 2030		GOJ MTF	CDB CSP	GOJ MTF		CDB CSP
National Goal	National Outcome	2012-15	2014-2016	2015-18	2018-21	2017-2021
Jamaicans are empowered to achieve their fullest potential	A healthy and stable population	Priority	N/A	Priority	Priority	N/A
	World-Class Education and Training	Priority	World-Class Education and Training	Priority	Priority	Enhanced educational quality
	Effective Social Protection	Priority	N/A	Priority	Priority	Improved effectiveness of social protection
	Authentic and Transformational Culture	Not a priority	N/A	Not a priority	Priority	N/A
Jamaican society is secure, cohesive, and just	Security and Safety	Priority	Security and Safety	Priority	Priority	Reduced crime, increased citizen security and support for at-risk youth
	Effective Governance	Priority	N/A	Priority	Priority	Improved public sector governance
Jamaica's economy is prosperous	A Stable Macroeconomy	Priority	N/A	Priority	Priority	N/A
	An Enabling Business Environment	Priority	N/A	Priority	Priority	Inclusive growth & competitiveness reforms
	Strong Economic Infrastructure	Priority	N/A	Priority	Not a priority	Resilient economic infrastructure
	Energy Security and Efficiency	Not a priority	N/A	Not a priority	Not a priority	Improved energy security and efficiency
	A Technology-Enabled Society	Not a priority	N/A	Not a priority	Not a priority	N/A
	Internationally Competitive Industry Structures (including Agriculture)	Not a priority	N/A	Not a priority	Priority	Agriculture sector transformed
Sustainable Management and Use of Environmental and Natural Resources	Not a priority	N/A	Not a priority	Priority		
Jamaica has a healthy natural environment	Sustainable Urban and Rural Development	Not a priority	Sustainable Urban and Rural Development	Not a priority	Priority	Reduced vulnerability to natural disasters
	Hazard Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change	Priority	Hazard Risk Reduction & Adaptation to Climate Change	Priority	Priority	

4.3.3 Alignment with CDB’s Cross-cutting Priorities

Finding 3: Alignment with CDB’s cross-cutting priorities at the appraisal stage is strongest in gender and the environment. Alignment was weaker in Regional Cooperation and Integration, Energy Efficiency and Security and Governance. This partly reflected that these areas were not relevant to all interventions. The degree to which these priorities continued to be integrated beyond the appraisal stage was less clear, but with some indications that integration of gender was not as strong during implementation.

A summary of the level of integration of different cross-cutting priorities is provided individually below in Table 4 and in the following sub-sections. Gender and the environment were relatively strongly integrated into a significant number of interventions at the appraisal stage, but due to the limited availability of PCRs and PSRs, it was not possible to build a clear picture of the extent to which this continued throughout implementation. Some stakeholders however felt that planned gender mainstreaming activities did not always proceed as anticipated. Weaker integration of other areas was generally seen as reflective of these priorities not being as broadly cross-cutting, although some CDB stakeholders felt that there were some missed opportunities for integration of RCI and governance.

GENDER

Both CSPs committed CDB to support gender mainstreaming and to improve gender awareness in all its activities, incorporating gender performance indicators and targets within country and sector results frameworks and undertaking gender analysis for each sector where active, including the collection and maintenance of sex-disaggregated statistics. Among sampled projects, approximately half of interventions were assessed as gender mainstreamed at appraisal, with another eight marginally mainstreamed. Three projects were not at all mainstreamed, with justifications provided. There was strong support from GOJ and other in-country counterparts for gender mainstreaming in all sectors, with several implementing agencies stating that even without CDB encouragement, they would mainstream gender in their activities.

Table 4: Summary of Sampled Project Alignment at Appraisal with CDB Cross-Cutting Priorities

Integration of CDB Cross-cutting Priorities	Gender* ⁷⁸	RCI	Energy	Environ.	Govern.
Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability - PBL	3.0				
Institutional Strengthening - MoFPS	2.5				
Strengthening Capacities for Implementation & Resource Mobilisation	2.0				
Sixth Industrial Line of Credit	2.5				
Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica’s ICT BPO Industry	2.0				
Street Light Retrofitting Project	2.0				
Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study	3.0				
Rural Water Supply Programme					
Canada - CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund					
Building Resilience & Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham					
Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation					
Establishment of a Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index	2.0				

⁷⁷ CDB (2014), Country Strategy Paper 2014-16 Jamaica; CDB (2017), Country Strategy Paper 2017-21 – Jamaica; GOJ (2015), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2015-18; GOJ (2019), Medium-Term Socio-Economic Development Framework 2018-21; PIOJ (2009), Vision 2030 Jamaica National Development Plan

* Gender marker scores provided. Score of 3+ indicates gender mainstreamed, 2-3 marginally mainstreamed, <2 not mainstreamed. Where no gender marker analysis was available, qualitative review of planned project activities and results was reviewed to provide a rating

Integration of CDB Cross-cutting Priorities	Gender ⁷⁸	RCI	Energy	Environ.	Govern.
Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project	3.25				
BNTF Ninth Programme – Jamaica	3.5				
BNTF 8th Programme	3				
Baseline Studies: 17 Vulnerable & Volatile Communities to Support GOJ's CRP	3.25				
National Disability Assessments	4.0				
Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in Electricity Sector	0				
Capacity Building for Market Access – Establishment of The Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
Uniforms Ltd					
Support to JIPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem	0				
Business of Music in The Caribbean Workshops	4.0				

Strong integration  Partial integration  No integration  Not applicable 

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

The 2014-16 CSP did not reference RCI at all, despite RCI being part of the 2010-14 and 2015-19 CDB Strategic Plans⁷⁹. In contrast, the 2017-2021 CSP stated that RCI would be mainstreamed across all initiatives⁸⁰ but did not outline how this would be done in practice. RCI was explicitly integrated into only five sampled projects, with three of these being implemented across the Caribbean region (Canada-CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund, the Community Disaster Risk Reduction Fund intervention (Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham) and the National Disability Assessments). A further four projects had partially considered RCI in their design, with RCI either not considered or not applicable to the remaining projects. Overall, there was a consensus among key informants that RCI was not as broadly cross-cutting as other CDB priorities, although some specific examples of where RCI could perhaps have been integrated were mentioned, such as in the BPO intervention.

ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY

The 2014-16 CSP only referenced Energy Efficiency and Security as they were part of Vision 2030's National Outcomes, but not as a CDB cross-cutting priority. Energy was not a standalone focus or priority area under the CDB's 2010-14 or 2015-19 Strategic Plans but was integrated within both as part the Environmental Sustainability priority area⁸¹. In contrast, in the 2017-2021 CSP, energy security was recognised as a cross-cutting issue, both because the reduction of energy expenditure is an important economic objective for Jamaica, as well as diversifying the energy mix toward RE is a key climate mitigation objective. As such, RE generation was included in agricultural projects, for example the Essex Valley Irrigation Project; the diversification of energy sources was a component of the Industrial Line of Credit; and a loan was provided to replace streetlights island-wide, to reduce energy cost and improve energy efficiency.

⁷⁹ Caribbean Development Bank, 2010; Caribbean Development Bank, 2015

⁸⁰ This was not mentioned in the 2014-2016 CSP, which focused on the mainstreaming of DRM and adaptation to climate change, including the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework (CSP 2014-2016, page 15).

⁸¹ Ibid

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

While Environmental Sustainability was a priority focus area in both the 2010-14 and 2015-19 CDB Strategic Plans⁸², the 2014-16 and 2017-21 CSPs did not explicitly identify environmental sustainability as a cross-cutting CDB issue⁸³. An environmental sustainability assessment was however reportedly carried out for the 2017-21 CSP as a whole⁸⁴, and both CSPs did identify environmental resilience or sustainability as a pillar of each Strategy, in alignment with Vision 2030. In practice, environmental sustainability considerations were the second most widely integrated area after gender, with half of sampled projects showing strong integration, and almost all the remainder being not applicable (due to being TA projects with no relation to the environment and no environmental footprint). Some interventions were also explicitly focussed on the environment and/or climate change, such as the bush fire warning system, Canada-CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund and Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham. Appraisals of CDB interventions appeared to always include an environmental sustainability assessment, and beyond the design stage, robust environmental sustainability implementation plans reportedly were prepared⁸⁵.

GOVERNANCE

The 2014-16 CSP did not reference governance as a cross-cutting priority or feature as a pillar of CDB's response, despite "promoting good governance" being listed as priority areas in the 2010-14 and 2015-19 CDB Strategic Plans⁸⁶. In the 2017-21 CSP governance was identified as a pillar of CDB's response rather than a cross-cutting priority. In the 2014-16 CSP, governance was mainly approached through community-level activities. The context of governance in Jamaica was carefully analysed in the 2017-21 CSP and a specific pillar was created to coordinate the pertinent actions. In practice, six sampled projects across the two CSPs integrated governance at the appraisal stage, including all three economic cooperation interventions. Eight interventions have been assessed as being potentially relevant to integration of governance based on the review of the type of implementation being carried out but did not have any governance components.

4.4 Coherence

4.4.1 Overview

Despite both CSPs highlighting the importance of alignment and collaboration with other development partners, CDB's engagement with existing development partners was limited in breadth, although there were some important positive examples of good cooperation, for example with other IFIs as part of the PBL. Nevertheless, partners are willing to work with CDB and leverage their regional experience and expertise. Internal coordination and coherence have been relatively strong during the design of the CSPs and interventions and has supported the mainstreaming of CDB's cross-cutting priorities to some extent but tends to be limited during implementation due to the lack of a country/strategy level coordination mechanism.

⁸² Caribbean Development Bank, 2010; Caribbean Development Bank, 2015

⁸³ Although they did refer to the environment being a cross-cutting issue in general

⁸⁴ Based on KIIs – copy of the assessment not seen

⁸⁵ A key regional level climate change intervention was also completed during the 2017-21 CSP period which is seen as a key initiative for enhancing environmental sustainability – the State of the Caribbean Climate report ([The State of the Caribbean Climate | Caribbean Development Bank \(caribank.org\)](#))

⁸⁶ Ibid

4.4.2 Coherence and Coordination with other Development Partners

Finding 4: While CDB routinely highlighted the importance of coordination and collaboration with other IDPs, for the most part this failed to materialise. There is however clear will among IDPs to work with CDB, and various mechanisms already exist to support this.

Both CSPs highlighted the importance of collaboration with other IDPs based on learning from prior CSPs related to maximising effectiveness and sustainability of investments. This was particularly important in the fiscally constrained Jamaican context. The 2014-16 CSP paper indicated that donor coordination had worked well over the previous strategy period and aimed to build on this. The 2017-21 CSP paper also emphasised the importance of donor coordination and collaboration and outlined potential avenues and mechanisms for improving this. These included taking part in periodic donor meetings; the potential for collaboration to scale up successful projects; and to share knowledge on Jamaica's governance framework to strengthen efficacy of project implementation. Despite meetings with partners during development of the 2017-21 CSP, there was no indication in the CSP that any agreements to collaborate had been secured, although the CSP did propose collaboration with IDB, WB and UNDP on citizen security.

Despite the acknowledged importance of donor coordination and collaboration, KIIs and document review unearthed very few examples of this taking place. The 2014-16 period PBL was one clear and important example of effective IDP collaboration, specifically between CDB, the IMF, IDB and WB. The previous PBL had also been based on a successful collaboration. An Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness PBL was planned during the 2017-21 CSP period but did not proceed as GOJ instead accessed \$200mn in budget support from WB⁸⁷. Other examples cited in background documents were collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on an irrigation project, and collaboration with IDB on TA to the Jamaica Intellectual Property Office (JIPO). The regional Disability Assessments project also engaged various IDPs and other stakeholders including the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, International Labour Organisation (ILO), IDB, the University of the West Indies (UWI) at regional level to provide guidance on methodology and tools. But there was no evidence that in-country IDPs were engaged, as relevant IDPs based in Jamaica were unaware of the intervention. In some respects, other IDPs acted as unintended competitors to CDB in Jamaica's constrained fiscal environment, offering more concessional lending rates and on a larger scale (see previous Section 5.2.2 on Relevance).

While it is possible that in case the 2017-21 PBL had proceeded it would have supported collaboration in other areas as well, the evidence overall points to CDB's lack of engagement with other IDPs, as the main constraint to collaboration and coordination. A majority of current IDP stakeholders were unaware of CDB's specific activities in country, due to the lack of participation by CDB in the formal and informal donor coordination mechanisms which existed. All IDPs were however keen to work with CDB to leverage CDB's acknowledged track record in key sectors such as rural development, the environment and climate change. CDB is also keen to work more with partners as stated in the new CES currently being drafted. There are clear opportunities for this, with various existing IDP coordination mechanisms mentioned:

- In climate change, there is a national development partners meeting that takes place regularly.
- In gender equality, various IDPs including UN agencies, EU, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) collaborate.

⁸⁷ CDB (2022): Country Strategy Completion Report

- UNDP hosts an UN-led donor coordination working group, which looks across the whole development portfolio, to identify gaps and strategically identify which IDP is the best fit for the gaps.

PIOJ also plays an important role in donor coordination, ensuring that support from IDPs is not duplicative.

4.4.3 Internal Coordination and Coherence

Finding 5: Internal CDB coordination is relatively strong during CSP preparation and at project appraisal stage, and there is some evidence that it is supporting mainstreaming of CDB’s cross-cutting priorities. However, it is weaker during CSP and project level implementation, and is being restricted by the lack of a country/strategy level mechanism to support ongoing coherence.

During the preparation of both CSPs, the Country Economist and Operations Officers from various units/divisions worked closely together to ensure that the Strategy was relevant to both the country’ and CDB priorities while remaining coherent as a package⁸⁸. Once implementation began however, coordination was focused on the individual project level, where staff from relevant units were involved in both appraisal and supervision in line with the specific intervention. For example, as BNTF projects cut across multiple sectors, they typically involved inputs from social sector, agriculture, and civil engineers/officers.

Internal coordination at project level also supported mainstreaming of CDB’s cross-cutting priorities to varying degrees. CDB staff from the Environmental Sustainability Unit and Social Sector Division were involved in appraisal of all interventions to ensure that CDB’s cross-cutting priorities such as environment and climate change, energy efficiency/sustainability and gender were reflected as appropriate in project design/appraisal. The processes for mainstreaming of environment/climate change appear to be relatively strong throughout a project’s life, with explicit implementation plans in place at intervention level and regular monitoring of these plans by the relevant CDB officers. It was not clear if the processes for ensuring ongoing integration of other priorities such as gender, energy, and governance were as strong: there was no evidence from available reports or interviews that supervision of interventions explicitly captured these areas as a routine part of supervision and reporting processes⁸⁹. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, gender marker analysis is conducted for every project during appraisal, but it was not clear from documents or interviews to what extent it is monitored at project level on an ongoing basis. Similarly for energy efficiency/sustainability and governance, there was no specific evidence found of these being routinely monitored as a cross-cutting factor in relevant projects.

Beyond the project level, there are examples of coordination taking place. Officers working on Jamaican projects do communicate and coordinate with each other on an ad hoc basis through various informal channels, and report that they inform each other and the Country Economist of any specific concerns. There is also regular contact between the Office of Risk Management and the Country Economist, including via quarterly Enterprise Risk Committee meetings, where country-level macroeconomic issues are discussed. There is also ad hoc coordination with the OIE if an officer project requests advice⁹⁰. Over the past year, the new CBD President has been championing a new “One CDB” approach, but from interviews there was no clear evidence yet how this was playing out.

While the above highlights that there are several types of internal coordination and communication happening, there was no CSP/Country level coordination mechanism in place to ensure that the strategies

⁸⁸ As appears to be standard practice during CSP/CES development

⁸⁹ Limited availability of PCRs and PSRs and the fact that we were unable to speak to CDB gender specialist means we do not feel confident enough to say outright that no processes exist, however.

⁹⁰ Although OIE maintain their independence by not e.g., getting involved in developing an RMF as they will then be expected to evaluate using that same RMF

were being implemented and monitored as a coherent whole⁹¹. Country teams are informal, and while some referenced improvements in terms of ongoing communication through e.g., Microsoft Teams Channels, some CDB staff felt such a more formal mechanism would be beneficial:

“It would be wise to have one [a coordination mechanism] and to take recommendations from the economist, but currently most of the teamworking on the CSP is when it is prepared” (CDB Operations Office).

Current IT set-ups are also failing to support coherence and coordination at country strategy level. Documents relevant to a country are neither stored in one single place or tagged in a way that they can be easily retrieved; some are not saved at all outside of individual’s email accounts; and existing computer folder/filing system set-up does not always allow staff to access relevant files stores in another division or unit’s drive. This also has implications in terms of the ability to monitor at country/CSP level, as discussed further in Section 5.4.2.

4.5 Effectiveness

4.5.1 Overview

Overall progress against CSP level outcomes was mixed, with seven out of nine outcomes partially achieved, one mostly achieved, and one not achieved. CDB’s contribution to progress ranged from none to some. While this may seem poor, it should be seen within the context of high-level national outcomes where CDB is one of several actors providing support. Inappropriate RMFs, with improperly aligned results and a lack of SMART indicators, meant that progress could not be (and was not) captured during implementation. Adaptive management was thus not facilitated by the RMF, and as a result course correction at CSP level was limited.

4.5.2 Appropriateness of Results Monitoring Frameworks

Finding 6: Overall, the CSP Results Monitoring Frameworks were designed to measure high-level development results. There was little alignment of results from CSP outcome level to sector and output levels and indicators were in most cases not fully SMART. No review of CSP progress was conducted prior to the end of each CSP period. As a result, limitations in RMF design and challenges with CSP progress were not captured and course-correction was not facilitated.

RMFs were included in the design of the two CSPs. These RMFs featured country objectives (articulated under Vision 2030 Jamaica), sector outcomes, KPIs for the sector outcomes, indicative areas for support/interventions and risks/assumptions. As such, the RMFs allowed for measuring development results using the defined KPIs. However, there is little evidence that the data generated by specific interventions have been used for measuring progress. In practice, the M&E system was not implemented.

The RMFs set up for the CSP 2014-16 and CSP 2017-21 have a total of nine (9) CSP outcomes, as defined in the original approved documents for both CSPs, and 23 intermediate (sector) outcomes. Indicators and targets within CSP RMFs were generally not designed according to the “SMART” approach. For instance, the outcome indicators for the disability assessment states: “enhanced capacity of BMCs to design, implement, monitor and evaluate evidence-based programmes that mainstream disability, through the availability of quantitative and qualitative data on disability.” which are not specific, measurable or timebound⁴⁸. Due to the large number of indicators without any baseline and/or endline data, progress at

⁹¹ This has reportedly started to change recently (post evaluation data collection), with Country Economists encouraged to form Country Team channels on the Microsoft Teams platform for broad discussion around developments in the country

sector level could not be appropriately assessed using the indicators provided. We have, however, attempted to provide some indication of progress through use of other data, where available (see Annex G).

CSP level monitoring was not conducted on an ongoing/regular basis: the planned Mid-Term Review was not conducted, and no other attempt was made prior to the completion of 2017-21 CSP Completion Report to monitor or assess progress at this level. As a result, areas of poor progress were not captured, and adaptive management was not possible. If ongoing monitoring or the Mid-Term Review had been attempted, it would have identified that the sector outcomes and related KPIs were not fit-for-purpose and may have triggered a revision to the RMFs.

As it stands, monitoring was only carried out at intervention level, and was primarily conducted by the executing agencies. It appears there were also weaknesses at this level, with most projects not having PSR or PCR in place⁹², and indicators not SMART in many instances. In most cases specific interventions were not included in the CSP papers, and thus specific outputs were not defined in the CSP RMFs. Project-level RMFs were for the most part not aligned with the CSP RMFs, and thus there was no integrated tool for M&E of the CSPs.

CDB's internal systems also failed to facilitate monitoring: documents appear not to be routinely filed/tagged to one area where all officers working on the country in question are able to access them, and in some cases are not filed at all. This makes ongoing and/or retrospective review of progress against indicators hard to impossible, as the necessary reports are not available for review. Finally, while several intervention level indicators were designed to collect gender-specific information, the CSP level RMFs did not consistently capture gender disaggregated data.

4.5.3 Progress towards CSP and Sector Outcomes

Finding 7: Progress towards CSP outcomes was mixed overall, with seven out of nine outcomes partially achieved, one mostly achieved, and one not achieved. CDB's contribution to progress ranged from none to some. While this may seem poor, it should be seen within the context of high-level national outcomes where CDB is one of several actors providing support. There were some indications that progress and CDB contribution was stronger in outcomes where CDB interventions were being carried out with agencies with more implementation experience, for example BNTF/JSIF and Ministry of Finance led interventions.

The long-term goal and strategic objectives of the CSPs are described in the Theory of Change of the CDB CSPs 2014-16 and 2017-21 for Jamaica, attached as Annex F. CSP progress against these results has been limited, with most outcomes only partially achieved. Of the nine CSP outcomes, seven were partially achieved, one mostly achieved, and one not achieved. Annex G provides a detailed summary of achievement against RMF indicators under each sector outcome, but for several of these, data for the specific indicator provided in the RMF were not available. Where possible, the evaluation has sought to provide a relevant alternative indicator to provide some indication of progress, but these are not always rigorous and thus no assessment of sector level progress is provided. This evaluation's assessment of progress at CSP outcome level is broadly in alignment with that made in the 2017-21 CSP Completion report, although with a more favourable rating given in two outcome areas (see Table 5 below)⁹³.

⁹² Although it is possible that they have been completed but cannot be located

⁹³ The broad reason for this difference in rating is that the Completion Report assessed progress based on indicators which were often not well-matched with the outcome; our rating is based on a broader review of related progress based on wider document review, as summarized in Table 6 and elaborated in Annex G. Our assessment also differentiates between overall progress (based on contributions from all stakeholders) and CDB contribution.

Table 5: Rating of Progress towards CSP Outcomes

CSP Outcomes	2017-21 CSP Completion Report Assessment	2014-16 & 2017-21 CSP Evaluation Assessment	CDB Contribution
1: Enhanced Educational Quality	Partially achieved	Partially achieved	Limited
2: Improved Effectiveness of Social Protection	Partially achieved	Partially achieved	Some
3: Improved Public Sector Governance	Partially achieved	Partially achieved	Some
4: Reduced Crime and Increased Citizen Security	Not achieved	Not achieved	None
5: Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness Reforms	Not achieved	Partially achieved	Limited
6: Resilient Economic Infrastructure	Not achieved	Partially achieved	Limited
7: Agricultural Sector Transformed	Partially achieved	Partially achieved	Limited
8: Reduced Vulnerability to Natural Disasters	Partially achieved	Partially achieved	Some
9: Improved Energy Security and Efficiency	Mostly achieved	Mostly achieved	Some

There was mixed progress overall, with CDB’s contribution ranging from “none” to “some”, with no examples where CDB provided significant or vital contribution to the progress achieved. It is important to emphasize however that at CSP outcome level, the contribution of any single development partner is always within the context of all other actors, and so providing a significant or vital contribution at this level is not necessarily achievable⁹⁴.

Within this overall mixed picture, there were some examples of positive progress which contributed to CSP outcome progress:

- BNTF contribution to Outcome 1 (Enhanced Educational Quality) and Outcome 2 (Improved Effectiveness of Social Protection) – both partially achieved, limited to some CDB contribution:
 - BNTF interventions supported the construction and upgrading of classrooms in rural areas, specifically in primary schools. The interventions are implemented through the JSIF. Over 53,000 people benefited from BNTF 7 and 8 interventions (52% women), and there are indications that these interventions are both well targeted and contributing to the intended outcomes:

“We visited a school recently with over 1000 children. They have been able to take several classes off the shift system and thus increase teaching contact time. There was another school, where this helped to alleviate a security risk as children were scared to leave home as it was dark at 7am when the first shift started. Girls leaving school later at risk of being assaulted. So BNTF goes beyond education and covers security. BNTF work is really changing lives” (CDB staff)
 - BNTF projects also provide an example of strong monitoring which could be learned from. JSIF applies a robust and detailed monitoring system which defines the measurable results and includes specific indicators to assess efficiency, such as response time for appraisal and approval of sub-projects. The system also generates information on the ratio of sub-projects which meet quality standards, including annual financial audits completed and recommendations addressed within six months of the audit, and sustainability of the projects in terms of proportion which support capacity building in compliance with sector/industry standards. However, there are challenges - longer term outcomes and impacts are not measured due to funding/capacity constraints, and detailed gender analysis has not been done

⁹⁴ Or desirable in the context of a limited overall CSP envelope

at the sub-project level. Gender analysis would enhance the understanding of how meeting the practical versus strategic needs affect one or the other gender.

- 2014-16 PBL and MoFPS interventions to Outcome 3 (Improved public sector governance) – partially achieved, some CDB contribution:
 - Results associated with the PBL were generally positive, including a stabilisation in the fiscal position and progressive reductions in the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio from 145% of GDP in FY 2012/13 to an estimated 122.5% in FY 2016/17. Growth was modest but there was a small increase to 1.3% in 2016 from 0.9% in 2015 and 0.5% in 2014.
- Contribution of various Technical Cooperation projects (including the bush-fire warning system) to Outcome 8 (Reduced Vulnerability to Natural Disasters) – partially achieved, some CDB contribution:
 - The Bush Fire Warning Index intervention is a successful ongoing collaboration between the Meteorological Service of Jamaica (MSJ) and the Jamaica Fire Brigade (JFB). The Index has been developed and tested for six months to date, with good results, although still in need of some fine-tuning to enhance the accuracy for all areas, based on different weighing of some of the parameters. It is being utilised across the island and it identifies better and better areas which have potential for fires, but additional assistance is needed to fine-tune the index.
 - Collaboration between MSJ and JFB has deepened because of the intervention, with information shared monthly.
 - Public awareness results are also very positive, especially in two pilot communities.
- Contribution of Street Light Retrofitting and Capacity Building for Productivity in the Electricity sector towards Outcome 9 (Improved Energy Security and Efficiency) – mostly achieved, some CDB contribution:
 - The Streetlight project involved the replacement of the existing system of 105,000 High-Pressure Sodium (HPS) streetlight fixtures to 110,000 fully integrated smart LED streetlight fixtures with a centralised management control system. Energy savings have already been significant and will continue over coming years.
 - The intended outputs in the electricity sector project were achieved and this was perceived by the beneficiary and implementing organisation as helping them operate more efficiently.

The CSP outcome with the least progress was **CSP Outcome 4 (Reduced crime, increased citizen security and support for at-risk youth)**, which was not achieved. Several specific interventions planned under this outcome did not proceed, and while BNTF resources were highlighted as a possible source of support, CDB's comparative advantage to concentrate its work in rural areas through BNTF was not leveraged. As a result, no progress was made outside conducting baseline studies in 17 communities under the GOJ Community Renewal Project. The M&E framework had been developed through EU support in 2016 and while valuable, it would not be effective unless robust baseline data were collected to populate the indicator tables and create the community profiles needed for the design of interventions and the tweaking of existing programmes.

Progress under other outcomes is summarised as follows:

- **Outcome 5 (Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness Reforms) - partially achieved, limited CDB contribution:** There were a great number of projects approved under this outcome which includes CDB Private Sector Development and Technical Cooperation sectors. However, the indicators were not appropriate to the strengthening of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSME) or improving the overall business ecosystem through the Caribbean Technological Consultancy

Services (CTCS) and MSME Unit. Some of the interventions required the articulation of new indicators, such as one relating to creative industries.

- **Outcome 6 (Resilient Economic Infrastructure) - partially achieved, limited CDB contribution:** Implementation of the streetlight retrofitting project was a significant successful intervention in this area. However, enhancing the economic infrastructure in water and sanitation services (Hermitage Dam and Rural Water Supply) were both delayed. The indicator for measuring progress in this area related to gender sensitization; other indicators need to be identified as well.
- **Outcome 7 (Agricultural sector transformed) - partially achieved, limited CDB contribution:** There is ongoing implementation of large agriculture projects in Essex and Clarendon/St. Catherine Southern Plains, but also the introduction of innovative “climate-smart” techniques such as aquaponics. Regarding the Essex Valley project, a thorough baseline exercise was done: the expected financial impact of the project on farmers’ likely revenue was assessed considering the returns from improved productivity, post-harvest handling and projected cost streams associated with the interventions. Indicative crop and activity budgets for “with” and “without” project scenarios were developed. The results show the financial viability of the crops supported by the project and their potential to improve profitability and the incomes of the target beneficiaries. The project includes a formal mechanism for stakeholder engagement, embedded in the establishment of community participation groups (CPGs). In addition, through meetings with the farmer’s group and the wider community, updates and feedback is being obtained from stakeholders on the status of project implementation and mechanisms is being explored to resolve conflicts. In line with GOJ’s commitment to transparency, key project related data including details of the project’s scope, approved budget, results, and implementation status are reportedly available to the public and relevant data are reportedly posted on GOJ’s Open Data portal (e.g., the Agricultural Business Information System and the quarterly contracts awards database).

Table 6: Results Matrix of CSP Outcomes and Sector Outcomes

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
1: Enhanced Educational Quality	1.1: Increased access to high quality education and training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BNTF 8 and 9 School construction/rehabilitation projects (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partial achievement: Given overall performance against RMF/other available indicators, is plausible that education quality did improve nationally up to the end of 2019. 2020 and 2021 has not been considered due to the known impact of COVID-19 on education which would skew progress • CDB contribution: Limited, though slightly higher at schools in rural areas where BNTF is active
	1.2: Improved quality of/access to ECD, secondary, TVET and higher education by men and women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand and upgrade TVET and STEM programmes in schools and training institutions (<i>not implemented</i>) 	
	1.3: A standards-driven and outcome-based education system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BNTF 9 SENCO Phase 2 – Advancement in Inclusive Education and Recreation (<i>complete</i>) • BNTF 8 and 9 WASH & Maintenance Training (<i>complete</i>) • BNTF 8 classroom/ PWD facility projects (<i>complete</i>) 	
	1.4: Improved performance in poor performing schools and in English and Mathematics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	
	1.5: Strengthened training programmes for increased productivity, with special focus on unattached youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	
	1.6: Increased access to tertiary education by qualified students from poor and vulnerable households	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
2: Improved Effectiveness of Social Protection	2.1: Effective livelihood programmes (indirect social protection) implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Disability Assessments (<i>partially complete</i>) BNTF 8 and 9 rural road and water sub-projects (<i>complete</i>) BNTF 8 and 9 Farm Road Access and Drainage Sub-projects (<i>complete</i>) BNTF 8 and 9 Maintenance Training (<i>complete</i>) BNTF 9 Capacity Building Training for Agriculture and Tourism Projects (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partial achievement: Based on overall progress against RMF or other identified indicators, it is plausible that social protection has improved nationally CDB contribution: Some. Given the inputs into disability assessments, and various BNTF inputs including the therapy centre, social worker training (youth-at-risk project)
	2.2: Social issues that are associated with crime, ameliorated. (<i>See also 4.1</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 Youth-at-Risk sub project (<i>complete</i>) BNTF 9 Establish a residential Child Therapeutic Centre (CPFSA) (<i>complete</i>) 	
3: Improved Public Sector Governance	3.1: Improved capacity for strategic policy management and coordination, including evidence-based, gender responsive decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development of a national monitoring system for SDGs. (<i>Not implemented</i>) PPAM and PCM training was carried out in Jamaica 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partial achievement: It is plausible that social protection has improved nationally, but it is not possible to measure by how much. CDB contribution: Some. The successful 2014-16 PBL provided valuable contribution but must be seen in the context of other IDPs. Other interventions also plausibly provided some contribution.
	3.2: Improved technical and political governance systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening the Economic Growth Council Secretariat (<i>not implemented</i>) 2014-16 fiscal consolidation growth and social stability PBL (<i>completed</i>) Institutional strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica (<i>completed</i>) Strengthening capacities for implementation and resource mobilisation (<i>ongoing</i>) 	
4: Reduced Crime, Increased Citizen Security and Support for At-Risk Youth	4.1: Social issues that are associated with crime, ameliorated. (<i>See also 2.2</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Anti-Violence, Communication and Outreach Programme (<i>not implemented</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not achieved: Based on available data related to major crimes, perceptions of safety and murder rates, this has not been achieved CDB contribution: None. The CRP baseline studies are useful but cannot be seen as having contributed yet, and other interventions did not proceed
	4.2: Strengthened capacity of communities to participate in creating a safe and secure society and support provided for the existing Community Renewal Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducting Baseline Studies for Seventeen Vulnerable and Volatile Communities to Support the GOJ'S Community Renewal Programme (<i>partially completed</i>) National Crime Reduction Project (Border and Community Security) (<i>not implemented</i>) Rejuvenating Communities Project in West Kingston (<i>not implemented</i>) 	
5: Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness Reforms	5.1: Improved access to, and quality of skills training based on labour market needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness PBL (<i>not implemented</i>) Expansion Of Certification Services by The National Certification Body of Jamaica (<i>partially complete</i>) National certification body of Jamaica - certification scope expansion to include food safety management system (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partially achieved⁹⁵: Based on available data, it would appear there has been some progress here based on decrease in female and youth unemployment rates,

⁹⁵ Compared to rating of “Not achieved” in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TA - SERV safe Training and Certification for Food Service Managers and Handlers in Jamaica (<i>mostly complete</i>) • National Workshops on MfDR for Business Support Organisations (<i>mostly complete</i>) • Capacity Building for Market Access - Establishment of The Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory (<i>complete</i>) 	<p>improvement in Global Innovation Index rating</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB contribution: Limited. Based on the LOC intervention and early success of interventions such as the support to JIPO, as well as several small Technical Cooperation interventions, CDB contribution here can be seen as limited, especially when considered in the context of major support from the World Bank for this area.
	5.2: Improved private sector operations and development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support To JIPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem (<i>CDB portion complete</i>) • Business Of Music in The Caribbean Developmental Workshops (<i>complete</i>) • Uniforms Ltd (the Uniform Centre) (<i>complete</i>) • Sixth Industrial LOC (<i>partially complete</i>) • Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica’s ICT BPO (<i>complete</i>) • Increasing The Export Capacity of Micro and Small Agro-Processors Using the Cluster Approach (<i>partially complete</i>) • Support to Jamaica manufacturers and exporters association expo Jamaica 2021 - digital tradeshow (<i>complete</i>) • Enhancing the export capacity of micro and small agro processors using the cluster approach (<i>complete</i>) 	
6: Resilient Economic Infrastructure	6.1: Improved access to, and quality of, climate resilient social and economic infrastructure, based on the expressed needs of women and men in the target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Street Light Retrofitting Project (<i>complete</i>) • Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study (<i>in progress</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partially achieved⁹⁶: Indicators available on water and sanitation, and inputs from other IDPs, it appears likely this has been at least partially achieved • CDB contribution: Limited. While the Street Lights project has saved 27,929 MW of energy to date, other interventions are ongoing and have not provided any contribution to date.
	6.2: Increased access to water and sanitation services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preparation Of Detailed Designs for A Rural Water Supply Project (<i>complete</i>) • Rural Water Supply Programme (<i>in progress</i>) 	
7: Agricultural Sector Transformed	7.1: Increased agricultural production and productivity, which is climate proof	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity Building Support for Aquaponics Farmers and Trainers (<i>complete</i>) • Workshops On Capacity Building in Jamaican MSMEs in Agro-Processing Sector to Satisfy Food Safety Requirements (<i>complete</i>) • Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project (<i>ongoing</i>) • Southern Plains Agricultural Development Project (<i>ongoing</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mostly achieved⁹⁷: Given the indicators available, it appears this outcome has been mostly achieved • CDB contribution: Limited. Given that majority of the more significant projects are still in early stages, CDB

⁹⁶ Compared to rating of “Not achieved” in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report

⁹⁷ Compared to rating of “Partially achieved” in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feasibility And Design Study - St. Catherine And Clarendon Agricultural Development Project (<i>complete</i>) Financing for South St. Elizabeth Irrigation Project (<i>not implemented</i>) 	contribution cannot be expected to be more than limited at this stage
8: Reduced Vulnerability to Natural Disasters	8.1: Improved Capacity for Strategy Policy Management to reduce CC vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canada – CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund (<i>mostly complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partially achieved: Improvements in indicators available related to development/ integration of CC into key GOJ strategies, movement on concessional climate funding and improvement in housing quality indicators. Their partial achievement is likely CDB contribution: Some. Several planned interventions did proceed with strong results in some such as the bush-fire warning index. Others however are still in progress, so rated as some contribution at this time
	8.2: Enhanced institutional capacity to better manage environmental, CC and disaster risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening Capacity to Manage Environment and Social Risks (<i>complete</i>) Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management (<i>mostly complete</i>) Upgraded Flood Early Warning System for Rio Cobre Watershed (<i>complete</i>) Establishing An Environmental and Social Risk Management System (<i>complete</i>) 	
	8.3: Coordinate system for response to post-hazard events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Building Capacity in Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (<i>complete</i>) 	
	8.4: Reduced risk and improved resilience focusing primarily on poor and vulnerable communities as result of strengthened national capacity for mitigation, management, and response to hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation (<i>complete</i>) Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities, Clarendon (<i>complete</i>) Climate Change Adaptation and Risk Reduction Technology and Strategies to Improve Community Resilience (CARTS) Project (<i>unclear</i>) Llandewey/Ramble Environment and Disaster Mitigation Initiative (<i>unclear</i>) 	
	8.5: Support the process of achieving security of tenure for the poor and reduce the number of informal human settlements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No CDB interventions 	
9: Improved Energy Security and Efficiency	9.1: Diversify energy mix towards RE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in The Electricity Sector (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly achieved: Given available indicators on %age of share of renewables, this appears to have been at least mostly achieved CDB contribution: Some. In addition to successful electricity sector capacity building interventions, multiple other CDB projects integrated RE/EE aspects.

	Complete/ Fully achieved		Ongoing/ Partly achieved		Not achieved		Did not proceed/ not assessed
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A more granular overview of CSP progress, including assessment against RMF indicators is provided in Annex G.

4.6 Efficiency

4.6.1 Overview


CSP performance in terms of implementation timelines has been poor, and appears to have worsened during the 2017-21 CSP, partly because of COVID-19 related disruptions, which also negatively impacted disbursement levels. The main constraining factors at project level were burdensome and slow CDB processes; insufficient or slow CDB engagement; insufficient or inappropriate design and planning of interventions; and limited GOJ/executing agency capacity and cumbersome approval processes and structures. Supporting factors were positive engagement and strong CDB and GOJ/executing agency capacity in projects such as BNTF and several Technical Cooperation interventions.

4.6.2 Project Implementation and Disbursement

Finding 8: CSP performance in terms of duration between key project milestones has been poor, and appears to have worsened during the 2017-21 CSP, partly because of COVID-19 related disruptions, which also negatively impacted disbursement levels.

Performance in terms of duration between key project milestones appears to have worsened from the 2014-16 to 2017-21 CSP periods in all areas except for grant approval to agreement times. Worsening timelines between agreement to first disbursement in the 2017-21 CSP period can potentially be partly ascribed to COVID-19 disruptions, as two projects had agreements signed in July 2019, but disbursement did not take place until 18 and 20 months later⁹⁸. The grant agreement to first disbursement timelines improved in the 2017-21 CSP period, decreasing from 4.5 to 2.7 months. Most grants (17 of 23) during this period were TA projects, which may account for this decrease, as reportedly fewer processes are involved on both GOJ and CDB sides for pushing through non-capital projects.

Figure 7: Average Duration between Key Project Initiation Milestones



Due to the limited number of PSR and PCRs available for review⁹⁹ among sampled projects, it has not been possible to create a representative chart of expected versus actual implementation timelines as has been done with previous CSP evaluations. However, with the limited documents available and triangulating across sources, it is clear that there have been some significant delays, for example the “Institutional Strengthening


⁹⁸ “Support To JIPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness and Growth of MSMEs” and “Strengthening Capacities for Implementation and Resource Mobilisation”

⁹⁹ Due to a combination of them not existing or not being locatable and thus shared with the evaluation team

- Ministry of Finance, Jamaica” project was due to complete its final disbursement on 31 Aug 2018¹⁰⁰, but as of December 2021, was still under implementation^{101,102} - a delay of over three years; and some understandable delays to infrastructure projects as a result of COVID-19, such as the Street Light Retrofitting Project which was originally due to be completed by the end of 2020, but was still under implementation at the end of 2021.

Disbursement rates have also reflected these challenges (Figure 8 and Figure 9), with for example disbursement for two large agriculture interventions, the Essex Valley Agricultural Development and Southern Plains Agricultural Development projects, at only 22% and 13% disbursement, respectively, despite being several years into implementation. Other projects with low disbursement levels are reflective of the fact that they were approved relatively recently, in 2020 or 2021 rather than slow implementation progress. The various factors contributing to delays are outlined in the following section.

Figure 8: 2014-16 and 2017-21 Loan and Grants (>\$2m) Commitments vs Disbursement (\$USDm)




¹⁰⁰ CDB (2019), PSR, Institutional Strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica, Jan–Sep 2019

¹⁰¹ This was reportedly based a Ministry of Finance request, and was related to COVID-19 delays

¹⁰² CDB (2022), Country Strategy Completion Report

Figure 9: 2014-16 and 2017-21 Grants (<\$2m) Commitments vs Disbursement (\$USDm)



4.6.3 Factors Affecting Implementation

Finding 9: A broad range of factors affected implementation at portfolio and project level. At portfolio level, the key factors have been highlighted under sections on CSP and Programme Management, Relevance and Coherence. At project level, the main constraining factors were burdensome and slow CDB processes; insufficient and/or slow CDB engagement and communication; insufficient or inappropriate design and planning of interventions; and limited GOJ/executing agency capacity and cumbersome approval processes and structures. Supporting factors were positive engagement and strong CDB and GOJ/executing agency capacity in key projects such as BNTF and several Technical Cooperation interventions.

COVID-19 was a commonly cited factor which affected implementation in various ways, including supply chain delays and increased costs (particularly affecting infrastructure projects) and movement restrictions affecting community engagement activities. It also resulted in CDB officers being unable to conduct physical supervision visits for an extended period. Attempts were made where possible to conduct remote supervision, but the first in-person visits in over two years did not resume until mid-2022. This contributed to in-country stakeholders' perception of insufficient engagement, one of general constraining factors outlined below, but stakeholders were clear that this factor existed both prior to the pandemic and continues to some extent since the pandemic has subsided. COVID-19 also severely affected GOJ's overall financial situation as previously described, as well as that of the broader economy, with a knock-on social impact.

COVID-19 did lead to one unexpected positive which supported overall implementation, as it pushed CDB towards accepting electronic reporting and approval processes. The other main factors that constrained overall implementation (the most regularly cited listed first) included:

- Burdensome and slow CDB processes (worse than other IFIs)
- Insufficient and slow CDB engagement and communication
 - Good engagement was however reported with JSIF on BNTF, Development Bank of Jamaica (DBJ) on the Line of Credit and with Technical Cooperation intervention beneficiaries
- Insufficient/inappropriate design and planning of interventions, contributing to delays during implementation and/or poor sustainability
- Limited GOJ/Executing agency capacity and cumbersome approval structures¹⁰³
- Insufficient flexibility by CDB in terms of ability to adjust planned and in-progress interventions in line with contextual changes
 - In contrast, WB and IDB were noted as being more flexible – reported near 100% implementation of WB strategy seen by GOJ stakeholders as due to their flexible approach)

In contrast to the generally negative picture on engagement, it became evident during primary data collection that coordination and engagement at intervention level was positive in both BNTF interventions between CDB and the executing agency JSIF, and between CDB and beneficiaries of CTCS/Technical Cooperation interventions. In the case of BNTF, it was proposed that this was due to this being a long-term ongoing intervention, with an executing agency with now many years of implementation experience and thus in-built capacity to implement, combined with CDB staff commitment to strong and regular ongoing communication, including regular country visits¹⁰⁴. In the case of Technical Cooperation projects, these small, short-term interventions involved direct engagement between the relevant CDB officer and the beneficiary organisation, with no intermediary, and not long, drawn-out approval processes (compared to capital investment/infrastructure projects). This again allowed for more direct and effective ongoing engagement with in-country counterparts, which was universally appreciated.

The issue of insufficient or inappropriate design and planning of interventions was one raised by stakeholders at both CDB and in-country (GOJ and executing agencies) and was seen as something that both CDB and executing agencies were responsible for. Some significant examples of where, in retrospect, the original design or scoping of CDB interventions was seen as resulting in delays was in the Hermitage Dam project, where inaccurate assumptions about silting being the main issue with the dam leading to delays; and in the

¹⁰³ Although reportedly GOJ capacity to engage has improved since data collection was conducted, with the recent appointment of a Project Economist at PIOJ for the CDB portfolio, which has reportedly greatly improved lines of communication and is expected to deepen engagement between CDB and GOJ

¹⁰⁴ It was also suggested by one key informant that JSIF's position as a quasi-government agency may mean it has fewer bureaucratic hurdles, but this was not corroborated by other stakeholders

Rural Water Supply Project, where initial community mapping did not cover all the intended beneficiary communities, which resulted in inaccurate scoping of required resources. Other examples referenced included the design of the Essex Valley Agriculture Project and the adequacy of gender budgets; and the design of the Disability Assessments¹⁰⁵.

In the case of the proposed Dry Dock initiative, which did not reach appraisal stage at the time of the field mission, the main factor which prevented progress was CDB's overall risk appetite, which appears to have been insufficient to take on a private sector project of this magnitude. Given that even the much smaller Private Sector Division supported "Uniforms Ltd" business has subsequently closed (but trained staff are using the learning elsewhere), this serves to highlight the risks involved to CDB in this sector, and so the way forward in projects of this size and nature remains to be seen.

4.7 Sustainability

4.7.1 Overview

Overall sustainability of results achieved by the CSPs was mixed and was affected by limited capacity strengthening of implementing agencies and insufficient identification of and mitigation against risks. Despite this, there were several examples where there were reasonably positive sustainability prospects.

4.7.2 Strengthening of National Systems

Finding 10: The importance of building the capacity of national systems was widely acknowledged. However, in practice CDB's follow-through was mixed – training was often provided, and several projects were implemented by staff of Jamaican institutions. However, there were also several examples where temporary Project Implementation Units were used, with limited prospects of the personnel and/or skills being absorbed into the wider organisation.

CDB officials and government counterparts recognised the importance of building in sustainability through institutional capacity strengthening, including provision of training and building programmes into GOJ institutions, but also felt this was not always achieved. Despite designing an appropriate institutional set-up with government commitment and ownership as part of both CSP papers, contextual changes often meant that things did not go to plan. For example, under the Uniform centre project, the intended training school was not realised, which was attributed to limited contractual time of the consultant. While the training was very helpful for team members - they became more skilled – the main benefit was in finding work when the company shut down after a long period of reduced work due to COVID-19. In April 2022 the company closed, and the equipment was sold.

In terms of how to strengthen sustainability, a common theme in feedback both from CDB and GOJ was the need to build capacity of the executing agencies and ensure that training and related interventions are reaching the right people and agencies. Several interventions used the Project Execution Unit (PIU) model, whereby staff are hired for a fixed period to implement a project, but some GOJ stakeholders felt that this model was not sustainable, and that CDB could do more to actively build the capacity of agencies rather than just placing consultants within PIUs. However, several stakeholders noted that currently the human resource capacity and/or the structure of implementing agencies, especially government departments, meant that often there are no staff with sufficient availability to support the level of project management required. Another recurrent theme was the need for better needs assessment up front, as noted in the case of the Hermitage Dam and Rural Water Supply interventions.

¹⁰⁵Though in both cases it was noted these were budgeted regionally, which constrains CDB's ability to adapt.

4.7.3 Risk Identification and Mitigation

Finding 11: Not all CSP level risks were identified, and among those that were identified, several materialised and were insufficiently mitigated against.

Both CSPs outlined several potential delivery risks, but for the most part those outlined in the 2014-16 CSP did not materialise. Almost all the risks outlined in the 2017-21 CSP did however materialise, most notably the risk around “macroeconomic shock or unforeseen circumstance impairing GOJ’s ability to meet debt obligations and limit CSP implementation”.

Figure 10: Potential Risks and Mitigation Measures¹⁰⁶

CSP Risk factors identified	CDB's mitigation response	Risk outcome
2014 – 2016 CSP		
Frequent incidents of natural disasters, particularly hurricanes. High fiscal costs for rehabilitation causing inflation spikes and aggravated rural poverty	Jamaica’s participation in CCRIF, and ongoing efforts to mainstream DRR in the agriculture sector and develop a parametric risk insurance product	Risk did not materialize: Only one major storm/hurricane impacted Jamaica during this time (Matthew) and caused little damage.
Fiscal vulnerability to output shocks: debt dynamics very sensitive to performance of the economy, with high primary balances limiting GOJ developmental expenditure	GOJ building additional space into medium-term policy framework, finding alternative modes of finance for capital development programmes	Risk partially materialised: Although fiscal accounts stabilised and public debt-to-GDP ratio decreased from 145% to 122% from 2014- 2016, government spending was still constrained by the economic context.
Jamaica vulnerability to international economy due to being small, open economy with narrow production base.	No risk mitigation response identified	Risk did not materialize: There were no major international or regional economic shocks during the CSP period.
2017 – 2021 CSP		
Macroeconomic shock or unforeseen circumstances impair GoJ’s ability to meet debt obligations, and limit CSP implementation	CDB to coordinate closely with IMF’s SBA Programme to mitigate macro risks. The MTR will provide an opportunity to reassess fiscal prospects	Risk materialised: debt initially trended downward during CS period, reaching 94.8% in FY 2019/20, but debt ratio rose to 110.1% due to dramatic decline in GDP caused by COVID-19 pandemic. No evidence Bank’s interventions contributed.
GOJ has insufficient liquidity to meet debt service obligations to CDB and to provide counterpart contributions	CDB will continue to monitor debt ratios. MTR provides an opportunity to reassess the CSP, as well as liquidity position. Annual surveillance of economic performance and policies to support corrective measures, support for key areas in macroeconomic stability	Risk materialised: debt initially trended downward during CS period, reaching 94.8% in FY 2019/20, but debt ratio rose to 110.1% due to dramatic decline in GDP caused by COVID-19 pandemic. No evidence Bank’s interventions contributed.
Implementation capacity constraints	Support to strengthen project implementation capacities in GoJ. Deepening CDBs’ understanding of political economy in reform areas. CDB to intensify and strengthen collaborative oversight of portfolio	Risk materialised: inadequate implementation capacity continued throughout CS period, notwithstanding support from CDB to Jamaica in training for PPAM, PCM, and procurement.
Climate change and weather-related natural disasters.	CDB participation in efforts to mainstream DRR. CSP will provide opportunity to reduce vulnerability, through support to CDC and through CC considerations in interventions	Risk did not materialize. Indicator relating to DRR not measured due to unavailability of data.

¹⁰⁶ Based on analysis of the CSP 2014-16 and CSP 2017-21 papers and CSP 2017-21 Completion Report.

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a dramatic decline in GDP and significantly affected CSP implementation. Mitigation approaches to address this and other risks which materialised were not sufficient: No MidTerm Review (MTR) was conducted; CDB did not strengthen and intensify collaborative oversight of the CSP.

Furthermore, there were some operational risks that were not explicitly mitigated against despite the importance of these factors being outlined, most notably the risk associated with not engaging sufficiently with in-country stakeholders including IDPs; and of not conducting an MTR or otherwise conducting ongoing programmatic monitoring of the Strategy. Both these risks materialised and were exacerbated with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. As CDB had failed to explicitly identify and put in place mitigation measures against these risks, it was poorly positioned to respond when they materialised.

A summary of risks and mitigation measures is provided in Figure 10.

4.7.4 Sustainability of Results

Finding 12: Realisation of sustainability was mixed overall, with positive evidence of sustainability in several of the projects sampled, but also several interventions where prospects for sustainability were low or sustainability had apparently not been achieved.

Positive examples of sustainability were found in several sectors:

- **Economic infrastructure (also relevant to renewable energy sector):**
 - The Streetlights intervention is likely to have been sustainable, partly because the institution is very well established.
- **Social sector:**
 - There were indications that BNTF sub-projects have good prospects for sustainability. For example, the Harbour Primary School WASH sub-project is continuing, with the maintenance plan being sustained.
- **Environmental sustainability sector:**
 - The development of the bush fire index was found not only to have a positive benefit but also had built capacity for the longer term with the Jamaica Fire Brigade and Met office through computerisation of bush fire records.
- **Renewable energy sector:**
 - The Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in The Electricity Sector appears to have effectively supported improved capacity and thus sustainability of the Office of Utility Regulation (OUR)
- **Technical cooperation (also relevant to private sector):**
 - The support to MSMEs through the Small Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ) has led to longer term results such as a law which gives MSMEs preferential treatment in GOJ procurement and reduced criteria for MSMEs. The conference that was funded by CDB built relationships with regional bodies which are still in place.
 - The Bureau of Standards packaging lab is still functional several years after CDB support was received, although the industry in Jamaica is still small, so it has not expanded as much as they hoped.
 - Another project with clear long-term benefits is the support on mechanisms for valuing and protecting intellectual property rights, resulting in training of the valuers, widening the

knowledge base and awareness of intellectual property. The involvement of the commercial banks and the central bank of Jamaica is a positive as is the recognition at the international level which was achieved. The project has focused on building skills which can be retained and strengthening capacity in a way which can benefit a cohort of businesses.

However, in several other interventions prospects for sustainability are low/unlikely:

- **Economic infrastructure sector:**
 - In the rural water project, the engagement of Rural Water Supply Limited is in principle helpful for sustainability but the project has run into challenges and there are risks that the designs which are proposed are seen as overly advanced for the needs and beyond what the National Water Company would be able to sustain when it is handed over to them. Ownership from local communities is also seen as mixed, with cynicism due to failed promises at various stages.
- **Social sector (agriculture):**
 - In the Essex Valley agriculture/irrigation project, long-term sustainability is not yet achieved because of reliance on government subsidies, as tariffs charged to farmers do not cover costs.
- **Environmental sustainability:**
 - The Portmore Municipal Cooperation project on disaster risk management has not achieved sustainability, with challenges around financing of the Geographic Information System component and recruiting and retaining specialist staff. CDB officials noted that while the Bank has been providing project management training, it is not clear whether the participants from the executing agency were the right people.

5 Conclusions

The conclusions below pull out the main over-arching strengths and weaknesses that have emerged from the findings.

5.1 Country Relationship, Relevance, and Coherence

CDB has a long-standing relationship with Jamaica, and GOJ and other in-country stakeholders perceive CDB as having valuable regional expertise and experience. However, CDB's sub-optimal engagement with Jamaica from 2014-21 led to a failure to capitalise on this comparative advantage. This, along with a failure to strategically collaborate and coordinate with other IDPs, has allowed other IFIs to dominate by offering funds in larger amounts and/or at preferential rates in a context of constrained GOJ fiscal space.

Jamaica is a key BMC in terms of its population, history with CDB and potential lending envelope. CDB will need to build on what was reportedly a well-received mission in July 2022. Given the number of in-country stakeholders who referenced the lack of permanent in-country presence as a limitation, it is vital that CDB find ways to make up for this. There is strong commitment from CDB, GOJ and other in-country

counterparts to rebuilding the relationship, and strong commitment from the Country Economist and other CDB staff to learn from past missteps. Keeping this momentum going will require significant effort at overall CES and individual intervention level.

There is room for CDB to focus the support provided through the new CES on those areas where GOJ (and other IDPs) perceives it has specific track record and expertise, such as climate change, irrigation and water supply, and rural education and access projects. This may improve uptake of grants and loans and maximise opportunities for collaboration and sharing of expertise with others. Such cross-fertilisation of expertise may also allow CDB to prove its worth in sectors where it has struggled to gain traction to date, but it feels it has value to add, such as citizen security.

5.2 Implementation

As noted in other CSPEs, a broad range of factors affected implementation in Jamaica, but a common theme was one of mutual frustration, with both parties finding each other's structures and/or processes often confusing and/or convoluted.

There are indications that infrastructure-type projects being implemented under less experienced executing agencies are the most challenging, as GOJ approval structures and ongoing implementation requirements are the most demanding in these cases. But there are potential opportunities to learn from the mutually positive experience of CDB and JSIF in implementing multiple BNTF infrastructure projects.

5.3 Risk Management and Sustainability

There was some tension between CDB's desire to minimize the risk of project implementation being affected by insufficient executing agency capacity to manage projects, with the desire to strengthen national systems. The success of interventions, such as BNTF, through JSIF; and the Street Light Retrofitting Project, through JPS, offer potential lessons on how other in-country agencies can be supported to improve their project management capacity to support CDB and other IDP projects, and thus set them on the pathway to more sustainable capacity and results.

5.4 CSP Monitoring and Evaluation

The CSP RMFs were well aligned with Vision 2030 Jamaica, which is appropriate and offers opportunities for CDB to align with and contribute to GOJ's ongoing monitoring of Vision 2030 objectives. This alignment was however not leveraged: instead of identifying CSP indicators with readily available and collated GOJ data, non-SMART indicators were chosen which neither captured CDB contribution nor overall progress. The lack of appropriate RMFs resulted in frustration among CDB staff as even where progress was made, it was not always captured. CDB staff were keen to improve monitoring but had limited capacity to do so: there is no dedicated officer assigned to conduct ongoing CSP monitoring, and existing staff have multiple responsibilities and varying degrees of M&E expertise and interest. Even if there were sufficient existing capacity to conduct ongoing CSP level monitoring, the lack of supportive systems (including IT systems) and processes acts as a further barrier. All of this has resulted in an M&E system that acts more as a barrier than as a nimble, intuitive system which could allow CDB and in-country counterparts to identify where progress is off-track, and adaptations are necessary.

6 Recommendations

CDB's CES moving forward will need to be framed within Jamaica's overall economic outlook and sustainability as it recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. Recommendations are offered against the main evaluation criteria as follows:

1: Country Relationship, Relevance and Coherence

- **Recommendation 1a: Explore and identify the most appropriate ways for CDB to become more visible and mitigate the lack of permanent in-country presence in Jamaica in the immediate future, linked to the launch of the new CES.**
 - This could include a review of the frequency and type of mission visits to ensure they support delivery of the overall CES and individual interventions. Similarly, the frequency and format of remote engagement efforts with Jamaica could be reviewed and better tailored to the CES requirements and preferences of in-country stakeholders.
 - For example, infrastructure/capital investments are required to go through additional GOJ approval processes, which may benefit from in-country visits at key times. Similarly, if investments in specific sectors are seen to be struggling to get approval, this may indicate a need for more and/or better targeted in-country missions by relevant Operations Officers.
- **Recommendation 1b: Explore options that would be feasible and cost-effective for provision of a more permanent in-country presence in the medium- to long-term. Options could include recruitment of a full- or part-time Jamaica-based member of CDB staff; or contracting of a local fund agent or delivery partner.**
 - The role of this individual/entity would include improved ongoing monitoring of CES implementation, and participation in formal and informal engagement mechanisms with GOJ, other counterparts and IDPs.
 - Given this would involve a change to CDB's standard model of working at country level, it is understood that this recommendation would require high-level discussion across CDB. However, given Jamaica's importance within the CDB portfolio, the available options should be considered, along with the operational and financial implications of each.
- **Recommendation 1c: Ensure that renewed engagement with Jamaica includes all key GOJ, IDP and other in-country partners (e.g. private sector and NGO community), and that CDB clearly demonstrates where it can provide added value in supporting Jamaica's development needs.**
 - Specifically, ensure that CDB is actively involved in all existing in-country IDP coordination mechanisms, and look for opportunities to lead IDP engagement in areas where CDB is already perceived as having a comparative advantage, such as climate change.

2: Implementation:

- **Recommendation 2a: As part of renewed engagement efforts with in-country stakeholders, conduct a targeted, Jamaica-specific review of CDB processes and guidance, to identify areas for improvement.**
 - Prior CSP evaluations have identified some level of BMC frustration with CDB processes, and findings in this evaluation also identify this as an issue in Jamaica. It is interesting to note that it was the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic that pushed CDB towards accepting soft-copy exchange/receipt of key documents from BMCs, which demonstrates that processes can be adapted where there is a push for this to happen.

- **Recommendation 2b: Ensure that all CDB staff engaged in the Jamaica CES are well briefed on GOJ’s development frameworks and approval structures, and that future CES receive support from all necessary areas of government.**
 - GOJ’s development framework and approval structures are rigorous, comprehensive, and multi-layered, especially for capital investment projects. Informal mechanisms and relationships can also affect the likelihood of a particular intervention having the necessary fiscal space created. Given this complex context, it is vital that CDB staff working with the Jamaica CES are fully appraised of the formal and informal structures that exist.
 - A detailed Jamaica orientation brief, which is reviewed on an annual basis, as structures and key individuals within PIOJ and Ministry of Finance (for example) change, would be useful, and would support efforts to increase and improve engagement with Jamaica.
 - If CDB does consider the development of some form of permanent presence in Jamaica, the role of the individual or entity engaged could also include orienting CDB officers on the Jamaican context and helping them to negotiate the structures that exist.

3: Risk Management and Sustainability

- **Recommendation 3a: Work with the government to build country-level capacity (particularly in Project Management) which can support successful project implementation while also building long-term institutional capacity, and thus sustainability of results. Specifically, ensure that CDB is abreast of ongoing GOJ discussions around how to improve project management capacity of key government ministries.**
 - There is a need to engage with GOJ and other partners to review how limited in-country capacity affected project implementation and develop better ways to address and mitigate this risk. There are reportedly discussions taking place within GOJ around how to improve the project management capacity of key government ministries. CDB should ensure they are kept abreast of these discussions, so that future intervention design can consider changes in the context and where appropriate move away from the preferred “quick fix” of putting in place short-term Project Implementation Units.
- **Recommendation 3b: Review lessons learned from interventions which have been successfully implemented without the creation of short-term, external consultant led Project Implementation Units. This may include a review of whether agencies which already have proven implementation capacity, such as JSIF and National Water Commission, can be used to (co-)implement interventions which may be outside of their normal area of operations.**
 - Where building capacity from the ground up may be challenging, there may scope for Executing Agencies with less capacity to work alongside and co-implement alongside agencies with more experience of managing CDB/donor funds. If this avenue is explored, then it is vital to ensure that there are clear terms of reference for the agencies involved, to avoid and confusion or conflict around respective roles.

4: CSP Monitoring and Evaluation

- **Recommendation 4a: Develop CES RMFs in a more participatory way that increases awareness and buy-in. Ensure targets are SMART, and clearly identify/mitigate assumptions and risks. Ensure project RMFs feed into the overall CES RMF, and that key processes which support this, such as production of Project Supervision/Completion Reports, are completed for all projects.**
 - Both CDB and GOJ stakeholders should be involved in the development/review of CES RMFs, to ensure they align with broader in-country results frameworks and also consider wider CDB targets/priorities (such as gender mainstreaming, for example).

- **Recommendation 4b: Ensure more effective ongoing monitoring and adaptation. This should include clear assignment of responsibilities for overall CES, sector, and intervention level monitoring. It may also include designation of Mid-Term Reviews as a Board requirement; inclusion of CES monitoring as part of the role of any future permanent in-country presence (see Recommendation 1b).**
 - In addition to clear assignment of monitoring responsibilities, there should be agreed check-in points to monitor progress. This will support timelier course-correction of interventions if/when it becomes clear that an intervention is not on track to achieve the anticipated results and allow for targets and associated indicators to be adjusted in line with the context. This will help to ensure that stakeholders remain focused on the aim of interventions, improve likely effectiveness and sustainability, and reduce frustration associated with indicators that do not capture the work completed.

Appendix 1 Management Response

1. Management welcomes the Independent Evaluation (IE/the Evaluation) of the country strategies (CSs) for Jamaica during the periods 2014-16 and 2017-2021. The Evaluation examined the extent to which the Bank's CSs and programme in Jamaica¹⁰⁷ had achieved their intended outcomes and offered lessons and recommendations to improve development effectiveness going forward. The Bank's CS serves as the basis for its engagement with member countries and is a programming framework that determines programmes/projects, as well as the allocation of financial resources to achieve national development objectives. Recognising the importance of this tool, Management seeks to continuously refine its approach to better serve its clients within a dynamic environment. To this end, Management finds the report timely and has already taken into consideration the report's findings in the updating of the 2017-2021 CS Paper Extension to 2024. The various lessons and recommendations identified have guided the dialogue with stakeholders at the country level, as well as preparatory work for the new strategy expected to be developed in 2025.

2. The Evaluation also aimed to complement and add depth to the 2017-2021 CS Completion Report¹⁰⁸ (CSCR), the Bank's self-assessment which was completed shortly before the evaluation started. The Evaluation findings align closely with that of the Bank's self-assessment. The CSCR rated overall CS performance as "*marginally unsatisfactory*" reflecting the limited progress made toward achieving most of its stated outcomes, illustrated by the fact that none of the nine expected outcomes were achieved. These outcomes were linked to interventions aimed at enhancing strategic results areas of education, social protection, governance, agriculture, disaster management, and energy efficiency. By the end of 2021, 16 of 28 project interventions identified within the 2017-CS were not initiated, 9 were ongoing, and 3 were near completion. However, satisfactory progress was assessed on projects initiated in the 2014-CS. With the completion of education projects, for instance, the outcomes *viz.* "*Increase access to tertiary education by qualified students from poor and vulnerable households*" and "*Upgrade and Enhance the quality and access to tertiary education in Jamaica*" were assessed as achieved and mostly achieved, respectively, contributing to Jamaica's national development objectives for the tertiary education sector and the overall strategy of enhancing its human capital. Under the 2014-CS, CDB also provided support to enable Jamaica's business environment via the provision of an industrial line of credit to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, whose outcome was evaluated as partially achieved.

3. The CSs for Jamaica were being implemented during a time of severe fiscal and debt challenges. The Evaluation concluded that the overall relevance of the CS was satisfactory as they aligned well with Jamaica's development strategy and prioritise and CDB's cross-cutting priorities, but they were too ambitious. Overall effectiveness was mixed, and project implementation relatively poor; with efforts needed to address delays in project commencement and implementation, to ensure sustainability of interventions and to maintain ongoing dialogue with stakeholders at the country level. The report's recommendations call for improvements related to a range of different functional areas, from strengthening visibility, implementation, and monitoring, to scaling up engagement and fostering collaboration. In the main, the report correctly ties the weak performance to the implementation of Jamaica's aggressive Economic Reform Programme¹⁰⁹ that was centred on debt reduction, a reality recognised by the Government of Jamaica (GOJ). Diminished country appetite for the Bank's Ordinary Capital Resources, as a result, eroded country ownership of the strategy. The restrictive impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to the poor implementation experience as GOJ pivoted its policy focus to pandemic response and economic recovery. Supply chain disruptions and procurement delays, as well as reduced Bank engagement, slow and burdensome Bank processes, and insufficient communication and planning with implementing agencies were other factors noted.

¹⁰⁷ Including projects which fall under these Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and are completed or still being implemented.

¹⁰⁸ A separate self-assessment of CSP, 2014-16, was not undertaken but projects identified under this strategy and that were under implementation or completed within the 2017 strategy cycle were taken into consideration as part of the self-evaluation of the 2017-CS.

¹⁰⁹ Supported by a 4-year Extended Fund Facility financing arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, initiated in 2013.

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
1. Country Relationship, Relevance and Coherence				
<p>Recommendation 1a: Explore and identify the most appropriate ways for the Bank to become more visible and mitigate the lack of permanent in-country presence in Jamaica in the immediate future, linked to the launch of the new Country Engagement Strategy (CES).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This could include a review of the frequency and type of mission visits to ensure they support delivery of the overall CES and individual interventions. Similarly, the frequency and format of remote engagement efforts with Jamaica could be reviewed and better tailored to the CES requirements and preferences of in-country stakeholders. ○ For example, infrastructure/capital investments are required to go through additional GOJ 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>Management acknowledges that the lack of a permanent physical presence in-country can potentially place CDB at a strategic disadvantage given that other major multilateral financial institutions are physically domiciled in Jamaica and agrees, in principle, that strategies and approaches that will enhance Bank visibility – such as strengthening country engagement and Bank responsiveness – are central to the ongoing success of the Bank’s operations in country, to leveraging comparative advantage, improving project outcomes and impacts and ultimately increasing development effectiveness. However, Management is not convinced that a physical presence in Jamaica would have significantly improved project/strategy performance and outcomes given Jamaica’s binding policy constraints.</p> <p>The recommendation is in line with recent Management action as efforts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of pipeline project implementation plans post-Board approval of the new CES. • Regularise portfolio reviews. • Explore greater engagement, through participation in in-country development partner coordinating meetings. 	<p>Relevant units within the Projects and Economics Departments.</p> <p>Projects Department – Office of the Director of Projects</p> <p>Led by Economist.</p>	<p>By Q2, 2024</p> <p>Q1, 2024</p> <p>Q1, 2024</p>

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<p>approval processes, which may benefit from in-country visits at key times. Similarly, if investments in specific sectors are seen to be struggling to get approval, this may indicate a need for more and/or better targeted in-country missions by relevant Operations Officers.</p>	<p>are already underway to increase visibility in Jamaica. Inexperienced staff has benefited from in-country familiarisation and consultation visits post-pandemic aimed at renewing and strengthening country relationships, building country knowledge, and better informing country programmes. Remote engagements will continue to be utilised to maintain contact and visibility.</p> <p>Similarly, to improve quality at entry, improve country programme focus and buy-in, a high-level in-country engagement mission with key decision-makers within GOJ involving senior and executive officials was prioritised as a part of the approach to initiating the new CS in the first half of 2023.</p> <p>The Bank will also need to commit to approaches and strategies that ensure responsiveness and continuous follow-through during the implementation phase of the strategy where engagement tends to dwindle, while improving its relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. Strengthened pipeline/operational management processes through the development of pipeline implementation plans, and</p>			

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
	<p>review/revise and reintroduce the country portfolio review process – a framework for dialogue on implementation issues with GOJ and project management units – are key approaches.</p> <p>These can consider an expanded communication strategy for the new strategy that would incorporate a formal launch of the new Strategy in country post-Board approval twinned with success stories that show the beneficial impact of the Bank’s resources.</p>			
<p>Recommendation 1b: Explore options that would be feasible and cost-effective for provision of a more permanent in-country presence in the medium-to-long term. Options could include recruitment of a full or part-time Jamaica-based member of Bank staff; or contracting of a local fund agent or delivery partner.</p> <p>○ The role of this individual/entity would include improved ongoing monitoring of CES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>While accepting the recommendation, Management is, however, fully seized of the reality that the implementation challenges encountered in Jamaica are more nuanced than presented in the report and notes that permanent in-country presence may not be the panacea to this intractable issue. As such, this recommendation should be explored only after a thorough analysis of the implementation challenges being experienced in Jamaica, which the technical assistance (TA) report is expected to provide, in addition to</p>	<p>The Bank commits to reviewing and considering the recommendations and proposed actions coming out of the implementation deficit TA project currently underway.</p>	<p>Office of the Director of Projects</p>	<p>Q4, 2024</p>

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<p>implementation, and participation in formal and informal engagement mechanisms with GOJ, other counterparts and International Development Partners (IDPs).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ○ Given this would involve a change to the Bank’s standard model of working at country level, it is understood this recommendation would require high-level discussion across the Bank. But given Jamaica’s importance within the Bank portfolio, the available options should be considered, along with the operational and financial implications of each. 	<p>presenting clear recommendations to ameliorating these challenges.</p> <p>Leveraging the Bank’s new Guidelines on Flexible Working Arrangements that incorporate hybrid, remote working arrangement such as flexi-place arrangements, can be explored to allow staff to be located outside of duty station for extended periods to enhance the delivery of specific, time-bound outputs such as the new country strategy.</p>			
<p>Recommendation 1c: Ensure that renewed engagement with Jamaica includes all key GOJ, IDP, and other in-country partners (e.g., private sector and non-governmental organisation community), and that the Bank clearly demonstrates where it can provide added value in supporting Jamaica’s development needs.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>Management welcomes and supports this position and notes that even though the Bank does not have a strategic policy framework for stakeholder engagement, broad stakeholder engagement and consultation with in-country partners is actively pursued in operational functions including at the country level (via surveillance and strategy</p>	<p>The Bank commits to work closely with country officials to seek approval of the Bank’s participation in the annual development partners meetings.</p>	<p>Led by Country Economist</p>	<p>Q1, 2024</p>

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specifically, ensure that the Bank is actively involved in all existing in-country IDP coordination mechanisms, and look for opportunities to lead IDP engagement in areas where the Bank is already perceived as having a comparative advantage, such as climate change. 	<p>missions) and at the project level during appraisal missions. Management accepts that engagement is important but must be strategic and appropriate for it to be meaningful and impactful.</p> <p>Management accepts that given limited resources, the Bank can have significantly more impact if it can successfully leverage other development partners' resources through close coordination. The CES is the Bank's principal instrument used to articulate its value proposition and comparative advantage relative to other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and to demonstrate where the Bank can provide tangible added value to Jamaica's development agenda. In the formulation of the CES, extensive and broad-based consultation and dialogue are undertaken with other MBDs to pursue avenues for collaboration. Since January 2023, the Bank and the World Bank have met formally on several occasions to explore key areas for collaboration and to share country knowledge and analytical work.</p>			

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
	GOJ coordinates periodic/annual development partners meetings where partners meet and provide an update on ongoing and planned interventions in country. The Bank, however, has not participated in these meetings in recent years.			
2. Implementation				
<p>Recommendation 2a: As part of renewed engagement efforts with in-country stakeholders, conduct a targeted, Jamaica-specific review of the Bank processes and guidance, to identify areas for improvement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Prior CSP evaluations have identified some level of Borrowing Member Country (BMC) frustration with the Bank processes, and findings in this evaluation also identify this as an issue in Jamaica. It is interesting to note that it was the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic that pushed the Bank towards accepting soft-copy exchange/receipt of key documents from BMCs, which demonstrates that processes can 	<p style="text-align: center;">Rejected</p> <p>There are several ongoing initiatives being undertaken by the Projects Department, including a TA project to examine root causes and potential solutions to the implementation deficit in BMC's. Hence implementing this Jamaica-specific recommendation will duplicate ongoing efforts.</p>	No action proposed.		

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
be adapted where there is a push for this to happen.				
<p>Recommendation 2b: Ensure that all Bank staff engaged in the Jamaica CES are well briefed on GOJ's development frameworks and approval structures, and that future CES receive support from all necessary areas of government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ GOJ's development framework and approval structures are rigorous, comprehensive, and multi-layered, especially for capital investment projects. Informal mechanisms and relationships can also affect the likelihood of a particular intervention having the necessary fiscal space created. Given this complex context, it is vital that Bank staff working with the Jamaica CES are fully appraised of the formal and informal structures that exist. ○ A detailed Jamaica orientation brief, which is reviewed on an annual basis as structures and key 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>The recently completed CES completion report noted that Jamaica's development planning architecture had underwent significant reform and had evolved substantially. Given these enhancements to the development framework and approval structures management agrees that all staff, newly onboarded staff ought to be adequately briefed on these new country procedures. To close the Bank's staff knowledge gap in GOJ's development planning rules and procedures, familiarisation missions are initiated for all newly onboarded staff assigned to Jamaica. These familiarisation missions are intended to provide staff with the opportunity to meet and establish contact with country officials in their respective sectors, as well as gain deeper insight into the development challenges and country-specific operational rules and procedures which guide the public sector investment programme. Moreover, staff on an ongoing basis, either through country appraisal</p>	No action proposed.	Office of the Director of Projects	

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<p>individuals within the Planning Institute of Jamaica and Ministry of Finance (for example) change would be useful and would support efforts to increase and improve engagement with Jamaica.</p> <p>○ If the Bank does consider the development of some form of permanent presence in Jamaica, the role of the individual or entity engaged could also include orienting Bank officers on the Jamaican context and helping them to negotiate the structures that exist.</p>	<p>missions, supervision missions, or macro-economic surveillance missions, frequently engage with country officials and are apprised of any changes in the procedures and rules that are germane to the Bank's operations with country.</p>			
3. Risk Management and Sustainability				
<p>Recommendation 3a: Work with GOJ to build country-level capacity (particularly in Project Management) which can support successful project implementation while also building long-term institutional capacity, and thus sustainability of results. Specifically, ensure that the Bank is abreast of ongoing GOJ</p>	<p>Rejected Jamaica, like most BMCs, benefited from the Banks's Public Policy Analysis and Management (PPAM) and Project Cycle Management (PCM) training programme aimed to supporting institutional reforms to enable effective management of policies, programmes, and projects. In 2018, 166 modules were enrolled, and 116 Jamaican public servants participated, of which 73.1% and</p>	<p>No new action required.</p>	<p>Procurement Policy Unit</p>	

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<p>discussions around how to improve project management capacity of key government ministries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There is a need to engage with GOJ and other partners to review how limited in-country capacity affected project implementation and develop better ways to address and mitigate this risk. There are discussions taking place within GOJ around how to improve the project management capacity of key government ministries. The Bank should ensure they are kept abreast of these discussions, so that future intervention design can consider changes in the context and, where appropriate, move away from the preferred “quick fix” of putting in place short-term project implementation units (PIUs). 	<p>25.9% were females and males, respectively. Of the total participants, 39 were eligible to receive certificates at the end of the course offering. This low completion reflects that most participants did not meet the two key criteria for receiving the certificate, that is a minimum attendance of 80% and the preparation of action plans outlining how they would utilise the knowledge and skills learnt in their day-to-day operations.</p> <p>The Bank, in collaboration with the University of the West Indies Open Campus, is presently developing and piloting the online versions of both courses. This virtual platform is expected to facilitate greater access, which will enhance project implementation capacity and improve the capacity for strategic policy management and coordination, including evidence-based, gender-responsive decision making in the future.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In collaboration with the Bank, procurement courses are made available through the regional procurement center “U-Tech” based in Jamaica. 			

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Bank's Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) is continuously investing in knowledge share and keeping clients up to par with the recent procurement developments. Hence, PPU will launch online course in September 2023. • PPU is encouraging /supporting Jamaica's involvement in the Inter-American Government Procurement Network; and, at present, Jamaica is the Chair of the Caribbean Chapter of the network. • In September 2022, the Bank has approved the E-GP in Jamaica, and it is being used successfully. • For challenges related to slow process. We can refer to the Bank's Roster of Consultants. Jamaica is encouraged to use all the resources available to improve their project management. 			

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
	The Bank will be reintroducing the PPAM, PCM and procurement training to key stakeholders in Jamaica.			
<p>Recommendation 3b: Review lessons learnt from interventions which have been successfully implemented without the creation of short-term, external consultant-led PIUs. This may include a review of whether agencies, which already have proven implementation capacity such as the Jamaica Social Investment Fund and the National Water Commission, can be used to (co-)implement interventions which may be outside of their normal area of operations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Where building capacity from the ground up may be challenging, there may scope for Executing Agencies with less capacity to work alongside and co-implement alongside agencies with more experience of managing Bank/donor funds. If this avenue is explored, then it is vital to ensure that there are 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>CDB staff continually works to engage with clients to improve project implementation. These engagements include training and capacity building, institutional strengthening initiatives, and reviewing of internal policies and systems. The proposed implementation deficit TA project will help to focus these efforts.</p>	<p>No new action proposed.</p>	<p>Projects Department/Basic Needs Trust Fund</p>	<p>ongoing</p>

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
clear terms of reference for the agencies involved, to avoid and confusion or conflict around respective roles.				
4. CSP Monitoring and Evaluation				
<p>Recommendation 4a: Develop CES Results Management Frameworks (RMFs) in a more participatory way that increases awareness and buy-in. Ensure targets are Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic and Time-bound, and clearly identify/mitigate assumptions and risks. Ensure project RMFs feed into the overall CES RMF, and that key processes which support this, such as production of Project Supervision/Completion Reports, are completed for all projects.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Both the Bank and GOJ stakeholders should be involved in the development/review of CES RMFs, to ensure they align with broader in-country results frameworks and consider wider CDB targets/priorities (such as gender mainstreaming, for example). 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>The recommendation to design the RMF in a participatory manner aligns with good practice and the Bank’s procedural standard. The Bank has adopted Managing for Development Results principles and approaches to results management and measurement across the corporate, county and project level operations, and is committed to enhancing the results and outcome focus of monitoring and evaluation processes. Weaknesses in practice reflect inadequate training and continuous staff turnover, with the inflow of inexperienced staff. The preparation of supervision and completion reports is required under the policies and procedures that guide the Bank’s operations. These reports are produced, some with delays that are often the result of limited human resources with competing priorities.</p>	<p>The Bank is committed to improving the design, alignment, and approaches to developing RMFs.</p> <p>Specific actions will include ensuring that all staff receive continuous training.</p>	Corporate Services Division	Ongoing

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date <i>(Y/M/D)</i>
<p>Recommendation 4b: Ensure more effective ongoing monitoring and adaptation. This should include clear assignment of responsibilities for overall CES, sector, and intervention level monitoring. It may also include designation of Mid-Term Reviews as a Board requirement; inclusion of CES monitoring as part of the role of any future permanent in-country presence (see Recommendation 1b).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In addition to clear assignment of monitoring responsibilities, there should be agreed check-in points to monitor progress. This will support timelier course correction of interventions if/when it becomes clear that an intervention is not on track to achieve the anticipated results, and will allow for targets and associated indicators to be adjusted in line with the context. This will help to ensure that stakeholders remain focused on the aim of interventions, improve 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accepted</p> <p>The Bank agrees that monitoring and adaptation are key elements of the CS cycle and notes that the Bank’s Operational Policy addresses the issues raised. Management agreed since 2021 to prioritise the completion of strategy monitoring reports which were not being done in previous years due to low prioritisation; mid-term reviews and completion reports are included in current work programmes, while CSCRs are being appended to new CESs that are required for Board consideration. Similarly, responsibilities for strategy/ project level monitoring are already clearly assigned in the Bank. A review of CES processes is pending.</p> <p>Management is of the view that CES mid-term reviews, and especially those that do not recommend substantial course-correction or changes to the Board-approved CES, do not require Board oversight. Reviews that do recommend substantive changes to the scope of a Board-approved CES will be reviewed</p>	<p>No action required.</p>	<p>VPO Office, Director of Projects Office and Director of Economics Office.</p>	

Recommendations	Management Comments/ Responses <i>(Accepted/Accepted but Modified/Rejected)</i>	Commitments/Actions	Responsibility Centre	Target Completion Date (Y/M/D)
effectiveness and sustainability, and reduce frustration associated with indicators that do not capture the work completed.	and considered by the Bank's Country Committee for approval.			

Annexes

Annex A – Sampling of Projects

Due to the significant number of activities which were planned and implemented (around 50 for this BMC), it was not possible to review every project. Instead, a sampling exercise was conducted which sought to cover the main sectors and focus on the largest projects while also achieving a reasonable coverage. Project-level data collection and analysis was based on this sub-set of projects. A total of 22 projects were sampled across the various sub-sectors, including the largest projects in terms of absolute disbursement levels, along with the TA associated with those projects. This sampling also incorporated a cross-section of grants and loans, and some with relatively low percentage disbursements. In line with requests during the Inception phase, one regional level project implemented in Jamaica was included (National Disability Assessments) and one project which did not make it to appraisal stage (Dry Dock Initiative), as it was felt there was valuable learning to be captured.

Sector	Strategy		L	G	TA	Amount	Disburse-ments	%age disbursed
Economic Cooperation	2014-16	Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability - PBL				\$35.00m	\$35.00m	100%
	2014-16	Institutional Strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica				\$0.40m	\$0.38m	96%
	2017-21	Strengthening Capacities for Implementation & Resource Mobilisation				\$0.30m	\$0.03m	11%
Private Sector Development	2014-16	Sixth Industrial Line of Credit				\$15.00m	\$8.11m	54%
	2014-16	Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica's ICT Business Process Outsourcing Industry				\$0.20m	\$0.18m	90%
	PENDING	Dry Dock Initiative				PENDING	PENDING	PENDING
Economic Infrastructure	2017-21	Street Light Retrofitting Project				\$25.00m	\$25.00m	100%
	2014-16	Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study				\$0.60m	\$0.30m	50%
	2017-21	Rural Water Supply Programme				\$30.00m		0%
Environment Sustainability	2017-21	Canada - CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund				\$3.59m	\$3.48m	97%
	2017-21	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities, Clarendon				\$0.62m	\$0.29m	47%
	2017-21	Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation				\$0.38m	\$0.24m	62%
	2017-21	Establishment of a Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management				\$0.35m	\$0.23m	66%
Social Sector	2017-21	Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project				\$43.61m	\$8.96m	21%
	2017-21	BNTF Ninth Programme - Jamaica				\$7.52m	\$7.15m	95%
	2014-16	BNTF 8th Programme				\$1.83m	\$1.72m	94%
	2014-16	Baseline Studies For 17 Vulnerable & Volatile Communities to Support GOJ's Community Renewal Programme				\$0.44m	\$0.25m	57%
	PENDING	National Disability Assessments				PENDING	PENDING	PENDING
Energy	2017-21	Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in Electricity Sector				\$0.13m	\$0.12m	95%
Technical Cooperation	2014-16	Capacity Building for Market Access – Establishment of The Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory				\$0.27m	\$0.23m	86%
	2014-16	Uniforms Ltd				\$0.02m	\$0.02m	96%
	2017-21	Support to Jamaica IPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness & Growth of MSMEs				\$0.15m	\$0.12m	80%
	2017-21	Business of Music in The Caribbean Developmental Workshops				\$0.12m	\$0.10m	84%

Annex B – List of Persons Interviewed

INCEPTION PHASE

- Tommy Descartes / Jason Cotton
- Karl Pivott, Operations Officer
- Michel Thomas, Operations Officer CTCS
- Anthony George / Elbert Ellis
- Hopeton Peterson
- Antonia Hart, Operations Officer

- ToC session: Anthony George, Hopeton Peterson, Farmala Jacobs, Luther St. Ville, Zamanie Moodie, Alana Goodman-Smith

MAIN PHASE

- Malcolm Buamah, Risk Dept. CDB
- Owen Scarlett, Courtney Cole, Al Powell, Leitha Geddes, Petronia Colley, Lorna Green, Opal Gordon Ricketts, Kristal Tucker-Clarke, Joudene Jomie, Joan Wilsom, Marina Young, Wayne Williams, MAF
- Garth Jackson, National Water Commission
- Anthony Shaw, Dorothea Simpson, DBJ
- Oliver Blake, FCDO
- Naudia Crosskill, Shanique March, Philippa Ricketts Edmunds, PMC
- Maureen Dwyer, MOEY
- Karlene Francis, WB
- Anieta Lewis, Mr Lalor, Jovan Johnson, PIAB
- Wayne Lewis, Mr. Lecky, SBAJ
- Omar Sweeney, JSIF
- Clifford Spencer, Rohan Dacosta, Karl Hyatt, Oral Shaw, Casetta Green, Maxine Russell, Marsha Dennie, MIIC
- Denise Antonio & Ava Whyte-Anderson, UNDP
- Paula Hagley, Kamesha Blake, Mr. Salmon, JMEA
- Herbert Freckleton, Andrew Carthy, Alston, Peckham
- Errol Lebert, Mr. Grant, St. Elizabeth MC
- Barbara Scott, PIOJ
- Sharon Peake, Karyll Aitcheson, Canada High Commission
- Jodi-Ann Clarke, Kay-Marie Forbes-Robotham, HEART/NSTA
- Christine Hendricks, JCPD
- Tommy Descartes, Preliminary Results session
- Evan Thompson, MSJ
- Lilyclaire Bellamy, JIPO
- Sean Martin, Sandy Dawson, Donovan Morgan, JFB
- Cedric Wilson, Courtney Francis, OUR
- George Goode, Janett Mayne, Old Harbour Primary School
- Greg Khan, Uniform Centre
- Anthony George, CDB

- Aniceto Rodriguez Ruiz, EUD

Annex C – List of Documents Reviewed

CROSS-CUTTING CDB DOCUMENTS:

Title	Year
COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER 2014-16 - JAMAICA	2014
COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER 2017-21 - JAMAICA	2017
COUNTRY STRATEGY COMPLETION REPORT JAMAICA (2017-2021)	2022
Gender Implementation Guidelines for the Design and Implementation of Education Sector Development Plans	undated
Integrating Gender Equality into Education and Training Sector Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Public-Private Sector Partnerships	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Trade Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Housing Sector Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Water Sector Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Transport Sector Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into Private Sector Development Operations	2018
Integrating Gender Equality into the Energy Sector	2018
Operations Manual: Caribbean Technological Consultancy Services Network	undated
CTCS Supporting Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development in the Caribbean (primer/fact sheet)	undated
Caribbean Technological Consultancy Services Network Application for Technical Assistance	undated
Agriculture Sector Policy and Strategy	2020
Caribbean Development Bank Strategic Plan 2010-2014	2010
Discussion Paper: Youth Policy and Operational Strategy	2019
Education and Training Policy and Strategy Corrigendum	2017
Energy Sector Policy & Strategy	2015
Governance and Institutional Development Policy and Operational Strategy (draft for Discussion)	2017
Procurement Policy and Procedures for Projects Financed by CDB	2019
Private Sector Development Strategy	2016
Draft Strategic Plan 2015-2019	2014
Strategic Plan 2020-2024	2019
Technical Assistance Policy and Operational Strategy of the Caribbean Development Bank	2012
Evaluation of CDB's work through development finance institutions and other financial intermediaries (2012-19) Final Evaluation Report	2021
Loans, Grants Approved by Country in USD March 1, 2014, to February 23, 2022	2022
Office of Independent Evaluation Fiscal Consolidation, Growth and Social Stability Policy-Based Loan - Jamaica	2022
Validation of Project Completion Report, Paper 106/2022-B1	2022
Hazardous Waste Management Plan	2019
Ministry of Industry Investment and Commerce Strategic Business Plan 2022/23 - 2025/26	2022
Energy Sector Policy & Strategy Evaluation	2022
Caribbean Regulators table	Unknown
project per diem chart on CB for Productivity Improvement	2018
Concept Note - Expert Advice on the Tariff Productivity Methodology for the Jamaica Public Service Company	Unknown
Tariff Productivity Improvement Advice for the Electricity Sector - Jamaica	2017
CDB/OUR/USAID-CARCE Emerging Regulatory Issues Workshop	2018

PROJECT-SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS:

Project	Documents
Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability - Policy-Based Loan	Project Closure Report Corrigendum PCR Validation Report,
Institutional Strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica	Project Approval Notification Project Supervision Reports
Strengthening Capacities for Implementation and Resource Mobilisation	Project Proposal Quarterly Progress Reports Project Inception Report Final Project Report

	Finance Resourcing Reports Report on Development of KPIs
Sixth Industrial Line of Credit	Project Appraisal Project Supervision Reports
Dry Dock Initiative	None
Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework For Jamaica's Information Communication Technology Business Process Outsourcing Industry	Project Proposal Project Supervision Reports
Street Light Retrofitting Project	Project Proposal President's Recommendation Project Appraisal Rapid Climate Risk Assessment Project Status Reports Project Supervision Reports Quarterly Progress Reports Project Brief
Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study	Project Proposal Project Supervision Reports
Rural Water Supply Programme	Project Proposal
Canada - Caricom Climate Adaptation Fund	Project Proposal
Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities, Clarendon	External Evaluation Report
Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation	Project Proposal Project Closure Report Project Inception Report Final Project Report
Establishment Of a Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management	Project Proposal Quarterly Progress Reports Project Inception Report
Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project	Project Approval Notification Quarterly Progress Reports HM Monthly Report
BNTF Ninth Programme - Jamaica	Project Approval Notification Staff Report Annual Project Performance Report Sub-Projects Summary Environmental Performance Report Approval of Addendum(s)
BNTF 8th Programme	Project Proposal Project Closure Report Sub-Projects Summary Rapid Assessment Report Approval of Addendum(s)
National Disability Assessments	Project Proposal 1st draft country report 1st draft policy brief Biannual Project Report
Conducting Baseline Studies for Seventeen Vulnerable and Volatile Communities to Support the Government of Jamaica's Community Renewal Programme	Project Proposal
Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in The Electricity Sector, Jamaica	Project Approval Notification Project Supervision Reports
Capacity Building for Market Access - Establishment of The Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory	Project Closure Report Workshop Completion Report Consultant Report
Uniforms Ltd	Project Appraisal Project Close-Out

Support To Jamaica Intellectual Property Office for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness and Growth of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises	Project Proposal Project Closure Report Project Approval Notification Beneficiary Questionnaire
Business Of Music in The Caribbean Developmental Workshops, Jamaica	Project Appraisal Workshop Completion Report

The following secondary documents were also independently sourced by the evaluation team and reviewed:

- CARICOM (2022). “Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)”. Accessed 28 May 2022 from [https://caricom.org/institutions/caribbean-development-bank-cdb/#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20Development%20Bank%20\(CDB,force%20on%20Janu](https://caricom.org/institutions/caribbean-development-bank-cdb/#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20Development%20Bank%20(CDB,force%20on%20Janu)
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Annex D – Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
RELEVANCE					
1.To what extent were the Bank’s CSP for Jamaica, and operational programs, aligned with the country’s development needs, strategies <i>and other government interventions?</i>	1,1 How well does the CSP align to Vision 2030 Jamaica and its MTF 2015-2018?	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review • Primary data collection (KIIs and group interviews) with CDB staff and GOJ counterparts <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by the ToC • Mapping of CSPs against GOJ plans/strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of alignment of CSP planned and actual interventions with needs identified within the GOJ planning framework (including national and sector development plans -Vision 2030, MTF and sector plans) 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB Jamaica CSP papers • GOJ national and sector development plans/strategies (e.g.: Vision 2030 Jamaica; MTF 2015-2018, MTF 2018-2021;.2017-18 Fiscal policy paper; Growth agenda Policy paper 2015-16; 2016 IMF SBF; 2013 IMF EFF. <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB staff • PIOJ, PIMSEC • IFIs: WB, IDB local offices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country’s development needs are changing rapidly in some respects, due to political and socio-economic factors - KIIs with GOJ counterparts will be especially important to understand relevance in this context • 1.4 added based on KIIs during inception phase
	1.2 How relevant was the CSP to pertinent GOJ sector strategies and plans and how were synergies with these exploited?				
	1.3 Did the CSP respond adequately to Jamaica’s economic and development context?				
	1.4 What factors influenced GOJ’s uptake of grants??				
2. To what extent was the CSP aligned with CDB’s own corporate strategies		<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review • Semi-structured interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of alignment of CSPs planned and actual interventions with CDB corporate strategies 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP papers • CDB corporate Gender, regional cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Note that the period covers two separate CSPs (one of which was shorter than standard) and

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
and priorities?		Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC • Mapping of CSPs against CDB corporate strategies 		strategies etc Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB staff: Corporate strategy 	priorities were evolving.
3. Were the programme and individual operations designed in a manner consistent with the Government's institutional capacity for implementation?	3.1 Did the design and implementation of the CSPs sufficiently consider capacity limitations and strengthening needs?	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review • Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of capacity assessments carried out and/or reviewed • Degree to which the interventions reflected capacity building limitations in design and implementation • Evidence of success of projects 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP papers, including risk assessments • Project proposals • PSRs and PCRs • External reports on GOJ capacity Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GOJ / PIOJ, PIMSEC • Project consultants and CDB staff • Multi-laterals: UNDP, WB, IDB • Bilateral: EU, USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Important question re. appreciation of institutional challenges
COHERENCE					
4. <i>How and to what extent</i> were the Bank's CSPs for Jamaica and operational programs		Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review/ • Semi-structured interviews Analysis:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of CDB participation in any GOJ/cross-partner coordination mechanisms • Other evidence of CDB coordination with other development partners 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP papers • Project proposals, PSR and PCRs • Other actors' project appraisal documents, 	

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
harmonised, coordinated or complementary with other actors' interventions, including but not limited to the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC • Mapping of CSPs against other actors' interventions • Mapping of coordination mechanisms/dialogue platforms, participation, and roles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No evidence of duplication of effort between CDB and other partners 	evaluations etc., WB and IDB <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary data collection: CDB staff and development partners (WB and IDB) 	
5. To what extent did internal coordination between CDB's units support implementation and mainstreaming of CDB's cross-cutting objectives, and utilised a "ONE CDB Approach"?	5.1 To what extent were Energy Efficiency (EE), Regional Cooperation and Integration (RCI), energy security and environmental considerations mainstreamed in CDB's interventions? 5.2 Were Gender Equity (GE) and relevant gender patterns and potential safeguarding issues in the fields of intervention adequately identified, accounted for and mainstreamed into	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review/ • Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC • Mapping of CSP interventions against CDB's gender, energy and RCI strategies. • Quantitative review and synthesis of gender mainstreaming scores 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment between planned/actual interventions and RCI focus areas (as outlined in CDB Private Sector Development Strategy) • Alignment between planned/actual interventions and Energy Efficiency and Security priorities (as outlined in Energy Sector Policy and Strategy) • CDB-assigned Gender mainstreaming scores (where provided in project documents) • Alignment between interventions and their implementation and known gender patterns/issues 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSP papers; loan and grant agreements; Project Proposals, PSRs and PCRs • BNTF support, CTCS, CDB policy documents • Relevant CDB corporate strategies on gender, RCI, energy. • CDB Gender Sectoral guidelines • GOJ and donor gender reports/ assessments Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB staff • GOJ counterparts: Bureau of Gender Affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Look at the links between loans (PBL and investment projects); between loans and supporting TA; and economic, gender and environmental policies with projects • Energy sector (and PBL) offers an important means to test this • Gender EQ made sub-question here due to connection, but important to emphasize this is a key area to look at

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
	<p>interventions?</p> <p>5.3 How and to what extent did CDB internal coordination mechanisms support complementarity and coherence and thus implementation of the CSPs?</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that internal coordination mechanisms supported complementarity and coherence and thus implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Academic: Gender & Dev studies Ministry of Science, Energy and Technology 	
EFFECTIVENESS					
<p>6. To what extent was an appropriate M&E strategy and system, including Results Monitoring Framework (RMF), included in the design of the CSPs and implemented in practice?</p>	<p>6.1 To what extent did the M&E system facilitate adaptive management?</p> <p>6.2 Did the M&E system allow for measuring development results and was data available for measurement?</p> <p>6.3 Were RMF outputs and outcomes consistent with the CSP and indicators and targets designed according to the SMART approach?</p>	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis of M&E strategy Red-amber-green (RAG) assessment of SMART-ness of RMF indicators Comparison of RMFs with reconstructed ToC, including: (a) Review of alignment between RMF outputs and outcomes; (b) Comparison of assumptions in ToC against risks/assumptions outlined in CSPs and/or RMFs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> M&E strategy exists for both CSPs and clearly outlines how and when M&E will be conducted and who is responsible, along with a plan for updating the RMF as necessary due to contextual changes RMF in place for each CSP and project/intervention-level RMFs, with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alignment between outputs and outcomes SMART indicators for outputs and outcomes Assumptions between achievement of outputs and outcomes, complete and clearly articulated 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers (including RMFs within) CSP M&E Strategy/reports CSP completion report Project Appraisal/design documents (with RMFs within) Project Completion Reports Any other documents that underlie the RMFs <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunity to reflect on (lack of) data for key social and economic indicators in Jamaica and extent to which CDB tried to address this.

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
	6.4 Did the RMF adequately capture gender disaggregated data?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realistic indicator targets • Alignment between CSP-RMFs and project-level RMFs • Evidence of data available against RMF indicators • Evidence of gender disaggregated indicators/targets where appropriate 		
7. To what extent did the Bank's interventions make progress towards the outputs, outcomes and strategic objectives set out in the CSP?	7.1 What is the status of delivery of the outcomes and outputs of the projects, programs, and TA interventions, as defined in the original documents approved by CDB?	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review • Semi-structured interviews • FGDs <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) • Qualitative assessment of to what extent assumptions in the causal pathway/results chain of the reconstructed ToC held • Assessment of to what extent outputs and outcomes in reconstructed ToC were achieved (utilising quantitative and qualitative data from CDB PSRs, PCRs etc. where there is a degree of commonality between results being assessed) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of to what extent critical assumptions in the causal pathway/results chain held • Evidence of achievement of outcomes, outputs and strategic objectives as defined in the reconstructed ToC 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB project data, appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs, ARPPs, DERs <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with programme leads and GOJ counterparts, JSIF, private sector and civil society key informants. • FGDs with MSMEs, BNTF beneficiaries (school staff) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where outcomes were not achieved, the principal explanatory factors will be identified <p>Unintended results could include innovations in approaches and outputs that have strengthened the CSP effectiveness.</p>
	7.2 How effective was progress towards the achievement of the CSP strategic objectives?				
	7.3 Have the Bank's operations and technical cooperation products had unintended results (beyond those				

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
	proposed)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Where necessary, Evaluation team ‘plausibility’ assessment of results chain. 			
EFFICIENCY					
8. What were the principal factors facilitating or impeding programme management and implementation, and the achievement of the intended outcomes and outputs? (Including operational design and portfolio management)?	<p>8.1 How and to what extent did these various factors affect overall management, implementation, and achievement against planned timelines?</p> <p>8.2 Was there sufficient and effective initial and ongoing engagement with CSP stakeholders (including GOJ counterparts and implementing agencies) to support implementation?</p>	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <p>Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mapping of expected versus actual approval and implementation timelines Mapping of coordination mechanisms, including frequency of coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of impact of various factors on management and implementation of interventions Extent to which expected timelines were achieved <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of ongoing communication between CDB officers and GOJ and executing agencies Evidence of mechanisms to identify and escalate GOJ and executing agency concerns to CDB and vice versa in a timely and effective manner 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs, evaluations, ARPPs, DERs <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Country Economist Programme leads and GOJ counterparts and other donors (for comparative experiences) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This relates to both Effectiveness (outcomes) and Efficiency (outputs) but is listed here only to avoid duplication Factors will include ‘external’ – e.g., macro-economic and institutional – as well as ‘internal’ e.g., project design, CDB’s instruments and processes. Added 8.2 based on feedback during inception KIIs
9. Did the indicative financial envelope disburse according to the CSP predictions?		<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quantitative assessment of project and sector disbursement levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent of funds’ disbursement 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and project data <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB Country Economist 	

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative assessment of reasons for variations in disbursement levels 			
10. To what extent was programme implementation able to adapt as necessary?	<p>10.1 To what extent was programme implementation able to adapt to evolving national systems and development plans, as well as shocks?</p> <p>10.2 To what extent was programme implementation able to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic?</p>	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews FGDs <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which programme implementation was able to adapt to evolving national systems Extent to which programme implementation was able to adapt to COVID-19 Extent to which the RMF was adapted where required. 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB appraisal documents, financial and project data <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB programme leads; GOJ counterparts; other donor partners FGDs with MSMEs and BNTF beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Combined with EQ 6, can also look at more generally any aspects of adaptive management were in place (e.g., politically savvy, and problem-led; strong, flexible locally led team; learning-focussed, with an agile M&E framework¹¹⁰)
SUSTAINABILITY					
11. What is the likelihood that programme results will be sustainable?	11.1 To what extent did the programme support the strengthening of national systems?	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <p>Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which output, and outcome level results are expected to be sustained in the medium to long-term Extent to which programme supported GOJ capacity strengthening, including of financial management and procurement systems 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OIE evaluations, Project Completion Reports, CSP completion report Project design, monitoring and completion reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will look at efforts to strengthen PCM capacity within GOJ and any efforts to strengthen financial management and procurement systems Can try to capture information on early/upcoming or

¹¹⁰ OPM (2017): How to set up and manage an adaptive programme (accessed 3rd May 2022 from act-adaptive-programme-management.pdf (opml.co.uk))

Evaluation Questions (EQs) <i>(Italics indicate additions and/or amendments to the ToR)</i>	Indicative Sub-EQs	Methodologies	Judgement Criteria	Data Sources	Comments
				Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB programme leads; GOJ counterparts; other donor partners 	likely changes in line with change of government that should be considered in drafting of new CSP
12. To what extent did the risks identified in the CSP adequately identify and mitigate against operational design elements?	12.1 What are the critical financial, socio-political, institutional, and environmental risks and how were they mitigated?	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review/ • Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) informed by ToC • Mapping of identified risks, mitigations, and risk outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risks associated with GOJ capacity identified and mitigations outlined • Risks associated with implementation by other partners identified and mitigations outlined. • Extent to which identified risks materialised • Extent to which additional risks (not identified in the CSPs) materialised • Where risks materialised, review of whether planned mitigations were implemented and successful 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs, evaluations, ARPPs, DERs Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB programme leads and Risk department; GOJ counterparts; other donor partners • Private sector representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider adequacy of mitigation measures identified in CSP and resourcing of those measures

Annex E – CSP Alignment with Vision 2030 Sector Plans

Sector Plan	V2030 Sector Plan			CSP Alignment	
	Goal	Outcome	Relevant Specific Actions/Focus Areas	CSP Sector Outcome	Interventions
Education	A standards-based education system that is internationally recognised	Quality educators are attracted and retained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure an entitlement to high quality professional development 	A standards-driven and outcome-based education system.	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 (special education and WASH training) 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 & 10 (special education and WASH training)
		A standards-based Education system that is internationally recognised is instituted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue the abolition of the shift system 		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 (school classroom building sub-projects) 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 & 10 (school classroom building sub-projects)
	Attainment of equal and inclusive access and retention, to ensure completion of secondary education and continuation to tertiary	Adequate number of school places available to meet all needs and reflective of emerging population trends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporate requirements for persons with disabilities into the design of new facilities 	Increased access to high quality education and training	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 (school classroom building sub-projects) 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 & 10 (school classroom building sub-projects)
Poverty Reduction	Equitable access to basic goods and services	Ensure access to safe water and sanitation facilities Provide adequate physical infrastructure including roads, public transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Modernize rural road networks, including major and minor roads Water and sanitation projects put in place in inner-city and other communities on scheduled basis 	Effective livelihood programmes (indirect social protection)	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 (road, water and irrigation access sub-projects) 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 & 10 (road, water and irrigation access sub-projects)
Social Welfare And Vulnerable Groups	A social welfare programme which is delivered in a professional manner that maintains people's sense of dignity and value.	Strengthen client-oriented institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train and retrain staff including social workers 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 (Social protection related sub-projects inc. social worker training)
	A society that adequately meets the basic needs of vulnerable persons.	Expanded range of programmes to meet practical and strategic needs of various vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide suitable accommodation, care, and protection to children in Institutions (e.g., residential care, mental health facilities, Children's Homes) according to specific needs 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 support to Establish a Residential TheraPIUtic Centre to provide psycho-social services for children

V2030 Sector Plan				CSP Alignment	
Sector Plan	Goal	Outcome	Relevant Specific Actions/Focus Areas	CSP Sector Outcome	Interventions
	A society in which the vulnerable population is identified and included in the social support system	A formal welfare system which provides coverage for its vulnerable population.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen the system of identification of beneficiaries of public assistance Programmes Improve system of selection of beneficiaries 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National disability assessments
National Security	Social cohesion within and among communities	Partnerships and participation are encouraged to prevent crime and ensure public safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve implementation of targeted community interventions 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 (Social protection related sub-projects inc. social worker training)
Agriculture	Enabling and facilitating framework, infrastructure, and support services	Modernised and Upgraded Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide adequate water supply, irrigation, and drainage to meet needs of sector 	Increased agricultural production and productivity, which is climate proof	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Essex Valley Irrigation Project 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project
					2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Southern Plains Agricultural Development Project
					2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feasibility And Design Study - St. Catherine And Clarendon Agricultural Development Project
			Improve and rationalize road infrastructure including farm roads network		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 (farm feeder road sub-projects) 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 & 10 (farm feeder road sub-projects)
Services	A globally competitive services sector	Service providers who meet relevant international and domestic standards and accreditation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduce certification into all services industries Appoint relevant institutions as certifying bodies Carry out training of staff in institutions involved in certification, accreditation, and monitoring of standards 	Improved private sector operations and development.	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expansion Of Certification Services by The National Certification Body of Jamaica 2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Certification Body of Jamaica - Certification Scope Expansion to Include Food Safety Management System 2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA - Servsafe Training and Certification for Food Service Managers and Handlers in Jamaica 2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshops On Capacity Building in Jamaican MSMEs in Agro-Processing Sector to Satisfy Food Safety Requirements

V2030 Sector Plan				CSP Alignment	
Sector Plan	Goal	Outcome	Relevant Specific Actions/Focus Areas	CSP Sector Outcome	Interventions
		Strong participation in global and domestic markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide relevant export development services to existing and potential exporters 		2017-21: Increasing The Export Capacity of Micro and Small Agro-Processors Using the Cluster Approach
	A business environment and responsive infrastructure which can adequately support the growth of the services sector	Improved provision of and access to capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand DBJ Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Line of Credit 		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sixth Industrial LOC
Manufacturing	An enabling business environment which fosters and supports the establishment, survival, and growth of manufacturing enterprises	An economy in which capital is equitably and competitively available for the sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve access to capital 	Improved access to, and quality of skills training based on labour market needs.	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uniforms Ltd
	A highly competitive manufacturing sector	A workforce with a high level of appropriate skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use SME clusters to access local and external training services to build core skills 		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Workshops on MFDR For Business Support Organisations
		High levels of company sophistication and business performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop range of functions of centre of excellence including the provision of centralised business support services 	Improved private sector operations and development.	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building for Market Access – Establishment of The Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory
	A sector which produces goods that meet and exceed the expectations of customers	Innovative products of high quality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work with Bureau of Standards (BSJ) to strengthen the use of the Standards mark Develop value-added products 		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support To Jamaica Manufacturers and Exporters Association Expo Jamaica 2021 - Digital Tradeshow
		A sector which gives excellent distribution, delivery of shopping experience and customer service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide relevant export development services to existing and potential exporters 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support to Jamaica IPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness & Growth of MSMEs
		Brand Jamaica established for internationally known, accepted and sought-after Jamaican manufactured products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen monitoring capacity of JIPO 		
Science Technology	A scientific culture entrenched into all aspects of national life	National capability for the development of indigenous STI knowledge, intellectual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve data systems on patents, trademarks, royalties etc 		

V2030 Sector Plan				CSP Alignment	
Sector Plan	Goal	Outcome	Relevant Specific Actions/Focus Areas	CSP Sector Outcome	Interventions
		property and businesses elevated and strengthened			
		Jamaica is a major generator and use of STI knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve intellectual property rights 		
ICT	A strong and competitive ICT sector	Develop investment and support framework for development of the ICT sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No specific relevant actions 		2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica's ICT Business Process Outsourcing Industry
Transport	A globally competitive and diversified maritime transport sub-sector	Provide the necessary infrastructure for local ship owners to develop short sea shipping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and develop suitable docks for shipping and receiving coastal cargo 		2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dry Dock Initiative
Labour Market & productivity	Full and satisfying employment	Integrate into the labour force, persons who are of working age and are outside of the labour force because they do not want to work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct research into this category of persons • Acting upon the reasons gathered from the research, conduct interventions to increase the labour market participation among persons in this category 	Strengthened training programmes for increased productivity, with special focus on youth	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability - PBL
Governance	More effective, complementary, and transparent government structures, seeking to move decision-making closer to the people	Create Quality Public Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create mechanisms for efficient and effective delivery of services • Build capacity of the public sector entities to effectively implement stated mandates • Build into practices and organizational principles openness and accountability • Develop transformative leadership in public officials 	Improved technical and political governance systems	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional Strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening Capacities for Implementation & Resource Mobilisation
Water	Adequate and safe water supply and sanitation to support the social and economic development of Jamaica	Capacity enhanced to effectively plan and manage the development and use of the island's water resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No specific relevant actions 	Improved access to, and quality of, climate resilient social and economic infrastructure	2014-16: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study 2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural Water Supply Programme
Energy	Jamaica's energy supply is secure and	Application of emerging appropriate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage application of appropriate energy 	Improved energy efficiency in	2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Street Light Retrofitting Project

V2030 Sector Plan				CSP Alignment	
Sector Plan	Goal	Outcome	Relevant Specific Actions/Focus Areas	CSP Sector Outcome	Interventions
	sufficient to support long-term economic and social development and environmental sustainability	energy technologies	technologies, skills, and results of research and development	public infrastructure And Diversify energy mix towards RE	2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in Electricity Sector
Culture and Creative Industries	Valuable and Viable, Dynamic & Innovative Creative Enterprises and Individuals	Expansion of participation in creative industries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase access to participation in the creative industries Identify and reduce barriers to expansion of each category of products and services in the creative industries 	Improved private sector operations and development.	2017-21: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Business of Music in The Caribbean Developmental Workshops



Well aligned



Partially aligned



Minimal/no alignment

Annex F: Theory of Change of Jamaica CSPs 2014-17 and 2017-21

INTRODUCTION

A Theory of Change (ToC) is a comprehensive description and illustration on how and why change happens, as results of a series of interventions implemented by organisations and stakeholders. It is based on sets of assumptions (“Theories”) which people and organisations have about cause and effect, risk, and contextual influences. It is focused on mapping the pre-conditions needed for enabling certain results through change and interventions.

A ToC usually first identifies the vision or long-term goals and then works back by determining the pre-conditions (outcomes and outputs or other results) that must be in place for these to occur. The ToC for the CDB Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) for Jamaica focuses on the pathways of change leading towards results which contribute to Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan (NDP). Since the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are well-aligned and integrated in Vision 2030 Jamaica, the CSPs also actively contribute to several specific SDGs.

The ToC assumes that each level of results is achieved through the contributions of a lower level of results. As such, the precondition of the long-term CSP outcomes and their contribution to the Vision 2030 Jamaica National Outcomes is that the Intermediate Sector Outcomes have been achieved. Similarly, these results can only be achieved if the results of the specific interventions have been achieved and are mobilised to contribute to the expected change.

LONG-TERM GOAL/IMPACT OF THE CSPs:

The long-term goal of CDB’s collaboration with the Government of Jamaica, through its Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), is to contribute effectively and substantially to “*Vision 2030 Jamaica - National Development Plan.*” The national vision statement is “*Jamaica, the place of choice to live, work, raise families and do business.*” This statement is well-aligned to CDB’s own strategic objectives to assist its Borrowing Members Countries (BMCs) in (a) Supporting inclusive and sustainable growth and development; and (b) promoting good governance. Through the CSPs, CDB will have contributed to each of the four National Goals of Vision 2030 through four compatible pillars of results.


The Theory of Change for the CSPs is illustrated through a diagram, see Figure 1 in this annex.

CSP OUTCOMES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO VISION 2030 JAMAICA’S NATIONAL GOALS AND OUTCOMES:

The CSP outcomes fall under four pillars:

- Pillar 1: Enhance Educational Quality and Improve the Effectiveness of Social Protection, with CSP Outcomes 1 and 2 linked to Vision 2030 Jamaica’s National Goal 1
- Pillar 2: Enhance Governance and Citizen Security, with CSP Outcomes 3 and 4 linked to Vision 2030 Jamaica’s National Goal 2
- Pillar 3: Increase Inclusive Economic Growth and Competitiveness Reforms, with CSP Outcomes 5, 6 and 7 linked to Vision 2030 Jamaica’s National Goal 3
- Pillar 4: Strengthen Environmental Sustainability and Energy Security, with CSP Outcomes 8 and 9, where CSP Outcome 8 is linked to Vision 2030 Jamaica’s National Goal 4 and CSP Outcome 9 to Vision 2030 Jamaica’s National Goal 3

Figure 1: Diagram of the Draft ToC for CDB CSPs 2014-17 and 2017-21



As such, overall, the CSPs have been designed to contribute to 11 of the 15 National Outcomes of Vision 2030 Jamaica, through the total of 9 CSP Outcomes as illustrated in Table 1 below. It is important to note that several the indicators listed in the CSPs are like Vision 2030 Jamaica indicators and therefore directly measure the contribution of the CSPs to specific National Outcomes.

Table 1: Linkages between the National Outcomes of Vision 2030 Jamaica and the CSPs

National Outcomes Vision 2030 Jamaica	Outcomes CSPs 2014-16 and 2017-2021
National Outcome 2. World-Class Education and Training	Outcome 1: Improved quality of and access to education (CSP 2014-16 & CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 3. Effective Social Protection	Outcome 2: Effective social protection (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 5. Security and Safety	Outcome 4: Reduced crime, increased citizen security and support for at-risk youth (CSP 2014-16 & CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 6. Effective Governance	Outcome 3: Improved public sector governance (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 8. An Enabling Business Environment	Outcome 5: Inclusive growth and competitiveness reforms (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 9. Strong Economic Infrastructure	Outcome 6: Resilient economic infrastructure (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 10. Energy Security and Efficiency	Outcome 9: Improved energy security and efficiency (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 12. Internationally Competitive Industry Structures	Outcome 7: Agricultural sector transformed (CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 13. Sustainable Management and Use of Environmental and Natural Resources	Outcome 8: Reduced vulnerability to natural disasters (CSP 2014-16 & CSP 2017-21)
National Outcome 14. Hazard Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change	
National Outcome 15. Sustainable Urban and Rural Development	

STAKEHOLDERS IN THE THEORY OF CHANGE

The Theory of Change assumes that when the **CSP long-term outcomes** are achieved, they feed directly into the pertinent Vision 2030 Jamaica National Outcomes and subsequently the National Goals.

However, for the **sector-level intermediate outcomes** of the CSPs to contribute to change benefiting the CSP Long-term Outcomes, a **wide variety of stakeholders** at national, regional as well as international levels will have been engaged in using the intermediate results, scaling them up or replicating them, enriching, and transforming the products. These stakeholders come from all sectors and are based in Government, Local Authorities, Civil Society Organisations and groupings, Trade and Professional Associations, Academia and training institutions, interest groups and charities, as well as community-based organisations, private sector, international development partners, etc.

The Intermediate (sector) outcomes are generated through the contributions of several **interventions by CDB**, including the provision of loans, grants, and Technical Assistance. Different **implementation partners** are responsible for the delivery of the various interventions, thus contributing to the achievement of the project level outputs and outcomes. These feed into the relevant sector (intermediate) and CSP (long-term) outcomes. As one moves from projects towards outcomes, the significance of CDB's contribution will

decrease, since other stakeholders are also working towards the same intermediate, long-term, and national outcomes. See also Figure 2 for a stakeholder mapping.

Figure 2: Mapping of Implementation Partners and Sector Level Stakeholders

CSPE JAMAICA - STAKEHOLDER MAPPING AND ANALYSIS

INFLUENCE ON THE CSPs	Anticipate information needs	Manage relationship proactively through frequent and regular engagement
	MOFPS Public Investment Appraisal Branch (PIAB)	Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) Ministry of Finance and the Public Service (MOFPS) Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) (various departments)
	Ensure positive opinion	Increase engagement
	IFIs: World Bank Group (WB) / Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) / Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce (MIIC) / Ministry of Transport and Mining (MTM) / Ministry of Education and Youth (MEY) / Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) / RADA Development Bank of Jamaica (DBJ)
	Monitor with minimal effort	Keep informed
	Bilaterals that increased engagement with Jamaica: Delegation of the European Union (EUD) / US Agency for International Development (USAID) / Global Affairs Canada (GAC) / UK Agency for International Development (UKAID) Bureau of Gender Affairs (BGA) / Institute for Gender & Dev. Studies (UWI) / entities engaged in climate change policy Municipal Corporations (MCs) / Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies Local Economists	Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ) / Jamaica Manufacturers and Exporters Association (JMEA) Jamaica Public Services Co. (JPS) National Water Commission (NWC) / Intellectual Property Office (IPO) / Bureau of Standards of Jamaica (BSJ) Beneficiaries in schools (BNTF), in MSMEs (CTCS) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) / other UN agencies
	INTEREST IN THE CSPs	

ASSUMPTIONS AND PATHWAYS OF CHANGE

Of note is that the ToC Diagram (Figure 1) currently only illustrates the pathways from CSP intermediate (sector) outcomes towards the Vision 2030 Jamaica National Outcomes and National Goals. It is intended to illustrate the pathways as well from intervention level or project outputs and outcomes towards intermediate (sector) outcomes. Therefore, the ToC will analyse for sampled projects under each sector covered by the CSPs, the factors which determine the pathways of progress towards project level outputs and outcomes and capture the intended changes which make these feed into sector outcomes. Due to the number of interventions, these will be illustrated in the diagram through a nested approach, linked to the relevant Sector Outcomes.

Several critical assumptions must hold for the ToC to be valid, for each level benefiting from the contributions of the lower level. The critical assumptions and risks are most relevant at three levels of change: (a) From Sector Outcomes to CSP Outcomes; (b) From Project Outcomes to Sector Outcomes; (c) From Project Outputs to Project Outcomes. Table 2 presents a preliminary list of those assumptions to be researched during the evaluation. As part of the Theory of Change validation process, these assumptions can be further discussed to identify if there were any other critical underlying assumptions in the Theory of Change at the time the CSPs were developed.

The pertinent **assumptions and risks** listed in the RMF of the CSPs are:

- GOJ finances are sufficiently robust

- There is sufficient GOJ and CDB capacity to take the programmes/ interventions forward
- Existing complementary projects proceed accordingly
- GOJ actively and successfully bids for TA funding
- UK-CIF projects are delivered in timely manner
- Feasibility studies are completed on time with clear recommendations
- CTCS support for mental health activities and PTSD
- CDB secures access to next tranche of the Climate Action Line of Credit
- CDB and GOJ identify and take forward projects most likely to qualify for concessional funding

Some additional assumptions and risks gleaned from the inception phase and the ToC validation workshop include:

- Jamaica experiences employment generation and a decrease of unemployment
- Major shocks will not override opportunities for project implementation
- Social risk will be manageable
- The CSPs will be able to adapt to new circumstances, within a context of uncertainty
- The size of CSP financed interventions will noticeable and measurable contribute to results
- The GOJ will comply with the regulations of the IMF programme
- The CSP projects benefit from loops of competitiveness in various sectors
- Economic opportunities for Jamaicans expand
- CDB will maintain a sufficient level of permitting risk
- CDB products are relevant to the private sector
- Threats of climate change and preparations for managing disasters galvanize institutional action
- Locally based solutions and innovations are demonstrated and used
- Strategic partnerships with appropriate stakeholders will be forged
- Related strategies, national plans and policies are implemented
- The GOJ priorities will not change drastically over the period of the CSP and institutional capacities of implementing partners remain sufficient
- The Vision 2030/MTF process proceeds apace

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

The consideration of CDB's cross-cutting issues enriches the implementation of all projects and activities of the CSPs in combination with appropriate partners and assists in the change process towards the CSP Long-term Outcomes. These issues (gender equality, regional cooperation, and integration, private sector development, energy security, digital transformation, and good governance) will be researched throughout the evaluation.

Table 2: Assumptions and Risks Relating to Change Processes

Sector	Name of Project (sample for evaluation)	Assumptions relating to: (a) progress from Sector Outcomes to CSP Outcomes	Assumptions relating to: (b) progress from Project Outcomes to Sector Outcomes	Assumptions relating to: (c) progress from Project Outputs to Project Outcomes
Economic cooperation	Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability Institutional Strengthening – Ministry of Finance, Jamaica Strengthening Capacities for Implementation and Resource Mobilization			
Private Sector Development	Sixth Industry Line of Credit Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica's ICT Business Process Outsourcing Industry		CDB and GOJ identify and take forward projects most likely to qualify for concessional funding.	
Economic Infrastructure	Street Light retrofitting Project Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study Rural Water Supply Programme			
Environmental Sustainability	Canada- CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change while Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities Clarendon Strengthening the Disaster Risk Management Capacity of the Portmore Municipal Corporation Establishment of a Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management		CDB secures access to next tranche of the Climate Action Line of Credit.	
Social Sector	Essex Valley Agricultural Development Project BNTF Ninth Programme – Jamaica		CDB and GOJ identify and take forward projects most likely to qualify for concessional funding.	

Sector	Name of Project (sample for evaluation)	Assumptions relating to: (a) progress from Sector Outcomes to CSP Outcomes	Assumptions relating to: (b) progress from Project Outcomes to Sector Outcomes	Assumptions relating to: (c) progress from Project Outputs to Project Outcomes
	BNTF 8th Programme – Jamaica Baseline Studies for 17 Vulnerable and Volatile Communities to Support GOJ's Community Renewal Programme			
Energy	Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in the Electricity Sector	Diversification into/increased investments in renewable energy reduce overall dependency on		
Technical Cooperation	Capacity Building for Market Access – Establishment of the Bureau of Standards Packaging Laboratory Uniforms Ltd Support to Jamaica IPO for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness & Growth of MSMEs Business of Music in the Caribbean Developmental Workshops			GOJ actively and successfully bids for TA funding.
Cross-cutting	All		Existing complementary projects proceed accordingly	GOJ finances are sufficiently robust There is sufficient GOJ and CDB capacity to take the programmes/interventions forward.

Annex G: Detailed Results Matrix for CSP Outcomes

The discussion on achievement of RMF indicators below is based on data from the 2017-21 CSP Completion Report, complemented with other data sources detailed in footnotes) sourced by the evaluation team. Where data could not be sourced for the specific RMF indicator, or where the indicator was deemed not to reflect the outcome being assessed, other relevant data is considered in order to provide an assessment of progress.

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
1: Enhanced Educational Quality	1.1: Increased access to high quality education and training	1.1.1 (CSP 2017-21). Percentage increase in suitably trained teachers and instructors available by 2021: Declined from 89% (baseline) in academic year 2016/17 to 87.0% in 2019/2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 8 and 9 School construction/rehabilitation projects (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partial achievement: Given overall performance against RMF/other available indicators, is plausible that education quality did improve nationally up to the end of 2019. 2020 and 2021 has not been considered due to the known impact of COVID-19 on education which would skew progress CDB contribution: Limited, though slightly higher at schools in rural areas where BNTF is active
		1.1.2 (CSP 2017-21). Percentage increase in national mean passing CSEC in five or more subjects at one sitting by gender by 2021: Increased from 39.0% in 2016/17 academic year to 43.6% in 2019/2020.		
		1.1.3 (CSP 2017-21). 5% increase in students writing Caribbean Advanced Proficiency Examination (CAPE) and students transitioning to postsecondary education by 2021: Increased 4.9% from 33.3% in 2016/17 to 38.3% in 2019/2020.		
	1.2: Improved quality of/access to ECD, secondary, TVET and higher education by men and women	CSP 2017-21. 5% increase in students writing at least one TVET subject at either CSEC or Caribbean Vocational Qualification by 2021: Increased by 0.5%, moving from 84.8% in 2016/17 to 85.3% in 2019/2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand and upgrade TVET and STEM programmes in schools and training institutions (not implemented) 	
	1.3: A standards-driven and outcome-based education system	CSP 2014-16. Grade Four literacy rates. Decreased from 92.5% in 2015 to 90.3% in 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BNTF 9 SENCO Phase 2 – Advancement in Inclusive Education and Recreation BNTF 8 and 9 WASH & Maintenance Training. BNTF 8 classroom/ PWD facility projects 	
		CSP 2014-16. Percentage of cohort achieving passes in STEM-related disciplines (by sex). CSEC Mathematics pass rate increased from 46.5% in 2018¹¹¹ to 61.2% in 2020^{112,113}; %age students writing at least one TVET subject at either CSEC or Caribbean Vocational Qualification increased from 84.8% in 2016/17 to 85.3% in 2019/2020.		
CSP 2014-16. Increase in attendance rate Primary school net enrolment remained relatively steady (90.6% in 2014, 89.6% in 2018¹¹⁴); Lower secondary school net enrolment increased from				

¹¹¹ <https://jis.gov.jm/increase-in-csec-passes/>; Jamaica Education Transformation Commission's Report, 2021

¹¹² Jamaica Education Transformation Commission's Report, 2021

¹¹³ It then declined to 42.5% in 2021, most likely due to COVID-19 school closures

¹¹⁴ https://stinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/Education.aspx

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
		<i>82.1% in 2014 to 88.9% in 2018¹¹⁵; Upper secondary school enrolment increased from 62.7% in 2014 to 91.3% in 2018¹¹⁶</i>		
	1.4: Improved performance in poor performing schools and in the areas of English and Mathematics	CSP 2014-16. Percentage of schools rated as effective: <i>Data not available</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	
	1.5: Strengthened training programmes for increased productivity, with special focus on providing solutions for unattached youth. (CSP 2014-16)	CSP 2014-16. Percentage of labour force that is certified: <i>Specific data not available/not measured. Youth unemployment rate decreased from 36% in 2014¹¹⁷ to 25% in 2018¹¹⁸</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	
	1.6: Increased access to tertiary education by qualified students from poor and vulnerable households.	CSP 2014-16. Performance on standardised tests. <i>CSEC scores decreased from 43% in 2015 to 30% in 2019. Number of students passing 5 or more subjects including Mathematics and English increased from 9,566 in 2018 to 10,087 in 2020¹¹⁹</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB Interventions 	
2: Improved Effectiveness of Social Protection	2.1: Effective livelihood programmes (indirect social protection) implemented	CSP 2017-21 % increase in labour market participation/livelihoods for women and youths in the rural areas by 2021.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Disability Assessments (<i>partially complete</i>) • BNTF 8 and 9 rural road and water sub-projects (<i>complete</i>) • BNTF 8 and 9 Farm Road Access and Drainage Sub-projects (<i>complete</i>) • BNTF 8 and 9 Maintenance Training (<i>complete</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partial achievement: Based on overall progress against RMF or other identified indicators, is plausible that social protection has improved nationally • CDB contribution: Some: Given the inputs

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ https://statinja.gov.jm/Demo_SocialStats/Education.aspx

¹¹⁷ STATIN (2015), Labour Force Survey, 2014

¹¹⁸ STATIN (2019), Labour Force Survey, 2018

¹¹⁹ Jamaica Education Transformation Commission (2021), The Reform of Education in Jamaica, 2021

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
		<p><i>Data not available for rural areas specifically. Youth - decreased from 36.5% (2017)¹²⁰ to 33.8% (2021)¹²¹. Women – increased from 56.3% (2017)¹²² to 57.0% (2021)¹²³.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BNTF 9 Capacity Building Training for Agriculture and Tourism Projects (complete) 	<p>into disability assessments, and various BNF inputs including the therapy centre, social worker training (youth-at-risk project)</p>
		<p>CSP 2017-21. Improved evidence bases for tackling various dimensions of SDGs associated with poverty reduction, by 2018</p> <p><i>Clear progress was made to improve evidence-based tracking of various dimensions of SDGs associated with poverty reduction</i></p>		
	<p>2.2: Social issues that are associated with crime, ameliorated. (See also 4.1)</p>	<p>CSP 2017-21. Percentage reduction in the number mental health and psycho-social cases by 2021.</p> <p><i>Specific data not available. Related data showed increase in suicide mortality per 100,000 population from 2.18 (2016) to 2.28 (2019)¹²⁴; Increase in number of mental health workers per 100,000 population from 12.26 (2017) to 20.38 (2020)¹²⁵</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BNTF 9 Youth-at-Risk sub project (complete) • BNTF 9 Establish a residential Child TheraPIUtic Centre (CPFSA) (complete) 	
3: Improved		<p>CSP 2017-21. Percentage increase in programmes and projects applying PPAM and PCM, by 2021: <i>Not measured</i></p>		<p>Partial achievement: It is plausible that social</p>

¹²⁰ STATIN (2018), Labour Force Survey, 2017

¹²¹ STATIN (2022), Labour Force Survey, 2021

¹²² STATIN (2018), Labour Force Survey, 2017

¹²³ STATIN (2022), Labour Force Survey, 2021

¹²⁴ [Country Profile Data and Template_FINAL_09.02.22_Jamaica.xlsx \(who.int\)](#)

¹²⁵ Ibid

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
	3.1: Improved capacity for strategic policy management and coordination, including evidence-based, gender responsive decision-making	<p>CSP 2017-21. 50% of programmes and projects in targeted ministries are gender mainstreamed, by 2021.</p> <p><i>Not measured, although average gender marker score at appraisal for CDB interventions in 2017-21 CSP was 2.6</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a national monitoring system for SDGs. <i>(Not implemented)</i> • PPAM and PCM training was carried out in Jamaica 	<p>protection has improved nationally, but it is not possible to measure by how much.</p> <p>CDB contribution: Some: The successful 2014-16 PBL provided valuable contribution but must be seen in the context of other IDPs. Other interventions also plausibly provided some contribution</p>
	3.2: Improved technical and political governance systems	<p>CSP 2017-21. Improvement in fiscal balance and debt-to-GDP ratios.</p> <p><i>Debt-to-GDP ratio decreased from 113.7% in 2016 to 94.8% in FY 2019/20. Prior to COVID-19, GOJ had managed to reverse debt dynamics and achieve its debt target.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening the Economic Growth Council Secretariat (not implemented) • 2014-16 fiscal consolidation growth and social stability PBL (completed) • Institutional strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica (completed) • Strengthening capacities for implementation and resource mobilisation (ongoing) 	
4: Reduced Crime, Increased Citizen Security and Support for At-Risk Youth	4.1: Social issues that are associated with crime, ameliorated. (See also 2.2)	<p>CSP 2017-21. Reduction in number of violent crimes against men and women in target areas, by 2021.</p> <p><i>Nationally, major crimes including robberies, rape, shooting, aggravated assault and break-ins have been trending downwards from 4,369 in 2018 to 3,661 in 2021¹²⁶. Percentage of respondents who felt safe walking in daytime decreased from 95% in 2016 to 91% in 2019. Percentage of respondents who felt safe walking at night fell from 82% in 2016 to 70% in 2019¹²⁷.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Anti-Violence, Communication and Outreach Programme <i>(not implemented)</i> 	<p>Not achieved: Overall based on available data related to major crimes, perceptions of safety and murder rates, this has not been achieved</p>

¹²⁶ [VNR_Goal_16.pdf \(pioj.gov.jm\)](#)

¹²⁷ Ibid

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
	4.2: Strengthened capacity of communities to participate in creating a safe and secure society and support provided for the existing Community Renewal Programme	CSP 2014-16. Contribute to reduction in Murder Rate per 100,000 population: <i>Murder rate in 2014 was 35 per 100,000, rising to 56 per 100K in 2017 before decreasing slightly to 45 per 100K in 2020</i> ¹²⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducting Baseline Studies for Seventeen Vulnerable and Volatile Communities to Support the GOJ'S Community Renewal Programme (partially completed) • National Crime Reduction Project (Border and Community Security) (not implemented) • Rejuvenating Communities Project in West Kingston (not implemented) • BNTF interventions in this area (not implemented) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB contribution: None. The CRP baseline studies are useful but cannot be seen as having contributed yet, and other interventions did not proceed
5: Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness Reforms:	5.1: Improved access to, and quality of skills training based on labour market needs	CSP 2017-21. Increase in skilled women and men employed in industry by 2021: <i>Specific data not available/Not measured. Male unemployment rate decreased from 14% in 2017 to 9% in 2021; Female unemployment rate decreased from 7% in 2017 to 5% in 2021</i> ¹²⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness PBL (not implemented) • Expansion Of Certification Services by The National Certification Body of Jamaica (partially complete) • National certification body of Jamaica - certification scope expansion to include food safety management system (complete) • TA - SERV safe Training and Certification for Food Service Managers and Handlers in Jamaica (mostly complete) • National Workshops on MfDR for Business Support Organisations (mostly complete) • Capacity Building for Market Access - Establishment of The Bureau of 	<p>Partially achieved ¹³⁰: Based on available data, it would appear there has been some progress here based on decrease in female and youth unemployment rates, improvement in Global Innovation Index rating</p> <p>CDB contribution: Limited. Based on the LOC intervention and early success of interventions such as the support to JIPO, as well as several small Technical Cooperation interventions, CDB contribution here can be</p>
		CSP 2017-21. Lowering the % of youth (14-24 years old) that does not work or study. <i>Youth unemployment rate decreased from 25% in 2017 to 219% in 2021</i> ¹³¹		

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ STATIN (2018), Labour Force Survey, 2017; STATIN (2022), Labour Force Survey, 2021

¹³⁰ Compared to rating of "Not achieved" in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report¹³¹ STATIN (2018), Labour Force Survey, 2017; STATIN (2022), Labour Force Survey, 2021

¹³¹ STATIN (2018), Labour Force Survey, 2017; STATIN (2022), Labour Force Survey, 2021

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
			Standards Packaging Laboratory (complete).	seen as limited, especially when considered in the context of major support from the World Bank for this area.
	5.2: Improved private sector operations and development	<p>CSP 2017-21. Increased labour market participation of graduates from National Training Agency/Housing, Opportunity, Production and Employment programme by 2019.</p> <p><i>Specific indicator data not available/Not measured.</i></p> <p><i>Credit to MSMEs from the GOJ and some private lenders peaked at \$59 billion in 2018 and decreased to \$39 billion in 2019 and 2020. In 2020, Jamaica improved its ranking in the Global Innovation Index (GII), placing 72 of 131 countries relative to 81 of 129 countries in 2019¹³².</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support To Jamaica Intellectual Property Office for Strengthening the Intellectual Property Ecosystem to Increase Innovation, Competitiveness and Growth of MSMEs (CDB portion complete) • Business Of Music in The Caribbean Developmental Workshops (complete) • Uniforms Ltd (the Uniform Centre) (complete) • Sixth Industrial Line of Credit (LOC) (partially complete) • Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica’s ICT Business Process Outsourcing Industry (complete) • Increasing The Export Capacity of Micro and Small Agro Processors Using the Cluster Approach (partially complete) • Support to Jamaica manufacturers and exporters association expo Jamaica 2021 - digital tradeshow (complete) • Enhancing the export capacity of micro and small agro processors using the cluster approach (complete) 	
6: Resilient Economic Infrastructure	6.1: Improved access to, and quality of, climate resilient social and economic infrastructure, based	<p>CSP 2017-21. Ministries and contractors involved in energy and infrastructure works are gender sensitised by 2021.</p> <p><i>No data available/not measured.</i></p> <p><i>Noted that other IDPs provided multiple inputs</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Street Light Retrofitting Project (complete) • Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study (in progress) 	Partially achieved¹³³: Given the data available on water and sanitation, and the volume of inputs from other IDPs, it appears likely this

¹³² [VNR_Goal_9.pdf \(pioj.gov.jm\)](https://pioj.gov.jm/VNR_Goal_9.pdf)

¹³³ Compared to rating of “Not achieved” in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report¹³⁴ PIOJ (2020), Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) 2019; PIOJ (2018), Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) 2017;

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
	on the expressed needs of women and men in the target			has been at least partially achieved
	6.2: Increased access to water and sanitation services	No KPI: <i>Exclusive Use of Water Closet increased from 72.9% in 2017 to 77.7% in 2019; Access to improved drinking water (rural areas) decreased from 64.5% in 2017 to 55.3% in 2019¹³⁴</i>	<i>Preparation Of Detailed Designs for A Rural Water Supply Project (complete)</i> <i>Rural Water Supply Programme (in progress)</i>	CDB contribution: Limited: While the Street Lights project has saved 27,929 MW of energy to date, other interventions are ongoing and have not provided any contribution to date.
7: Agricultural Sector Transformed	7.1: Increased agricultural production and productivity, which is climate proof	CSP 2017-21. Increase in the agriculture sector's Real GDP by 2021. <i>Baseline 2017.</i> In 2016, Jamaica's agriculture sector contributed 6.6% to overall GDP. By 2020, the sector's contribution grew by 1.3 percentage points to 7.9% (STATIN).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity Building Support for Aquaponics Farmers and Trainers (complete) Workshops On Capacity Building in Jamaican MSMEs in Agro-Processing Sector to Satisfy Food Safety Requirements (complete) Essex Valley Agriculture Development Project (ongoing) Southern Plains Agricultural Development Project (ongoing) Feasibility And Design Study - St. Catherine And Clarendon Agricultural Development Project (complete) Financing for South St. Elizabeth Irrigation Project (not implemented) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly achieved¹³⁵: Given the indicators available, it appears this outcome has been mostly achieved CDB contribution: Limited: Given that majority of the more significant projects are still in early stages, CDB contribution cannot be expected to be more than limited at this stage
8: Reduced Vulnerability to Natural Disasters	8.1: Improved Capacity for Strategy Policy Management to reduce CC vulnerability	CSP 2017-21. Increase in number of ministries and agencies with improved compliance monitoring, enforcement, and reporting systems by 2021. <i>Baseline 2017.</i> Data not available/not measured. Integration of the Sendai Framework into disaster risk reduction plans, passage of the Building Act, 2018 to improve resilience of infrastructure, along with hazard risk reduction made available through increased insurance coverage and convening of	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canada – CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund (ongoing - mostly complete) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partially achieved: Given improvements in indicators available related to development/integration of CC into key GOJ strategies, movement on concessional climate

¹³⁴ PIOJ (2020), Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) 2019; PIOJ (2018), Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) 2017;

¹³⁵ Compared to rating of “Partially achieved” in 2017-21 CSP Completion Report¹³⁶ Government of Jamaica (2022), Voluntary National Review Report on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
		<i>DRM committees at community level indicate there was progress in this area however¹³⁶</i>		<p>funding and improvement in housing quality indicators, it is likely their partial achievement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB contribution: Some: Several planned interventions did proceed with strong results in some such as the bush-fire warning index. Others however are still in progress, so rated as some contribution at this time
	8.2: Enhanced institutional capacity to better manage environmental, CC and disaster risks	<p>CSP 2017-21. All sectoral policies, strategies and plans mainstreamed with environmental, CC and disaster risk reduction by 2021.</p> <p><i>Data not available/not measured. See above for other relevant qualitative data which indicates there was progress in this area</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening Capacity to Manage Environment and Social Risks (complete) • Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management (ongoing – mostly complete) • Upgraded Flood Early Warning System for Rio Cobre Watershed (complete) • Establishing An Environmental and Social Risk Management System (complete) 	
	8.3: Coordinate system for response to post-hazard events	<p>CSP 2017-21. Increased use of concessional funding for qualifying interventions by 2021.</p> <p><i>Progress made towards assisting Jamaica access concessional climate funding from GCF and support provided under the ACP-EU-CDB NDRM projects to reduce vulnerability¹³⁷</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building Capacity in Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (complete) 	
		<p>CSP 2017-21. 100% of investment projects using appropriate tools to effectively address environment, CC, EE, and disaster risk reduction considerations during project design and implementation.</p> <p><i>Environment, Climate Change, EE, and DRM considerations are generally part of project design and, if appropriate, implementation. However, monitoring systems still need to be fine-tuned.</i></p>		
	8.4: Reduced risk and improved resilience focusing primarily on poor and vulnerable communities as result of strengthened	<p>CSP 2014-16. Cost of damage caused by disasters as a percentage of GDP.</p> <p><i>Specific data not available/not measured, \$128 billion in losses and damages from hydrometeorological events between 2000 and 2017. 2018-21 damages from weather systems totalled \$7.2 billion. Indicator not suitable due to dependency on size/type/number of events¹³⁸.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation (complete) 	

¹³⁶ Government of Jamaica (2022), Voluntary National Review Report on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

¹³⁷ Government of Jamaica (2022), Voluntary National Review Report on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

¹³⁸ Ibid

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
	national capacity for mitigation, management, and response to hazards		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities, Clarendon (complete) • Climate Change Adaptation and Risk Reduction Technology and Strategies to Improve Community Resilience (CARTS) Project (unclear) • Llandewey/Ramble Environment and Disaster Mitigation Initiative (unclear) 	
	8.5: Support the process of achieving security of tenure for the poor and reduce the number of informal human settlements	<p>CSP 2014-16. Contribute to percentage of population with secure housing tenure. <i>Specific data not available/not measured. Housing Quality Index increased from 72.2% in 2015 to score was 75.7% in 2019¹³⁹</i></p> <p>CSP 2014-16. Percentage of households in targeted vulnerable communities with access to potable water within 15 minutes of walking (BNTF). <i>Specific data not available/not measured. Proportion of people with access to basic drinking water increased from 90% in 2013 to 91% in 2020; and that the proportion of people using unimproved drinking water decreased from 2.2% in 2014 to 1.86% in 2020¹⁴⁰.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No CDB interventions 	

¹³⁹ Government of Jamaica (2022), Voluntary National Review Report on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

¹⁴⁰ Data Warehouse - UNICEF DATA

CSP Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status 30 June 2022
9: Improved Energy Security and Efficiency	9.1: Diversify energy mix towards RE	<p>CSP 2017-21. 100% of investment projects using appropriate tools to effectively address environment, CC, EE, and DRM considerations during project design and implementation.</p> <p><i>Specific data not available/measured. Percentage share of renewables increased from 6.3% in 2014 to 13.0% in 2021¹⁴¹</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Street Light Retrofitting Project (complete)- note this project is also listed under 6.1, but it is relevant to both Capacity Building for Productivity Improvement in The Electricity Sector (complete) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly achieved: Given available indicators on %age of share of renewables, this appears to have been at least mostly achieved CDB contribution: Some. In addition to successful street light and electricity sector capacity building interventions, multiple other CDB projects integrated EE aspects.



¹⁴¹ Government of Jamaica (2022), Voluntary National Review Report on the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

Annex H – Detailed Disbursement Summary

Sector	Strategy	Client	Loan	Grant	TA	Amount	Disbursements	% total sector disbursement	%age disbursed	Board Approval Date	Agreement Date	
Economic Cooperation	2014-16	Fiscal Consolidation Growth and Social Stability - PBL	GOJ	x		10,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	99%	100%	11-Dec-14	15-Dec-14	
					25,000,000.00	25,000,000.00						
	2014-16	Institutional Strengthening - Ministry of Finance, Jamaica	GOJ		x	x	400,000.00	383,333.33	1%	96%	13-Oct-16	24-Feb-17
	2017-21	Strengthening Capacities for Implementation and Resource Mobilisation	GOJ		x	x	300,000.00	33,333.00	0.1%	11%	11-Jan-19	08-Jul-19
Private Sector Development	2014-16	Sixth Industrial LOC	Development Bank of Jamaica	x			15,000,000.00	8,107,000.00	97.3%	54%	11-Dec-14	06-Feb-15
	2014-16	Enhanced Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Jamaica's ICT Business Process Outsourcing Industry	GOJ		x	x	200,000.00	179,116.13	2.1%	90%	11-Dec-14	23-Mar-15
	2017-21	Increasing The Export Capacity of Micro and Small Agro-Processors Using the Cluster Approach	Jamaica Business				234,399.52	46,969.54	0.6%	20%	13-Apr-21	22-May-21
Economic Infrastructure	2017-21	Street Light Retrofitting Project	Jamaica Public Service Company	x			5,000,000.00	5,000,000.00	20%	100%	20-Jul-17	14-Dec-17
							10,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	39%			
							10,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	39%			
	2014-16	Hermitage Dam Rehabilitation Study	GOJ		x	x	375,000.00	185,392.28	1%	49%	18-May-15	02-Nov-15
						223,133.00	116,807.72	0%	52%			
2017-21	Preparation Of Detailed Designs for A Rural Water Supply Project	Use Of Funds - CDB		x	x	750,000.00	94,964.00	0%	13%	27-Apr-20	27-Apr-20	
2017-21	Rural Water Supply Programme	GOJ		x		30,000,000.00		0%	0%	10-Dec-20	01-Jan-99	
Environment Sustainability	2017-21	Canada – CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund	GOJ		x		3,589,696.00	3,478,000.00	69.4%	97%	25-Jun-20	25-Jan-21
	2017-21	Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change While Reducing Disaster Risk in Peckham and Surrounding Communities,	EHF Limited		x		621,500.00	290,551.71	5.8%	47%	20-Sep-17	31-Oct-17
	2017-21	Climate Change Adaptation and Risk Reduction Technology and Strategies to Improve Community Resilience (CARTS) Project	GOJ		x		650,000.00	269,802.04	5.4%	42%	20-Sep-17	05-Jun-18
	2017-21	Strengthening The Disaster Risk Management Capacity of The Portmore Municipal Corporation	ACP EU				380,992.19	236,227.34	4.7%	62%	20-Jul-17	20-Jul-17
	2017-21	Establishment Of a Comprehensive Bush Fire Warning Index for Effective Bush Fire Management	ACP EU				351,775.38	233,514.73	4.7%	66%	16-Mar-17	20-Jul-17
	2017-21	Llandewey/Ramble Environment and Disaster Mitigation Initiative	Llandewey Benevolent		x	x	650,000.00	214,000.00	4.3%	33%	20-Sep-17	31-Oct-17
	2017-21	Upgraded Flood Early Warning System for Rio Cobre Watershed	ACP EU				251,206.94	172,758.48	3.4%	69%	20-Jul-17	20-Jul-17
	2017-21	Establishing An Environmental and Social Risk Management System	Development Bank of Jamaica		x	x	55,373.00	48,974.50	1.0%	88%	17-May-17	12-Jul-17
	2014-16	Strengthening The Capacity to Manage Environment and Social Risks	PIOJ		x	x	40,369.00	27,780.36	0.6%	69%	27-Apr-16	29-Dec-16
	2014-16	Building Capacity in Post-Disaster Needs Assessment	PIOJ		x	x	50,624.00	38,887.43	0.8%	77%	26-May-16	31-Mar-17